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The pace of increasing life expectancy in recent decades came as a surprise to 
demographers, as mortality rates unexpectedly improved at the oldest ages in 
developed countries.  The most common policy response, although one not yet 
planned for New Zealand, is to increase eligibility age for the public pension.  
Given the complexity and uncertainty of processes driving mortality 
improvement, future lifespans cannot be known.  However, it is questionable 
whether policy makers and individuals understand the extent of past and 
likely future lifespan increase.  Available evidence suggests individuals tend to 
underestimate how long they may live.  Population mortality forecasts are 
generally conservative and poorly explain longevity uncertainties.  Longevity 
risk - the possibility that future lifespans will be longer than anticipated - 
threatens individuals' pre-retirement financial planning and public pension 
policy. 
 
This thesis examines the extent of longevity risk, its causes, significance 
and remedies, in these two domains, for New Zealand.  The theoretical 
existence of longevity risk has been acknowledged, but has not been subject to 
critical analysis in New Zealand or elsewhere.  Here, a unique generalisable 
methodology exploiting insights available from international mortality 
comparisons is designed, combining actuarial and demographic theory.  After 
assessing the flaws in the time-dependent or period approach to measurement 
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of life expectancy that are known in theory but underexplored in practice, the 
method emphasises the lifecourse or cohort approach.  The three factors that 
determine longevity risk - plausible population lifespan prospects, the lifespan 
assumptions used by policy makers and individuals' subjective lifespan 
expectations - are identified and the relationships between them analysed for 
New Zealand.  An interpretation of the consistency of New Zealand's past 
mortality trends and future projections with those of other British settler 
countries, supplemented by a review of the consequences of mortality variance 
within New Zealand, shows that plausible lifespans in New Zealand are likely 
to be higher than those in the official projections on which policy makers rely.  
The first survey to ask how long New Zealanders think they will live shows 
that collectively, New Zealanders are more likely to underestimate future 
lifespan than not, based on a variety of beliefs about mortality that are not 
consistent with the evidence on increasing lifespans.   
 
Longevity risk from underestimation of future lifespans is revealed in 
New Zealand policy making and in individual New Zealanders' retirement 
plans.  The most likely cause is the repeated misuse of life expectancy 
indicators in an environment lacking public discourse about increasing 
longevity.  A remedy would be switching from using flawed period life 
expectancy indicators to using cohort life expectancy or modal age at death.  
Using plausible estimates for future lifespans based on more optimistic 
estimates than the official projections most often referenced would be 
important but mitigate longevity risk to a lesser extent.  A more extensive 
public debate than has been held so far about eligibility age for New Zealand's 
public pension would itself, if using appropriate indicators for future 
lifespans, provide an opportunity to address longevity risk.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis is about longevity risk: the risk that future lifespans are 
underestimated in superannuation (or pension) policy and individual 
retirement planning.  It begins from a hypothesis that lifespans are routinely 
underestimated as mortality is improving, and investigates the extent to which 
that is the case, why it occurs, how significant is the consequent longevity risk 
and potential remedies.  This is an internationally relevant subject, and 
international theory and evidence are used, with detailed findings developed 
in the case of New Zealand.  This first chapter sets the context for the 
remainder of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
The ‘ageing population’ has been studied and commented on widely (United 
Nations 2007).  Population ageing happens when the rate at which children are 
born decreases and lifespans increase as mortality rates decrease.  This 
demographic change is occurring in all developed countries, including New 
Zealand (Dunstan and Thomson 2006).  Population ageing has critical long-
term implications in policy areas including superannuation, retirement 
planning and personal saving, health, housing and transport.  Public policy 
making on these issues requires long-term future predictions on both the 
demand side – the numbers of older people claiming superannuation, for 
example – and the supply side: how many people will be contributing tax to 
pay for it.   
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Generally for developed countries, including New Zealand, people are 
increasingly likely to survive to age 65, the common age of eligibility for public 
pensions, and the average length of time an individual receives the pension is 
increasing.  In the absence of policy change, improving mortality rates mean 
the cost of public pension rises.  Policy making for issues of an ageing 
population therefore needs evidence on population mortality.  Because 
mortality is improving rapidly, it is possible that assumptions about future 
mortality are conservative so that the assumed future average lifespans in the 
evidence base used by policy makers underestimate what is likely.  In 
superannuation policy, this could result in higher fiscal cost than anticipated, a 
rushed decision to increase eligibility age when giving more notice would be 
preferred, or other necessary adjustments made more adverse than desired.  
Similarly, if individuals fail to realise that mortality is improving, they will not 
have considered the financial or other implications in their retirement 
planning, and will suffer longevity risk that will become apparent when their 
retirement appears too long for the amount of savings made.  This thesis aims 
to fill knowledge gaps about longevity risk in New Zealand, noting features 
relevant more widely. 
 
1.2 Research problem and hypothesis 
The question posed in this thesis is: What is the extent of longevity risk in New 
Zealand superannuation policy and by New Zealanders; why does it exist; 
how significant is it; and, what are potential remedies?    
 
The starting point that longevity risk is likely to exist is formed by the 
hypothesis that lifespans are routinely underestimated in this current era of 
improving mortality.  Themes from a variety of source literature accumulate to 
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suggest an inherent tendency to underestimate future longevity in both policy 
and individual settings.  Further, it is common knowledge within demography 
and actuarial science that the period life expectancy indicator most often used 
to describe average lifespans is in fact flawed for that purpose, increasingly so 
at this stage of demographic change in developed countries, with the more 
technically correct cohort life expectancy indicator less likely to underestimate 
lifespan.  Yet there has been little analysis of the practical consequences of this 
problem and none in relation to longevity risk.  However, if misunderstanding 
of likely lifespans exists at least in part due to a faulty indicator of population 
average lifespan then public information about lifespan may play a role in 
causing longevity risk; and may therefore also be in part a remedy.  This 
hypothesis further suggests that the two settings of policy and individual 
planning need to be considered together; as the first setting provides public 
information which may be used in the second. 
 
1.3 Justification for the research 
How long people live is of clear economic importance in superannuation 
policy.  For individuals, their own (or others') potential lifespan may be an 
emotional subject, as well as being of financial consequence.  An individual's 
estimate of their own lifespan has been suggested as a measure of the value of 
life itself (Ross and Mirowsky 2002).   
 
Future lifespan is inherently uncertain, whether for an individual or a 
population average.  There is only limited international evidence that 
comprises few full surveys of the expectations of lifespan among adult 
populations.  Longevity risk in policy is increasingly of concern as mortality 
continues to improve and many developed countries face the fiscal pressures 
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of ageing populations.  That concern carries over to individual retirement 
planning as a response to those fiscal pressures is often for countries to adopt 
polices expecting more private saving for retirement. 
 
Yet despite the importance of understanding the extent of longevity risk 
and its significance in policy and retirement planning settings, no studies have 
been identified which consider the extent of longevity risk in policy and by 
individuals throughout life.  Identifying longevity risk requires the 
comparison of the lifespans used in the setting in question with likely future 
lifespans.  In New Zealand, there has been no systematic review of any of 
these elements: the objective rationale for lifespans assumed in policy making; 
the empirical evidence for subjective lifespans used in individual retirement 
plans; or comprehensively justified plausible future population lifespans.  This 
thesis seeks to fill the research gap in all three elements, and bring out 
conclusions for the extent and nature of longevity risk in New Zealand. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis in this thesis develops existing theory with new 
emphasis.  Because this study is interested in how individuals' expectations of 
longevity collectively compare with population benchmarks used in policy 
making, it emphasises individual lifespan measures.  This approach has 
received little attention, as most analytic work on mortality is concerned with 
the population average.  Average measures are often not sufficient for policy 
decisions, so this study also integrates emerging demographic theories on 
variance in lifespan to consider the distribution of individual lifespans and 
subjective lifespans.   
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Finally, the addition of actuarial literature and techniques to the 
demographic approach usually used in New Zealand supplements the 
evidence base and allows new interpretations.  The theoretical framework for 
this research is a specific subject - longevity, or its counter-cause, mortality - 
which is situated in both demographic and actuarial literature.  Demography, 
a distinct discipline within social science, uses data "as shrewdly as possible" 
to explain observed trends in vital human processes (Caldwell 1996 p. 333).  
Demography has a "small phenomenological turf" (Preston 1993 p. 603), being 
usually populations of national or regional size.  Actuarial science has an even 
smaller turf of life insurance and annuity populations of commercial interest, 
but has developed specifically from the consideration of future mortality and 
longevity risk (Haberman 1995).  Actuarial science uses many of the same 
techniques as demography and actuarial concepts are applicable to national 
populations.  However, the integration of demographic and actuarial literature 
is limited in New Zealand compared to practice in some other countries.  This 
research uses the knowledge and theory of mortality from both international 
disciplines, drawing a greater input from actuarial science than has been the 
case in New Zealand population studies.   
 
1.4 Methodology and outline of this report 
Answering the research question posed in this thesis requires a number of 
different investigations in two main settings - policy and individual retirement 
planning - which have different literatures.  It sources demographic data from 
five countries.  It accumulates the results of different empirical analyses which 
have been developed from established and emerging demographic and 
actuarial techniques.  Because the research question has not been asked before, 
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the methodology, or rather, collection of methods, has had to be uniquely 
determined. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of existing literature on: longevity risk in 
policy and retirement planning; mortality trends and explanations of those 
trends; mortality forecasting methods; and uncertainty in mortality 
forecasting.  It accumulates the evidence for a hypothesis that assumed future 
lifespans are likely to underestimate likely lifespans.   
 
In order to develop a view on likely future lifespans in New Zealand, a 
number of approaches could have been taken.  Before this thesis the results of 
only limited testing of the plausibility of the mortality assumptions underlying 
Statistics New Zealand's population projections was available. Chapter 3 
develops theories of mortality to describe the methodology chosen to assess a 
plausible future for New Zealand's likely future longevity, and the rationale 
for the choice.  The method developed in this thesis takes a macro view of 
population mortality trends rather than a micro view of single risks to 
mortality, and supplements existing extrapolative demographic projections 
with analytic techniques drawn from actuarial science. A new framework on 
which to make a qualitative assessment of the plausibility of the mortality 
assumptions in official projections is developed using: a quantitative 
international comparison of past mortality trends; a quantitative international 
comparison of projections of future mortality; and, a mostly qualitative 
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The next three chapters describe the results of each of these analyses.  In 
Chapter 4, the past mortality trends of New Zealand are compared with those 
of the selected comparator countries using a comprehensive range of mortality 
measures.  This enables the comparison of future longevity projections of the 
same countries to be tested for consistency, and conclusions drawn about the 
relative optimism or pessimism of the assumptions made.  This analysis is set 
out in Chapter 5.  In Chapter 6, the variation in mortality between subgroups 
within the New Zealand population is examined.  That chapter also describes 
how emerging demographic theory on variance of mortality is developed to 
supplement the preceding analysis based on population average mortality.  
 
The lifespan assumptions used by individual New Zealanders in their 
own retirement planning required an original empirical study.  A survey was 
carried out by adding questions to a planned survey of New Zealanders' 
financial knowledge undertaken by the Commission for Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Income (then called the Retirement Commission) which provided 
the context of retirement planning.  The questions added to identify individual 
expected ages at death (or "subjective lifespan") were developed having 
learned from similar studies in other countries.  This survey additionally 
extended the scope of questions in order to identify the reasons why 
respondents chose a particular subjective lifespan.  This revealed insights to 
address longevity risk causes and remedies. The development of the survey 
approach is set out in Chapter 7. 
 
The results of the survey on subjective lifespan are shown in Chapter 8.  
The analysis of the responses was developed in order to describe the extent of 
under- or overestimation of lifespans, compared to a range of possible 
outcomes represented by different projections from Statistics New Zealand.  
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This technique was more detailed than that used in some previous studies and 
developed a more technically correct assessment of the distribution of lifespan 
underestimation.   
 
The results of the preceding analysis were used to quantify the extent of 
longevity risk in New Zealanders' retirement planning and New Zealand 
superannuation policy.  Chapter 9 integrates the findings in earlier chapters, 
focusing first on individual retirement planning, including some further 
results on retirement planning behaviour from the survey, secondly on policy 
and thirdly drawing out the links between the two settings. Once the inputs 
had been developed the calculation was straightforward.  For the individual 
setting, it used an existing planning tool, available to all New Zealanders, 
which follows the theory of the lifecycle savings hypothesis.  For the policy 
setting, existing Treasury fiscal projections were able to be used.  Chapter 10 
concludes and discusses wider policy and research implications.   
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1.5 Definitions 
The mortality rate, a basic unit of demographic or actuarial analysis, is defined 
as the probability of dying at a specific age at a specific time.  In demography, 
the term death rate is generally used instead.  A mortality rate can be an 
assumption for, or can represent the actual experience of, a specified 
population at a specified time.  In actuarial notation, the initial mortality rate 
at age x is represented by qx, which is the number of deaths at age x divided by 
the number of people who had their xth birthday in a certain period.  Another 
type of mortality rate, mx, or crude death rate, represents the number of deaths 
aged x in any year divided by the population of that age at the middle of the 
year.   
 
The relationship between the two rates: 
   
  
         
 
holds at all but ages less than one year (Hinde 2007).  For the purposes of 
this thesis, the difference between qx and mx is not significant, and the term 
'mortality rate' will be taken to imply the concept of the probability of dying at 
age x, population and time to be specified.  Detail on whether q-type or m-type 
mortality rates are used is given where necessary in the text.  
 
Life expectancy is calculated from mortality rates for a defined population.  It 
is a summary metric representing the average number of years left to live for 
members of a defined population at a specific age.  Life expectancy at age x is 
represented in actuarial notation as ex.  A fuller explanation of this measure 
and its use is in Chapter 3.  Table 9.5 provides a number of life expectancy or 
alternative measures that may be used by, or are available to New Zealanders.  
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Lifespan is a measurable unit; the age at death for an individual.  Lifespan as 
applied to a population or species requires a modifier, for example average 
length of life for a cohort born in a specified year (Carey 2003).  The maximum 
observed lifespan for humans is 122 years (Robine and Allard 1999).   
 
Longevity is a general term used here to indicate long life.   
 
Longevity risk is defined as per Stallard (2006) as the possibility that future 
lifespans turn out longer than anticipated, that is, assumptions of future 
lifespans are underestimates.  More detail is in section 2.1. 
 
Low Mortality, Medium Mortality (the "central estimate" or "medium 
estimate") and High Mortality refer to the different assumptions for future 
mortality underlying variant total population projections produced by 
Statistics New Zealand.  Primarily, the 2009 (base)-2061 projections are used as 
these are the latest National Population Projections as at the date of this thesis.  
The mortality assumptions and results are referred to as "official mortality 
projections", although Statistics New Zealand does not use this term.  Chapter 
5 sets out in detail the mortality assumptions and the resulting life expectancy 
and other measures for selected countries.  Very High Life Expectancy refers 
to an additional variant projection of Statistics New Zealand which assumes 
period life expectancy at birth reaches 95.0 years for the New Zealand 
population in 2061. 
 
Mortality risk is used here to refer to an external factor or characteristic of an 
individual or population which increases a mortality rate. 
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Superannuation is used interchangeably with public pension, or state 
pension, that is, the income benefit provided by a Government for its citizens, 
residents or others eligible once they reach a defined age.  In New Zealand, the 
public pension is called New Zealand Superannuation (NZS). 
 
Pension age or age of eligibility is the age at which full benefits of the public 
pension first become available.  The age of eligibility for New Zealand 
Superannuation is age 65. 
 
Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution (DC) refer to two types of 
private pension scheme.  In DB schemes the regular pension benefit to be 
received is defined by reference to a fixed parameter, such as a percentage of 
final salary.  In DC schemes the pension benefit is determined at the point of 
first receipt.  The benefit will depend on the investment returns achieved on 
the contributions made and on the terms of any annuity or other product used 
to turn the accumulated contributions into income. 
 
KiwiSaver is the main retirement savings product in New Zealand.  It is a 
voluntary, work-based, regulated savings initiative, sponsored by the 
government with schemes provided by private managers.  It is a DC product.  
New Zealanders are automatically enrolled into KiwiSaver when they start a 
new job, but may opt out, and may join at any time. 
 
The Retirement Commission changed its name to the Commission for 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Income in October 2011.  The Commission 
is an autonomous Crown Entity responsible for financial education in New 
Zealand and hosts the Sorted financial information website 
(www.sorted.org.nz).  The Retirement Commissioner (this title did not change) 
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publishes a review of retirement income policy every 3 years.  This thesis 
generally uses the abbreviated name of the Commission, CFLRI, but references 
the Retirement Commissioner's reports under that title. 
 
UK refers to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
"British" is used as the adjective for data from this entity. Where data is 
sourced from Great Britain only, it will be referred to as "GB".  For historical 
consistency, some data used will be sourced from England and Wales (E&W) 
the population of which is 88 per cent of that in the UK (ONS data). 
 
Other abbreviations used in this thesis include: 
NZ: New Zealand.  US: United States of America. 
M or m: Male.  F or f: Female. 
QXI: Annual rate of improvement in the mortality rate (see section 3.4). 
ONS: Office for National Statistics, UK; SNZ: Statistics New Zealand. 
 
In Chapter 7, variables of individuals' view of their own life expectations are 
defined: 
SLE: Subjective life expectancy. 
SLS: Subjective lifespan.   
SPS: Selective probability of survival 
 
  
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 1 
13 
 
1.6 Delimitations of scope 
This study considers two domains: public pension policy and individual 
retirement planning.  Retirement planning is used here to mean financial 
planning and saving for retirement.  It excludes other personal considerations 
that may be related to retirement such as housing, transport or care.  The 
policy considerations of these issues are also excluded. 
 
This study is not concerned with longevity risk for a private provider of 
insurance, pension or annuity products.  The mortality data considered is that 
of national populations, not the populations within portfolios of such 
providers.  Similarly, when longevity risk of an individual is considered, it is 
assumed that the individual is representative of any member drawn at random 
from a national population, not a policyholder or scheme member of an 
insurance or pension provider.  Individual underwriting by an insurance or 
pension provider is not considered here.  Issues relating to specific risk to the 
individual or the provider (such as moral hazard) are not considered.  
Annuitisation or other options for drawing down accumulated retirement 
savings are excluded.  This analysis investigates individuals' exposure to 
longevity risk pre-retirement, being concerned with the risk of not saving 
enough for later longevity (see section 2.1). 
 
In this thesis, the expectations that adults have for their lifespan are 
measured against population indicators.  This allows the consideration of the 
collective tendency for expectations to vary from the parameters used in policy 
making.  The accuracy of individual predictions for age at death is not 
considered: that would only be known for an individual after death.  
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This thesis is about mortality and lifespan - how long life is.  The quality of 
life, which may be measured by healthy life expectancy or other indicators, is 
important for both policy and individuals, but is out of scope for this thesis.  
Further, the measures used for lifespan here are generally measures of central 
tendency in national populations.  Consideration of the variance in lifespan is 
made in Chapter 6.  The commentary on variance of lifespan is restricted to 
what is needed to explain how variance is theoretically relevant to the analytic 
framework developed, with some empirical data from New Zealand.  This 
should not be interpreted as a full analysis necessary to understand variance 
or inequalities in lifespan between or within countries. 
 
1.7 Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis explores the existence, causation and remedies for longevity risk.  
Previous literature defines longevity risk, but any further investigation has 
been mainly confined to commercial applications.  This thesis considers 
longevity risk in two under-explored domains:  individual retirement planning 
and public pension policy.  In doing so, it contributes to theory and to 
empirical data in four main ways.  
 
First, this research takes a new theoretical perspective on measures of 
lifespan.  Unusually, this research takes the perspective of individual lifespans 
rather than using the more common analysis framework of a whole 
population.  The starting point is the comparison of likely lifespans with the 
lifespan expectations of individual New Zealanders, so longevity risk in the 
individual domain is explored.  This leads to a consideration of the potential 
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influence that indicators used in policy have on individuals, enabling an 
exploration of longevity risk in the policy making domain.  
 
Second, this thesis extends existing theory and practice to undertake 
original research on past mortality and lifespan prospects in New Zealand.  
This research adds new theoretically-based insights to the relatively limited 
mortality analysis so far undertaken of trends within New Zealand.  This 
approach emphasises learning from trends in like countries, which enables 
conclusions to be made about the plausibility of different variants of the 
existing New Zealand population longevity projections.  The design of the 
analytical framework used here references techniques from both demography 
and actuarial science, where usually analysis exists within a single discipline.  
The framework could be used for other national populations.  The framework 
is unusual for focusing on few peer countries for international comparison but 
using a wide range of different mortality indicators: the population average 
level and rate of change of mortality rates and life expectancy; recent past, 
current and future projected mortality indicators; and, a consideration of 
variance in mortality within the country in question.  This thesis therefore 
contributes an empirical database and interpretation of a range of mortality 
indicators for Australia, Canada, UK, US and with greater detail for New 
Zealand.  
 
Third, this thesis builds on existing research on subjective lifespan 
expectations in a new setting.  It contributes the first set of empirical data on 
the lifespan expectations of individual adult New Zealanders.  The survey 
instrument and sample also contribute the first results from a national adult 
population about reasons for choice of subjective lifespan and retirement age 
intentions, and the associations of these with lifespan expectations and a full 
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range of demographic variables.  The methodology improves technically on 
previous studies to allow the calculation of the distribution across the adult 
New Zealand population of the gap between individual expectations and 
lifespan outcomes defined by official estimates.  Individuals' reasons for their 
lifespan expectations are probed for the first time.   
 
Finally, this research accumulates theory and empirical findings to build a 
unique collection of analyses targeted at a specific research question not 
previously considered.  This analysis specifically questions why longevity risk 
exists in the pre-retirement phase of New Zealand's superannuation policy 
and individual retirement planning and enables some quantification of 
longevity risk under current policy settings and longevity prospects.  The 
research method illustrated here to diagnose longevity risk in New Zealand 
would be applicable elsewhere.  The remedies suggested, based on the 
evidence on longevity trends, are a contribution to the public framework for 
individuals' retirement planning and to the policy debate on the age of 
eligibility for superannuation.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
How long each of us will live is unknown.  The inherent uncertainty engages 
individuals emotionally and has consequences which have captured the 
attention of policy makers globally.  Statistics on mortality have been analysed 
in great detail and many theories developed to explain the drivers of 
lengthening lifespans.  The literature on which any exploration of longevity 
and its consequences is based is therefore large and encompasses a range of 
disciplines.  
 
This chapter reviews theory and literature on mortality and longevity 
which form the starting point for exploration of longevity risk: the hypothesis 
that assumptions of future lifespans are likely to underestimate. The first 
section explores what is known about longevity risk in both policy making and 
individual retirement planning.  The next section discusses the history of 
mortality trends and the explanations for them.  The third section describes 
mortality forecasting techniques to set the context for the fourth section which 
discusses how well mortality forecasting deals with the inherent uncertainty 
about future trends.  Each of these sections takes a global view before 
discussing the New Zealand situation.   
 
2.1 Longevity risk in policy and retirement planning 
Given uncertainty about how long each individual will live, future longevity 
can be over- or underestimated in national projections or forecasts and in 
public messages about longevity, as well by individuals.  This thesis takes the 
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position, established by the definition of longevity risk, that underestimating 
longevity is more serious than overestimating.   
 
"Longevity risk can be defined at individual and aggregate 
levels.  At the individual level, longevity risk refers to the possibility 
of living longer than assumed in financial planning for the 
retirement of a single individual.  At the aggregate level, longevity 
risk refers to the possibility of a higher average number of years of 
survival than assumed in designing a retirement security system for 
the aggregate." 
Stallard (2006 p. 575) 
 
In the context of personal retirement planning, the risk in overestimating 
longevity is saving too much for a retirement that turns out to be shorter than 
expected, potentially missing out on lifetime consumption as a result.  The risk 
of underestimating longevity is failing to provide financially for all of the years 
of retirement an individual turns out to have.  Longevity risk as defined 
asserts that the latter is a more significant risk.  At the aggregate population 
level, in the case of national public pension policy, the risk of overestimating 
future longevity is virtually cost-free, as most public pension benefits are not 
funded in advance.  As it became apparent that longevity was worse than 
expected, less public money would be needed to be spent on pensions than 
expected.  However, if in setting the parameters of the public pension, policy 
makers underestimate potential future lifespans, the consequent risk is that 
pension payments assumed to be promised have to be unexpectedly cut back 
or restricted; or other government spending compromised.  Thus, the concern 
here at both the individual and national population levels is longevity risk as 
defined by underestimating longevity.   
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The impact and risks of increasing longevity in public pensions has been a 
policy area of intense interest in the last decade or more.  The World Bank first 
drew attention to the need to consider pension reform because of the ageing 
population and greater longevity in its seminal 1994 report Averting the Old 
Age Crisis.  Since then, the topic has continued to be followed by major 
international organisations (Barr 2000; Holzmann and Stiglitz 2001; OECD 
2011b; United Nations 2007; World Bank 1994).   
 
Pension reform has multiple strands but a feature shared by many 
countries is an increase in the age at which the public pension first becomes 
payable.  The OECD reported in 2007 that nearly all its 30 member countries 
made some reforms to pension systems since the early 1990s, 16 of them 
designated "major".  The reform issues outside the scope of this study include 
how the level of average pension income compares with pre-retirement 
income, disparities in pension income levels, the balance between public and 
private provision and the nature of financial risks in private pensions.  
However, the OECD reported that an increase in pension age (the generic term 
for what in New Zealand is called age of eligibility for superannuation) was 
the most common feature of reform packages (OECD 2007, 2011b).  
 
In many ways, the focus on increasing the age of eligibility is not 
surprising.  Actuaries and demographers, working from their knowledge of 
lengthening lifespans as mortality improves, often make the intuitive leap to 
raising eligibility age as a policy response (Sanderson and Scherbov 2007; The 
Actuarial Profession 2006).  The cost of providing public pension or 
superannuation in future can be reduced dramatically when eligibility age is 
increased (DWP 2010; Rodway 2010). 
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Acting against this theoretical enthusiasm, there are concerns about the 
fairness of increasing eligibility age when mortality varies across a population 
and political concern about the unpopularity of such a plan (PPI 2003).  
Commentators on superannuation have explored ways to overcome these 
problems, for example, by having a lower eligibility age for workers with 
relatively low lifetime earnings (Zhivan et al. 2008) or by making the increase 
in eligibility age automatic by indexing to longevity data (Shoven and Goda 
2008).  No research was found that assessed and compared the process of 
decision making or the mortality or longevity data used in decisions about 
eligibility age.  The decisions may have been too hasty if mortality 
improvement is set to slow, or conversely longevity risk could exist even in 
countries raising the age quickly if the reform was rationalised using evidence 
which underestimates longevity.    
 
Longevity risk for individuals is most often discussed in the context of 
annuitisation under the framework of the lifecycle savings hypothesis which 
posits that people build up savings pre-retirement then draw down those 
savings after retirement (Brown 2003).  Annuities are a specific method of 
draw down: by using the accumulated savings to purchase an annuity, the 
purchaser is promised a regular income for life, and longevity risk is passed 
from the purchaser to the annuity provider.  The puzzle of why few people 
voluntarily buy annuities when the lifecycle savings hypothesis would predict 
it is the most economically rational action has preoccupied economists for 
some time (for example Brown 2001).  The increasing interest in this area of 
policy research has been stimulated in part by the growth in ownership of 
defined contribution (DC) private pensions and the decline in membership of 
defined benefit (DB) pension schemes.  DB schemes hold the longevity risk 
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within the scheme, but DC pensions are individual accounts where longevity 
risk is held by the individual.  Although New Zealand has had a smaller 
membership of DC pensions than other countries, it has also debated 
annuitisation or other drawdown options (Retirement Commissioner 2007, 
2010).  The relevance to New Zealand of post-retirement longevity risk for 
individuals increased following the introduction of KiwiSaver in 2007, as 
money invested in KiwiSaver is intended to be accessed as a lump sum at the 
age of eligibility for superannuation.   
 
In New Zealand and other countries then, the focus of individual 
longevity risk in literature and policy discussion has been in the post-
retirement period.  Although the effect of longevity risk is felt after retirement, 
when money saved is proven to be less than needed to last for a later than 
expected death unless annuitised, a contributory cause is not saving enough 
during the pre-retirement period, or by giving up work sooner than proved 
ideal.  A whole life perspective to longevity risk is therefore important.  Issues 
around annuitisation or other product options in the post-retirement period do 
not provide a complete explanation of longevity risk. 
 
The issue of building up enough money in retirement savings has also 
received some attention, but the focus here has been whether people are 
saving enough for a particular retirement income goal.  Such analyses have 
been made for example in the UK, USA and New Zealand (Engen et al. 2001; 
Pensions Commission 2004, 2005; Scobie et al. 2006).   All are based on similar 
methodologies, again based on the lifecycle savings hypothesis: they assume a 
target retirement income, project forward what pension individuals 
representative of the population will have from the state, calculate how much 
saving will make up the difference to the target, and then compare that so-
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called 'required' amount of saving with the actual level of saving observed.  
All these analyses find some evidence of undersaving, but all are complex 
calculations, with controversial assumptions (see PPI 2006, pp. 12-14).  
However, the risk being considered is that savings made are not sufficient 
given an assumed lifespan.  The risk that the assumed lifespan is 
underestimated has not been considered in studies of pre-retirement savings 
behaviour. 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the longevity risk individuals face 
because they underestimate their potential longevity before retirement.  If they 
underestimate then, whether or not they plan explicitly, they might: have a 
longer retirement than their lump sum or annuitised savings will cover; be 
reliant on the public pension alone for longer than intended; or, give up paid 
work earlier than they ideally should have done.  Previous work based on the 
lifecycle savings hypothesis focuses on economic outcomes assuming 
expectations about longevity were met.  The issue of concern in this thesis is 
instead the economic risk of expectations about longevity not being met. 
 
In the context of retirement planning and pension policy, individuals' 
longevity expectations, together with their expectations on retirement age, 
present an implicit assumption about how long superannuation and other 
retirement income have to last.  The realism of individuals' expectations of 
their own longevity could be a marker of how thoughtful individuals are 
about planning for their retirement.  The value people place on the personal 
longevity they expect is thought to influence directly individuals' economic 
decisions including retirement choices (Hamermesh 1985).  Collectively, 
individuals' assessment of lifespan may also indicate how receptive the public 
is to policy reforms based on rationale about trends in longevity, such as 
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increasing eligibility age.  If there is a widely-held understanding that 
mortality is generally improving then an increase in eligibility age is likely to 
appear more reasonable than if the public believe average lifespan is stable.   
 
It has been suggested that how long an individual expects to live is a 
measure of the value of life.  It "assesses one's store of the essential property - 
existence itself" (Ross and Mirowsky 2002 p. 470).  However, despite such 
claims for the importance of such expectations, there are few surveys 
representative of national adult populations providing empirical evidence for 
what these expectations are.  The methodology and results of these 
international studies are examined more closely in Chapter 7.  In brief, 
although summary findings as reported in these studies suggest that 
subjective lifespans are close to lifespans predicted in population life tables, 
this hides both over- and underestimation of longevity.   
 
The study that appears to be most relevant to an investigation of a 
national population suggests that the tendency is to underestimate lifespans 
because people ignore expected mortality improvements.  This study of the 
adult population of Great Britain found an average underestimation of 
lifespans of over four years for males and around six years for females 
compared to plausible contemporary estimates of future lifespans (O'Brien et 
al. 2005).  A theme from this and other studies (notably Hurd and McGarry 
1995, 2002; Mirowsky 1999; Popham and Mitchell 2007) is that men reflect that 
they have lower actual longevity than women on average, but men are more 
optimistic, so that women are more likely to underestimate their actual 
longevity.  However, studies have not probed how people think about 
longevity, if they think about it at all, whether or how they take individual risk 
factors into account or rely on a notion of the average, or how and why they 
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choose a particular estimate of their own likely longevity when asked.  
Therefore, international evidence suggests a risk of some significant 
underestimation of future lifespans, but offers little explanation for the 
mechanism by which it occurs.  The role expectations play in longevity risk is 
therefore unexplored, but could be significant both for individual retirement 
planning and in policy.   
 
2.2 Mortality trends and explanations 
Mortality has been improving in nearly all countries, including New Zealand, 
and as a result average population lifespans have become longer.  This section 
reviews the literature on the trends in historic mortality rates and the 
explanations for the factors driving the trends.   
 
Past mortality trends have been and continue to be measured for specific 
purposes such as the impact of public health measures on deaths from a 
specific cause.  Similarly, historic population mortality trends are analysed for 
insight into what has affected observed trends in longevity.  In this thesis, 
which is concerned with estimates of future lifespans, past mortality trends are 
interesting insofar as they contribute to theories about the possible future 
patterns of population longevity.  It is well established in demography that 
understanding past mortality trends is an important part of theorising future 
trends (for example, Hajnal 1955).  
 
The history of mortality rates in the western world is overwhelmingly one 
of improvement.  Mortality rates for adults in middle and older ages fell from 
the 17th century onwards even without specific planning for such a result 
(Peller 1948).  Late 19th and early 20th century interventions to improve 
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medical care, sanitation and living environments resulted in reductions in 
infectious diseases and lower mortality rates particularly for infants and 
children.  The pace of improvement in mortality rates at middle to older ages 
increased towards the end of the 20th century.  Mortality rates were generally 
stable from the 1950s to the 1980s as motor vehicle accidents and smoking-
related deaths balanced out medical advances.  But after the 1980s, public 
health initiatives were effective at changing behaviours especially in the 
wearing of seat belts and reductions in smoking.  Medical science developed 
still further.  By the end of the 20th century, diseases of middle to older life 
(cardiovascular, cerebrovascular and cancer) could be treated and lifespans 
extended longer than previously predicted (Preston 1996).   
 
These changes in the level of age-specific mortality rates over time are 
often shown by means of the 'curve of deaths' - the numbers of life table deaths 
at each age from a starting number of births.  Figure 2.1 shows this for females 
in the United Kingdom over a time period selected from available consistent 
data to illustrate the last eighty years of history outlined above.   
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Figure 2.1: Curve of deaths for females in the UK from three period tables 
(numbers dying at each age from 100,000 births experiencing age-specific 
mortality rates of year shown) 
 
Source: Period life tables in the Human Mortality Database, November 2010 
revision. 
 
The curve of deaths is asymmetric with two modes.  The reduction of the 
first peak at age zero has been significant even from the early 1920s.  The 
second mode is at adult ages of death.  In the last half century especially this 
mode has shifted to the right, a process called mortality shifting.  A narrowing 
of the peak is also visible.  This is due to improved health survival to older 
ages, halted by slower progress in maximum lifespan.  The latter trend is 
called compression of mortality by some authors or the rectangularisation of 
the survival curve as the alternative presentation in Figure 2.2 demonstrates 
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Figure 2.2: Survival curve for females in the UK from three period tables 
(numbers still alive at each age from 100,000 births experiencing age-specific 
mortality rates of year shown) 
 
Source: Period life tables in the Human Mortality Database, November 2010 
revision. 
 
In the last few decades, there has been a significant, and unexpected, fast 
improvement in mortality at older ages so that we are now in the era called 
"delayed ageing" by Kannistö (2001), and described as follows: 
"<mortality in old age *ages 80 and over+ has undergone in the 
developed countries during the post-war period a deep-going 
and fairly general transformation reaching much lower levels 
than have ever been recorded before.  Unprecedented in known 
demographic history, this decline has made in the prevailing 
trend a break which had not been foreseen in population 
projections." 
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As hinted in the above, the pace of improvement in mortality rates after 
the 1980s, especially at older ages, came as a surprise.  Despite now 
understanding better the past improvement in older age mortality rates, there 
is no suggestion that uncertainty in forecasting the future from the present is 
diminishing.  If anything, current understanding of the factors influencing 
mortality has increased the potential for theories on mortality to be developed, 
but the complexity of those theories means there is still a great deal of 
uncertainty about how mortality trends will develop in the short and long 
term (Vaupel 2009).   
 
Age and gender have been the usual two determinants in actuarial tables 
but it is now understood that there are many other factors influencing 
mortality rates.  Harper and Howse (2008) have summarised these factors.  
Their summary provides the basis for the following list of the main groups of 
factors influencing mortality, with supplemental references as shown: 
 Socio-demographic factors including age, gender, ethnicity, country of 
origin and marital status.  All other things being equal, mortality rates 
increase with age and are lower for females than males.  Married people 
have lower mortality rates than never married, divorced or widowed.  
The relative mortality of ethnic and migrant groups depends on 
situation.  In New Zealand, Māori and Pacific people are known to have 
a higher relative risk of dying, and Asian residents a lower risk of 
dying, than the New Zealand population not in those ethnic groups 
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 Socio-economic factors are expressed differently in different countries, 
with income or education sometimes used as a proxy.  Mortality rates 
worsen as socio-economic status worsens, even within small 
populations (Marmot 2005).  A large body of research on mortality 
variance, and its association with how finance, education, housing, 
employment, transport, and healthcare are distributed exists in the 
fields of epidemiology and public health (for example, WHO 2008).  
However, the mechanism by which individual factors or socio-
economic status however defined affect mortality risk is not well 
understood.  The evidence that education acts directly to improve 
mortality independent of socio-economic status is said to be 
underappreciated outside of demography (Baker et al. 2011). 
 
 Life course factors are usually explained by the 'developmental origins 
theory'.  This posits that conditions in utero, at birth or in very early 
childhood influence an individual's mortality risk even at advanced 
ages (Barker 2007; Eriksson 2005).  The potential importance of early life 
influences is supported by observation of birth cohorts who exhibit a 
characteristic mortality trend within a population, although early life 
factors may not be a complete explanation for the trend.  For example, 
the ‘golden cohort’ born between 1923 and 1940 in the UK has 
consistently experienced more rapid improvement in mortality rates 
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 Lifestyle factors are to do with personal behaviours.  In most 
developed countries, clear evidence has been found for higher mortality 
rates, all other things being equal, for those who smoke, eat an 
unhealthy diet, are obese, take inadequate exercise, drink excessive 
alcohol, or participate in hazardous sports or other risky behaviour.   
 
 Genetic disposition for longevity.  In demography, studies have 
shown a clustering of long lifespans in families, suggesting a genetic 
component to exceptional longevity (e.g., Willcox et al. 2006). To 
understand fully the genetic basis for longevity needs large-scale and 
logistically complicated studies.  To date, many genes potentially 
implicated in ageing have been identified, but few confirmed by 
multiple findings (Christensen et al. 2006; Fallin and Matteini 2009).   
 
 Medical technology, including the use of preventative pharmaceuticals 
such as statins to lower blood cholesterol, has significantly contributed 
to the lowering of mortality rates for certain diseases.  Carey (2003) 
suggests that the biological future of human lifespan will be determined 
by lifestyle ("healthful living") and three other factors, all in the field of 
medical technology: disease prevention and cure, organ replacement 
and repair, and ageing arrest and rejuvenation science.  
 
These factors are individually complex.  In some cases the pathway by 
which a factor might affect health or mortality is not understood.  It is not 
understood how these factors work together to produce the overall mortality 
risk for any individual at a certain age.  In particular, the relative importance 
of early and later life factors remains unresolved (Vaupel 2009).  Factors 
suggested to explain the existence of the golden cohort in the UK cover the 
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lifecourse, including improvements in the UK's ante-natal care in the late 
1930s, a healthy diet imposed by rationing in adolescence and early adulthood, 
being at the right age to benefit given the timing of medical advances in 
infectious diseases and cardiovascular disease and social changes such as 
smoking cessation (Dunnell 2008; Goldring et al. 2011; Lessof 1949).  Su (2009) 
suggested that early life factors are becoming less important over time; as 
infant and child mortality rates are now close to zero in most developed 
countries, later life conditions would be expected to become more important.  
Vaupel et al (1998) proposed that one quarter of the variation in adult lifespans 
could be explained by genetic factors, one quarter by early life conditions and 
half by conditions in later life.  There has been very little further comment on 
this hypothesis, although van den Berg et al (2011) suggested the formula 
cannot be generalised: genetic and environmental factors may be more 
important when economic conditions in early life are poor with individual 
factors becoming more important for people born in times of better economic 
conditions.  Overlaying all the influences of different factors and the interplay 
between them, individual mortality prospects are to some extent a matter of 
chance: 
"Individual characteristics are the phenotypic expression of the 
match or mismatch of our genes with our lifetime environment, 
coupled with a good dose of chance.  < these individual 
characteristics, measured in the pre-adult as well as the adult life, 
are associated with the risk of premature mortality or the chance of 
surviving to old age." 
Kuh et al (2009) p. 50 
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International comparisons a promising supplement to mortality analysis 
Given so many open questions, demographic theory on how the multiple 
potential factors cause population mortality trends, and on the differences in 
average mortality and its variance between and within populations, is 
tentative.  Biodemography - the idea that biology can inform demographic 
analysis - has an expanding literature, and has helped to improve 
understanding of how biomarkers can predict individual mortality risk.  
However, it is less well understood how trends in population indicators of 
biological risk might affect future trends in population mortality (Crimmins et 
al. 2010a; Olshansky et al. 2002; Vaupel et al. 1998).   
 
Another route to understanding trends at the population level appears 
more promising.  International comparisons are highlighted as a rich source of 
insight in demography (for example Canudas-Romo 2010; Oeppen and Vaupel 
2002).  This is based on the observations of similarity and difference in the 
mortality or life expectancy of nations over time.  White (2002) shows that 
among over twenty high income countries the change in life expectancy in 
individual countries from 1955 to 1996 showed significant convergence toward 
the group mean.  Wilson (2011) demonstrated convergence of life expectancy 
at birth in the second half of the 20th century between the groups of most 
developed and developing countries, with exceptions having suffered 
significant specific mortality setbacks.  However, Leon (2011) in remarking on 
the similarity of trend in life expectancy at birth since 1970 for Western 
European countries noted how they remained parallel but separate.  Thus, 
analysis of differences between like countries in generally similar mortality 
environments could inform understanding of the past experience of mortality 
for any individual country, and therefore add to theories for how mortality 
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may change in future.  Learning from international comparisons of past 
mortality trends is urged as best practice for projections of future population 
mortality for any country (Janssen and Kunst 2007; Li and Lee 2005).   
 
The data available for mortality or longevity analysis between countries is 
vast.  For example, the Human Mortality Database hosted by the University of 
California, Berkeley and the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 
contains well documented on-line access to population and mortality data for 
37 countries or areas, including complete life tables since the 1800s.  Summary 
measures such as life expectancy for areas, regions and countries are also 
available from organisations including the United Nations and OECD.  
Demographic literature contains a number of important comparisons of 
mortality or life expectancy data between countries made in order to 
investigate specific research questions (including those already referenced).  
Despite the difficulty in imputing cause to effect with certainty, models of 
potential future longevity that have been interpreted from observed mortality 
trends at population level add to demographic theory, even if somewhat 
qualitative (Burch 2003; Caldwell 1996; Hoem 2008).  Thus international 
comparisons of mortality trends are promising as a source of theoretical and 
qualitative insight for explaining the past and projecting the future.   
 
Mortality analysis in New Zealand more historic than future 
Past mortality trends in New Zealand have been comprehensively examined 
(Pool 1982, 1985; Pool and Cheung 2002, 2003).  The general trends described 
above applied in New Zealand.  New Zealand had an early reputation as a 
healthy country for the settler population, with the life expectancy of non-
Māori females in New Zealand the best recorded in the world from 1875 to 
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1940 (Leslie 1895; Lessof 1949; Oeppen and Vaupel 2002).  The advantage the 
non-Māori population in New Zealand had has been described as "a result of 
< a selected, well-fed, well-organized population in combination with a low 
disease load" (Bengtsson 2006 p. 91).  Later analysis decided New Zealand's 
early first placings were a result of unusual selective healthy migration, and 
allowed non-Māori females worldwide best placing only for calendar years 
1926-1937, 1939-41 and 1944 (Shkolnikov et al. 2011b).  Comparing total 
population average lifespans for generations born throughout the same period 
shows New Zealand was consistently the best among those countries where 
such data exists, with a distinct advantage in childhood survival (Statistics 
New Zealand 2007).  Mortality rates in New Zealand have steadily improved 
since then, but other countries have caught up.  Total population period life 
expectancy at birth in New Zealand in 2007 ranked 13th out of 31 countries in 
the OECD (OECD 2010). 
 
The state of analysis of current mortality trends in New Zealand is less 
comprehensive than the understanding of mortality history.  Mortality 
literature in New Zealand either reports on the impact of specific risk factors 
or medical intervention on specific causes of mortality, or seeks an ethnic or 
socio-economic cause for mortality differences within the population (Blakely 
et al. 2007; Blakely et al. 2008; Carter et al. 2010; Tobias et al. 2009).  Further, 
there is little analysis on mortality differentials between New Zealand and 
other national populations beyond the use of summary life expectancy 
measures (for example in Statistics New Zealand 2009c, p. 18).  The reasons for 
mortality differentials between New Zealand and other countries are therefore 
largely unexplored.  Although Statistics New Zealand state that "International 
comparisons of mortality and longevity continue to serve as a useful check on 
plausibility", they report only that "the New Zealand life expectancy 
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assumptions are broadly consistent with the latest available projection 
assumptions from national statistical agencies in Australia, Canada, Japan, 
United Kingdom, and the United States" (Statistics New Zealand 2009a).  In 
consequence, there is no integrated analysis of current New Zealand mortality 
trends at the population level to provide a basis for future mortality 
forecasting.   
 
2.3 Mortality forecasting methods 
However much analysis is carried out to explain past and likely future 
mortality trends, policy makers need assumptions about future population 
mortality or longevity.  These assumptions form the inputs to policy makers' 
economic models to produce estimates of, for example, the future costs of 
public superannuation.  The estimated future costs inform long-term policy 
planning.  This section reviews the literature on mortality forecasting to 
explore what demographic theories and methods are used to forecast future 
mortality.   
 
The assumptions used in policy are developed by national statistics 
agencies as part of regular forecasts of national population size.  The statistical 
agencies would refer to what are here called forecasts as "projections".  The 
difference between what is meant by forecasts as opposed to projections is 
significant, and discussed further in the next section, but for convenience, this 
section continues to refer to forecasts.   
 
National statistical agencies are usually staffed by demographers, but 
actuaries may also produce national population forecasts related to public 
pension schemes.  Actuarial science may have a limited literature, but it is a 
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rich source of knowledge on mortality.  Mortality forecasting is at the heart of 
the theory and practice of actuarial science, because insurance companies and 
funded pension plans can only be managed by valuations of their future 
liabilities which depend on when policyholders or pension fund members die.  
Actuaries first developed the concepts of mortality analysis (Keyfitz 1993; 
Olshansky and Carnes 1997).  Further, demographers have recognised that 
they have been less comfortable with mortality forecasting than with other 
aspects of their subject (Crimmins 1993; Preston 1993).  The majority of 
demographic work, as typified by national statistics agencies, is in measuring 
what has happened.  Such agencies usually make forecasts of future national 
populations only every five years, and forecasting future mortality is only one 
part of that, with fertility and migration being the other elements.  Actuarial 
literature and practice on mortality forecasting can therefore add to that in 
demography. 
 
However, there is only a small amount of demographic or actuarial 
literature specifically assessing approaches to mortality forecasting.  Much of 
this literature comes from the point of view of the technical expert.  It reviews 
variants of forecasting methodology (for example, Booth and Tickle 2008; 
Booth 2006) or promotes a specific method (for example, Bongaarts 2006; 
Dowd et al. 2010).  Booth and Tickle (2008) describe three methods for making 
projections of future longevity.  The most common is the "extrapolative" 
method which estimates the values of future mortality rates or other measure 
such as life expectancy on the assumption that the historic trend of the chosen 
measure will continue.  The "explanation" method uses structural or 
epidemiological models for separate parts of the mortality rate, which can 
mean extrapolating mortality rates for individual causes of death.  The third 
method ("expectation") makes forecasts based on expert opinion for outcomes.  
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The experts are likely to base their opinions on the future in part on their 
interpretation of past trends in the mortality rate.  Thus, all methods are to a 
greater or lesser extent dependent on some kind of extrapolation of the past 
into the future.  All methods require some judgement on exactly what past 
data are extrapolated, and how. 
 
The accuracy of forecasting mortality in industrialised countries improved 
over the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, in the era of fairly stable mortality 
rates.  From the 1980s, forecasts in European countries became less accurate, 
with future mortality rates being overestimated, that is, pessimistic about 
future mortality improvement and underestimating future lifespan prospects 
(Keilman 1997, 2008).  Throughout this period, demographers in different 
countries were using similar extrapolative methods.  In the 1980s mortality 
rates improved with the surprise of fast improving mortality rates at older 
ages.  As assumptions about future mortality improvement were based on the 
past, forecasts became less accurate (see also Booth and Tickle 2008 p. 33 and 
Murphy 1995).  At times when the pace of mortality improvement is 
accelerating, the extrapolative method is likely to underestimate future 
longevity, as the extrapolative method will always be behind time in 
identifying improvements.  Ever-improving assumptions for mortality change, 
and ever-lengthening forecast life expectancies, feature in successive national 
projections.   
 
As a response to criticisms of the simple extrapolation method, more 
complex variants based largely on stochastic modelling have developed in 
recent years.  Traditional extrapolation models produce one deterministic 
outcome scenario for each set of input assumptions.  Stochastic methods use 
probabilistic modelling so the output can show a range of possible outcomes 
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with associated probabilities.  The first stochastic models, notably the Lee-
Carter method, still did not allow for different rates of change of mortality 
rates at different ages (Lee and Miller 2001), so further development of 
stochastic methods has continued, introducing more assumptions and greater 
complexity in the extrapolative algorithm.   
 
These more complex stochastic models have brought new problems 
compared to the traditional deterministic methods.  Stochastic models are 
data-intensive, so costly to develop.  More assumptions are needed as input 
and the wider range of possible outcomes appears to increase uncertainty 
rather than help to explain it.  Users generally ignore the added information, 
preferring to use a single mid-range scenario outcome for simplicity.  The 
model choice may introduce new sources of uncertainty.  Although some 
compromises between fully deterministic and fully probabilistic have been 
suggested most national agencies still use deterministic extrapolative models 
(Abel et al. 2010; Booth 2006; Dowd et al. 2010; Long and Hollmann 2004; Lutz 
and Goldstein 2004; Stoto 1988).  However, whether stochastic or not, all such 
models depend on the time-series of historic data which forms the basis of 
extrapolation.  Regardless of the technicalities of method, longevity forecasts 
are based on extrapolation.   
 
The use of extrapolative models has been justified on the basis that the 
improvement in life expectancy over centuries has been remarkably linear, 
despite being caused by a multiple of social, medical and economic factors 
(Bengtsson 2006; Oeppen and Vaupel 2002; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000; Wilmoth 
2000).  However, the extrapolative method at its most simple will turn out to 
be inaccurate if future patterns in any of the factors - age, gender or other - 
underlying past changes in mortality rates turns out to be different from what 
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has happened in the past.  Simple extrapolation by merely mechanically 
following a formula will produce underestimates of future lifespans if actual 
mortality improvements are hidden within the overall trend or are 
unexpectedly rapid.   
 
The potential for the future of mortality to be different from its past is a 
nagging doubt.  Some commentators see conservatism in the use of the 
extrapolative model because it fails to take account of potential disturbances to 
past mortality trends which are more likely than not to increase lifespans 
further.  De Grey (2006 p. 84) suggests extrapolations are "dangerous" if they 
are based on "misuse of biology".  He suggests highly optimistic forecasts of 
four-figure future lifespans (which he expects demographers to ridicule) based 
on "plausible sequences of scientific advances" (de Grey 2006 p. 83).  While de 
Grey urges that an understanding of biology tells us mortality improvement 
will change beyond recognition, demographers continue to assume the past 
trend will continue in future, with scope for exercising different judgements 
about the use of past data (for example, Tuljapurkar 2005).  Keilman (2003) 
calls models that use epidemiological data "non-demographic" and suggests 
that many demographers lack the experience to work with models of disease 
causing mortality.   
 
It used to be the case that demographers could defend pure extrapolation 
on the basis that understanding of biology was not precise enough to translate 
into projection assumptions (Wilmoth 1998).  Given increasing knowledge of - 
and questions about - the drivers of mortality trends, that may change.  For 
example, Olshansky et al (2009) suggested that the US Census Bureau 
underestimated future population lifespans by assuming a slowdown in the 
rate of improvement of future mortality when advances in biomedical 
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technology could justify assumptions of accelerated improvement.  Olshansky 
is regarded as a pessimistic demographer with specific rebuttals made against 
his assumptions of the future path of mortality rates (de Grey 2006; Preston 
2005; Tuljapurkar 2005).   
 
Also important is new work understanding trends in mortality variance.  
As the changing nature of mortality variance begins to be understood, 
demographers are suggesting that pure extrapolation may become less valid in 
future.  In a recent paper examining how variance in lifespans has been 
changing as mortality compresses, and how variance is mathematically linked 
to the curve of the rate of aging by age, a former supporter of extrapolative 
projections now seems less sure that they will continue to be useful: 
 
"Given the long-term nonstationarity of variance, and the 
rapidity of its decline prior to 1960, it is questionable how helpful 
extrapolative forecasts may be."   
Tuljapurkar and Edwards (2011 p. 516) 
 
Therefore, to the scope for judgement in extrapolative forecasting is now 
added disagreement, if not outright controversy, about its validity in future.  
Even a technically complex extrapolative model is not immune.  An example is 
Dowd et al (2010) who projected average expected future lifetime for 65 year 
old males in England and Wales to 2006, using historic data from 1961 to 1980.  
The projection was carried out using a complex stochastic model, but was 
essentially extrapolative.  The actual population average not only always 
exceeded the central projection after 1985, but after 2000 was higher than the 
upper limit of the 90% prediction interval, and at the very end of the projection 
period was outside the prediction area.  As the authors describe, the forecasts 
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are "based on the assumption that the future will be like the recent past<This 
is a controversial assumption." (Dowd et al. 2010 p. 70).  The assumption that 
extrapolation was valid turned out not to take account of mortality improving 
faster than past data anticipated.  Now, the future might again be different 
from the past because of mortality shifting and compression.  The progress of 
mortality at the oldest ages has less empirical evidence on which to base 
theories.   
 
Demographers have been categorised as optimists or pessimists for their 
judgement on whether compression is up to a fixed limit to average human 
lifespan and if so, what that limit might be.  The classic example of a pessimist 
is Fries, who in an influential work in demographic literature proposed in 1980 
and confirmed with further evidence in 1989 that there would be a limit to 
human lifespan.  Fries envisaged a limit to maximum human lifespan of 
around 100 years with average lifespan distributed with a mean of 85 years 
and a standard deviation of 4 years (Fries 1980; Fries 1989).  However, Fries's 
model did not contemplate the impending acceleration of older age mortality 
improvement.  It essentially assumed a linear continuation of overall past 
trends.  Fries is now seen as unduly pessimistic, but the question of whether 
there will be a limit to human lifespan at all is still a controversial issue for 
demographers (Carey and Judge 2001; Carnes and Olshansky 2007; Oeppen 
and Vaupel 2002; Siegel 2005).  A consensus appears to be emerging that even 
if there is a limit then it is not yet relevant, as such a large improvement is 
needed to bring the average up to the already achieved maximum 
(Christensen et al. 2009).   
 
This consensus envisages average life expectancy will continue increasing 
within the period of current population projections.  In the UK, five out of the 
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panel of six experts who advise on future mortality assumptions for national 
forecasts said that life expectancy at birth would increase at least as fast over 
the next 25 years as it has over the last 25 years (Shaw 2008).  All 17 experts at 
a 2007 meeting of European Union (EU) demographers, in a trial of a 
questionnaire on future trends affecting mortality to develop a systematic 
approach to defining assumptions for population projections, concluded that 
the life expectancy measure would continue to increase, although with some 
uncertainty as to the pace of change (Lutz 2009).  The average life expectancy 
at birth for Japanese females breached Fries's limit in 2000, and the United 
Nations forecasts that measure to reach 90 years by 2040 and 95 years by 2090 
(United Nations 2011).  The future population projections from Statistics New 
Zealand assume a continued improvement of mortality rates.  The different 
variants make different assumptions only for the rate of change (Statistics New 
Zealand 2009a).   
 
2.4 Uncertainty in mortality forecasting 
Mortality theories have limited predictive power, and uncertainty in 
forecasting is inevitable.  This section is concerned with how the uncertainty of 
future mortality and longevity is expressed in the policy sphere.   
 
Academic literature is rather light on the theory and principles behind the 
use of mortality forecasting in policy settings.  There are very few studies of 
the principles from the demographers' standpoint, Stoto (1988) being a 
thoughtful exception.  Within policy literature, the recent evidence-based 
policy movement has offered only some general ideas reinforcing that 
technical information should be sourced from experts, which in this case 
would be demographers or actuaries (Young et al. 2002).   
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Demographers agree that the demographer should be responsible for 
estimating and presenting the uncertainty inherent in the forecasts presented 
to policy makers (Stoto 1988).  It is more controversial as to how the 
uncertainty of demographic forecasts should be reported to the user.  Keyfitz 
(1993) highlights the difference between the demographer who prepares a 
'projection' of what might happen in the future, given specific assumptions, 
and a user who wants a prediction of what will happen, and will interpret any 
demographic projection as such.  Keilman (2008) agrees with this assessment 
of how the user will read a projection, and suggests the term 'forecast' should 
be used, as that is more descriptive of how a user interprets a development 
that is possible or likely, but not certain.   
 
Keilman stresses also that users need to understand the uncertainty in any 
forecast: that there is uncertainty and some indication of how much.  He 
criticises the common practice of statistical agencies presenting deterministic 
'high', 'medium' and 'low' variants for population projections with no 
information on the likelihood of any one of these, or on what needs to happen 
for the variant to hold.  Users tend to pick out the medium variant as the most 
likely outcome (Goldstein 2004; Keilman 1997). 
 
Empirical evidence on the process of developing official national 
population projections is available from reports of the national statistical 
agencies.  These reports vary in degree of detail and explanation about how 
the mortality assumption or assumptions were derived, and on the degree of 
uncertainty attached to the assumptions.  Lutz (2009) surveyed national 
statistical agencies in the EU in 2005 to review how they prepare their 
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assumptions for national population projections, concluding that uncertainty 
was poorly explained:  
"While most users of projections are primarily interested in a 
best guess forecast, there is increasing demand for explicit 
consideration of the full range of uncertainty." 
Lutz (2009) p. 1 
 
However, as discussed in the last section, stochastic forecasting methods, 
which would provide quantified indicators of uncertainty intervals, are not 
widely used.  Lutz' survey showed that only one national statistic agency in 
the EU used stochastic forecasting, most produced three variants of 
deterministic projections, and some agencies produced fewer than three. 
 
In New Zealand, Statistics New Zealand produce national population 
projections generally within a five-year cycle, based on Census data, with 
projection period up to 55 years.  The methodology used for the latest set of 
projections is described in Statistics New Zealand (2009a).  New Zealand's 
population projections are presented in nine main series as a high, medium 
and low variant set of assumptions are used for each of mortality, fertility and 
migration.  This thesis focuses on mortality assumptions only.  These are 
presented in three main series (series 3, 5 and 7), to be referred to here as "Low 
Mortality", "Medium Mortality" and "High Mortality".  Chapter 5 sets out in 
detail the mortality assumptions and the resulting life expectancy and other 
measures.  The projections for period life expectancy at birth for New Zealand 
females in 2061 from these variants are, respectively: 91.2 years, 88.7 years, and 
86.2 years.  An additional series is produced, called here "Very High Life 
Expectancy" by assuming period life expectancy at birth reaches 95.0 years for 
both males and females in 2061.   
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As expected, because the extrapolative method is slow to catch up with 
mortality improvements, estimates of future lifespan in New Zealand's 
population projections have generally been revised upwards over time.  
Projections of life expectancy at birth have proven to be underestimates.  To 
illustrate from the medium estimate of the 1988-base projections, male life 
expectancy at birth in 2006 was projected to be 73.9 years.  This indicator 
increased through successive projections, until reaching 77.5 years in the 2004-
base projections, and the actual outcome was 78.0 years (2005-7 period life 
tables).  Similar patterns are seen for female data and other time periods, with 
longer projection periods generally increasing the inaccuracy of projections 
(data obtained from Statistics New Zealand, November 2011).   
 
No explanation is given as to what factors might drive Statistics New 
Zealand's three main mortality variants, and no probability is assigned to 
them.  The Medium Mortality estimate is set by a traditional demographic 
technique of extrapolation based on past mortality experience.  Projected life 
expectancy at birth in 2061 for the Medium Mortality estimate is midway 
between that for the High and Low variants, with no rationale given for the 
equivalent distance from Medium to the arbitrary High and Low variants.  The 
variants are not suggested as bounds of what is possible or even plausible.  
Indeed, Statistics New Zealand specifically rejects the Keilman approach 
stating that its demographic projections are "not predictions or exact forecasts" 
(Statistics New Zealand 2008 p. 5).   
 
Life expectancy is the summary indicator used to illustrate future lifespans 
under different mortality projection variants, but Statistics New Zealand 
downplays its likely accuracy or realism:  
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"The mortality assumptions should not be used as a precise 
measure of mortality or of mortality differentials between groups.  
It is important to note that the objective of population projections is 
not to specifically measure or project the life expectancy of the 
population.  For projection purposes it is more important to have a 
realistic yet tractable model for projecting mortality trends (and 
death numbers) into the future."  
Statistics New Zealand (2009a).   
 
While suggesting that the model is "realistic", the medium estimate is not 
so defined, although Statistics New Zealand say that it is "considered the most 
suitable for assessing future population changes" (Statistics New Zealand 
2009a).  Further, the other projection series "allow users to assess the impact on 
population size and structure resulting from changes in the assumptions for 
each of the components of population change" (Statistics New Zealand 2009a).  
Thus, there is no obvious theoretical underpin for the mortality assumptions 
other than following an extrapolative method.  They are not supported by a 
comprehensive analysis of the drivers of mortality trends in New Zealand, by 
information on mortality trends in other countries or by a biological rationale.  
The user has to decide which if any of the variants are likely or plausible.   
 
Consistent with the Keilman and Keyfitz view, users take the medium 
estimate of Statistics New Zealand's projections as if it were the most likely 
prediction.  The New Zealand Treasury’s long-term fiscal modelling requires 
forecast data for at least 40 years hence (The Treasury 2006).  Uncertainty in 
this time horizon is significant.  Only the medium variant of Statistics New 
Zealand's population projections is used in the New Zealand Treasury's long-
term fiscal statements (The Treasury 2006 p. 41; 2009 p. 18).  However, a 
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number of other assumptions have been used in other modelling work to 
illustrate demographic uncertainty (Rodway and Wilson 2006 p.12), and the 
use in fiscal models of demographic variants as given with no indication of 
uncertainty has been criticised in a Treasury Working Paper as "seriously 
flawed" (Bryant 2003 p. 1).  Thus despite understanding that uncertainty is 
poorly treated, the external message in the public Treasury statement is a 
single deterministic path for mortality: the Medium Mortality estimate.   
 
In the process where expert demographer develops population projections 
and a non-expert uses them, the complexities of dealing with uncertainty in 
future mortality are lost.  The demographer is unwilling to put probabilistic 
bounds or rationale on the mortality projections because that would demand a 
complex, and in most cases unavailable, stochastic model or a biological 
rationale which is outside the expert domain of the demographer.  The 
solution proposed is usually to develop a stochastic model (Abel et al. 2010; 
Bryant 2003; Lutz 2009).  However, as noted, a stochastic model requires more 
complex assumptions with probabilities assigned to variables.  If these 
probabilities themselves do not have a rationale, biological or otherwise, then 
the stochastic model is as open to criticism as a deterministic model.  Further, 
while some policy analysts may be expert in dealing with probabilistic 
modelling, most other user groups still demand a single forecast, and public 
messages reference a single forecast that is deemed, rightly or not, to be the 
most likely.  Moreover, even if uncertainties are demonstrated, for example 
with fan charts as in Dowd et al (2010), the question of how policy decisions 
would be made differently as a result has hardly been tackled.  
 
Thus more complex stochastic modelling may not be an easy or complete 
answer.  An alternative is to develop the use of deterministic scenarios 
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described not by variants of mathematically-based mortality assumptions, but 
plausible narratives.  The use of scenarios to consider what may happen in 
future as an aid to decision making is established in business management 
practice where the approach of presenting three alternative scenarios along a 
single dimension - such as the high, medium and low usually seen in 
demographic projections - is rejected as it does not challenge the user to think 
about the future as anything other than a continuation of the present (Wack 
1985a, b).  Instead, the aim is not to get one scenario right - accuracy is 
impossible anyway - but rather to illuminate the factors driving possible 
outcomes of the future by describing a narrative rationale for each alternative 
scenario.  Such a rationale could reflect an observed relationship with other 
data, such as comparison with trends in other countries, or by a hypothesised 
future trend based on empirical biological or medical data.   
 
The attraction for a narrative scenario approach in demography is that it 
meets the criticism that demographic forecasts are purely formulaic.  The 
difficulty is that 'what-if' scenarios can require a better understanding of how 
risk factors cause mortality outcomes and the trends in those risk factors than 
exists.  For example, a scenario based on 'if the incidence of smoking were to 
decrease by X per cent then the mortality rate would be likely to reduce by Y 
per cent' is no more than a sensitivity analysis unless it is based on empirical 
evidence of cause and effect.  Unfortunately, smoking is the single example 
where empirical evidence of cause and effect exists because the main cause of 
death from smoking - lung cancer - can be isolated.  Other mortality risks have 
complex outcomes unable to be linked to a change in mortality rate (Crimmins 
et al. 2010b).  As a result, a narrative scenario approach has been little used in 
demography or actuarial science.  While Lutz (1995) proposes what he calls a 
scenario approach, the term "scenario" is generally used where 'variant' would 
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be more appropriate.  The actual depth of narrative or rationale supporting 
assumptions in national population projections is still weak, as Lutz' later 
survey of EU countries' projections showed (Lutz 2009 p. 4). 
 
Two actuarial examples of long-term scenario-based mortality projections 
are found in Benjamin (1982) and Calvert (1946).  Benjamin presented dramatic 
new projections for future life expectancy in England and Wales, to general 
scepticism that his assumed strong mortality improvements could occur 
(Benjamin 1982 and discussion).  However, his forecasts were prescient.  The 
middle of the range of Benjamin's projections for life expectancy in 2017 has 
already been breached and his "extreme" projection for 2017 is expected to be 
reached in 2020 (GAD/ONS data).  Actual mortality rates in New Zealand in 
2000 compared well to those Calvert predicted fifty years earlier in a report 
commissioned by the New Zealand Government on the future of the country's 
population at the end of World War II (Calvert 1946 and Statistics New 
Zealand data).  Benjamin developed a rationale based on recent trends and 
potential new treatments for each cause of death separately.  Calvert 
considered qualitatively the possibility of new discoveries in drug technology, 
the expansion of "preventative medicine" like the introduction of free milk in 
schools, and a step change in "improved national vitality" from cutting down 
hours of work and improving standards of housing (1946 p. 36).  Benjamin and 
Calvert's reports were notable exceptions to the generally inaccurate and 
pessimistic mortality forecasts of the time, and provide examples of the power 
of thinking beyond pure extrapolation to reason on the basis of plausible 
narrative.  They are consistent with a model of "less computation, more 
cogitation" in the making of projections as urged by Hajnal (1955 p. 321). 
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2.5 Conclusions 
The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that longevity risk is prevalent 
in New Zealand and elsewhere.  Contributory factors to underestimation of 
lifespans include: over-reliance on historic trends as a guide to the future when 
mortality is improving; inadequacies in the extrapolative method 
demographers use to forecast future mortality; and, weaknesses in the 
communication of demographic evidence to policy analysts that offers a poor 
explanation of uncertainty in forecasting and little guidance on what evidence 
for future lifespans to use in policy modelling.  To reinforce the hypothesis, 
studies in countries other than New Zealand referred to briefly here and 
explored more fully later in this thesis give empirical evidence of a tendency 
for individuals to underestimate future longevity.  The extent of 
underestimation of lifespans in individual retirement planning and policy 
settings in New Zealand has not been quantified.   
 
When mortality improvement has been hidden or faster than expected 
then the use of extrapolative forecasting techniques tends to underestimate 
longevity.  Successive projections of future lifespans have consistently had to 
be revised upwards.  However, while demographers forecast mortality, some 
reliance on extrapolation seems inevitable.  In the judgement required for 
extrapolation there still lies scope for relative pessimism or optimism and 
major disagreements over the course of future mortality trends.  While the 
weight of demographic opinion is that mortality will continue to improve, the 
pace of future improvement is not agreed.  Questions over the future validity 
of pure extrapolative forecasting add further to the controversy of the 
technique.  The consequences of compression of mortality and the implications 
of changing mortality variance on population average mortality or life 
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expectancy are not fully understood.  Extrapolative methods will be slow to 
react to change in the pace of mortality rate change.  Thus the risk of 
underestimation of future lifespans still exists, in an overall context of 
uncertainty.  All of these points apply to developed countries where mortality 
had been generally improving over recent decades, including New Zealand.   
 
Alternatives to mitigate the problems of mortality forecasting have been 
suggested, but have not been taken up widely.  Ever more complex forecasting 
models do not seem to be the answer when there is insufficient understanding 
of the factors driving mortality rate change.  Instead, narrative scenarios of 
future longevity appear a promising tool consistent with Hajnal's view that 
projections would benefit from less computation or pure extrapolation and 
more descriptive consideration of potential major trends.  International 
comparisons of mortality trends have been suggested as a promising source of 
theoretical and qualitative insight for projecting future mortality.   There has 
not been a thorough comparison of New Zealand's past or future projected 
mortality trends with those of other relevant countries.   
 
Despite indications that longevity risk exists, in New Zealand and more 
generally, and some analysis within annuity or insurance settings, the extent of 
longevity risk in policy and by individuals remains unexplored.  The reasons 
for any underestimation of longevity have not been addressed or remedies 
suggested.  Thus while evidence accumulates to suggest an inherent tendency 
to underestimate future longevity in both policy and individual settings, 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical basis for mortality analysis 
This thesis undertakes mortality analysis for New Zealand in order to provide 
plausible future lifespans against which to test the expectations of individuals 
and policy makers.  The theoretical basis for the mortality analysis in this 
thesis is set out in this chapter.  First, the theory behind the most common 
measure of longevity - population average life expectancy - is explored in 
depth.  The second section describes the three-part framework developed to 
carry out the mortality analysis in this thesis and the theory behind it.  The 
following three sections give the details of the source data used to carry out 
the analysis.  The results of the analysis then follow in the subsequent three 
chapters, with additional theory on the third part of the framework in the 
relevant chapter. 
 
3.1 Flaws in life expectancy measure 
Longevity and mortality are complex technical subjects, yet of great interest to 
non-specialists.  Summary results from detailed analyses are often presented 
using a simplified interpretation with few measures.  The most commonly 
used measure of longevity is life expectancy.  Life expectancy at any age is the 
average remaining lifespan for the population the mortality data represents 
(Preston et al. 2001).  Life expectancy at birth is the average total lifespan, or 
equivalently average age at death, for the defined population.  Life expectancy 
is a useful measure for some purposes but it suffers from significant 
definitional and technical drawbacks as a means of conveying information on 
likely lifespans for individual decision making or national policy making, as 
the remainder of this section considers. 
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3.1.1 Period life expectancy underestimates real lifespans 
For any population, average life expectancy at any age greater than zero plus 
that age is greater than life expectancy at birth, because of selective survival.  
Even if mortality rates did not change over time, older people would have 
higher chances of longer lifespans than younger people.  Thus life expectancy 
at birth only applies as a measure of total lifespan to newborns represented by 
the underlying population.  Period life expectancy at birth is a poor indicator 
of potential lifespan for any ages over zero, or to represent the average for a 
population with a range of ages.   
 
Life expectancy, as conventionally used, will not indicate a realistic 
lifespan.  Usually in demographic sources "life expectancy" denotes a period 
life expectancy indicator, which is an artificial statistic.  Period life expectancy 
is calculated assuming mortality rates at each age that apply in a single period 
(usually a calendar year) for a population.  It is the average age at death for a 
population at that point in time assuming no change in mortality rates over the 
lifetime of the people in that population.  But in reality, mortality rates change 
over time.  A period life expectancy is therefore clearly artificial when applied 
to an individual person.  An individual experiences the mortality rate at each 
subsequent age that applies in subsequent years.  A more realistic and 
intuitive indicator of average lifespan, which reflects the changing of mortality 
rates with age, and therefore time, is cohort life expectancy, calculated using 
the average mortality rates at each age of a population of people born in the 
same year.   
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Period and cohort life expectancies at birth (e0) for the period t and the 
cohort born at time t respectively are functions of death rates for ages at 
different times: 
 
                                
 
                                     
 
Period life expectancy cannot represent a real expectation for any person.  
Only cohort life expectancy indicators take into account the lifecourse 
dimension of mortality change.  When age-specific mortality rates improve 
over time, as is currently the case in all developed countries, a period life 
expectancy indicator will underestimate a realistic average lifespan.  Period 
life expectancy for age x at time t will be lower than the cohort life expectancy 
for a cohort aged x at time t.  Cohort life expectancy will give a more realistic 
indication of a lifespan as it applies to an individual from the relevant 
population.  The realism of cohort life expectancy as an indicator of lifespans 
for cohorts still alive will be subject to the plausibility of the assumptions made 
about future mortality, but the realism of period life expectancy is limited 
because of the implicit assumption that mortality rates do not change. 
 
The need for assumptions of future mortality rates when calculating 
cohort life expectancy for a cohort still alive need not pose a problem where 
assumptions already exist, usually for population projections.  However, it 
requires more calculations from the usual requirements of the more commonly 
produced period life tables, and cohort life expectancies are less often 
referenced than period indicators.   
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The difference between period and cohort measures is understood within 
demographic and actuarial literature, as is the hypothetical nature of period 
life expectancy as a measure of lifespan (for example, Vaupel 2001).  However, 
demographic literature has focused on exploring the so-called "tempo effect", a 
theoretical concept used in measuring fertility rates, as an explanation for the 
difference between period and cohort life expectancy.  Studies on alternative 
measures for average lifespan, whether from the point of view of population 
dynamics (Wilmoth 2005) or to capture the true lifespan potential of an 
individual (Ediev 2011) have explored theoretical mathematical solutions 
based on the tempo effect, despite cohort life expectancy measures being a 
practical option.  Further, the implications of the differences between period 
life expectancy and cohort life expectancy in the current era of improving 
mortality do not have a wide literature in demography.  For example, having 
been first observed by Wilmoth (2005) that period life expectancy will increase 
more slowly than cohort life expectancy, Shkolnikov et al only recently (2011b) 
showed that the trend line for the highest national female cohort life 
expectancy at birth in the world for cohorts born 1870-1920 had a markedly 
steeper slope than that for best period life expectancy.  Not only does cohort 
life expectancy reveal higher lifespans than apparent from period life 
expectancy data, but also faster increasing lifespans.  Thus, the conclusions of 
much of theoretical and empirical demographic analysis based on period life 
expectancy may not apply to the progress of real lifespans from an individual 
lifecourse perspective which can, however, be analysed using cohort life 
expectancy. 
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3.1.2 Misrepresented as individual lifespan expectation 
Period life expectancy is a useful indicator for summary comparisons of 
population mortality across countries at a point in time or across time periods.  
For example, in the standard source for national population estimates and 
projections, the United Nations' "World Population Prospects", the selected 
mortality indicators used to compare across countries are the crude death rate, 
the infant mortality rate and period life expectancy at birth (United Nations 
2011).  Period life expectancy at birth is one of the components of the United 
Nations' Human Development Index, and epidemiologists use life expectancy 
as a summary measure of the health of a population, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.  Thus, period life expectancy is widely referenced, more so than 
cohort life expectancies, and the most common indicator is period life 
expectancy at birth.   
 
It is recognised that policy makers tend to use and communicate period 
data in preference to cohort data (for example, Booth and Tickle 2004), but the 
difference between the two is rarely explained in informal settings.  A casual 
reader can easily interpret period data as if it applied to his or her cohort.  In 
practice, life expectancy, particularly period life expectancy at birth, is often 
incorrectly reported as if it should be an individual's expectation, in the sense 
of an entitlement to a remaining length of life, rather than an average measure 
for a hypothetical population.  For example, this common claim for the state 
pension age would be true only if mortality rates each year in the life of "the 
average man" (lifetime undefined) were as they were in a specific year: 1948.  
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"When Beveridge brought in the state pension, kicking in for 
men at the age of 65, the male life expectancy was 64.  In other 
words, the average man died before he could claim any state 
pension at all." 
Lanchester (2010) in the Guardian Weekend 2 October 2010 
 
Formal research is not immune to the problem.  For example, a significant 
and detailed study from a large team of demographers and epidemiologists 
contained the following interpretation from period data: 
"In 2006, life expectancy in the United States at age 50 was 32.6 
for white women and 30.2 for black women; white men at age 50 
could expect to live 29.0 years on average and black men 25.2 
years." 
Crimmins et al. 2010b p. 9-5, emphasis added 
 
Table 3.1 gives examples of such misreporting of life expectancy in media 
and policy settings in New Zealand.  In the first example of Table 3.1, 82.2 
years  is the period life expectancy at birth assuming the mortality rates at each 
age that prevailed for New Zealand females in the period 2005-7 (Statistics 
New Zealand Total Population Period Life Tables).  However, the cohort life 
expectancy at birth for the average female New Zealander born in 2006 ranges 
from 86.7 to 93.8 years depending on the assumptions made on the pace of 
mortality improvement in future (Total Population Cohort Life Tables 
consistent with 2009-base projection assumptions, obtained from Statistics 
New Zealand November 2009).  Thus, period life expectancy used without 
explanation leads in this case to a potential underestimate of what can be 
expected as average lifespan of between 4.5 and 11.6 years. 
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"Figures released by Statistics New 
Zealand this week show that, on 
average, a girl born between 2005 
and 2007 will live 82.2 years." 
 
New Zealand Herald 15 November 
2008 (emphasis added) 
Period data misinterpreted as cohort. 
 
Use of "will" implies more certainty 
than can be possible. 
"In terms of average life expectancy, 
a baby girl born in New Zealand 
today can expect to live to 84 or 85; a 
boy six years less.  That means half 
of the males and females born today 
can expect to considerably exceed 
their allotted number of years." 
 
New Zealand Listener 5 June 2010 
Confusion between average (mean) 
and median. 
 
No source given, but figures not 
consistent with interpretation as 
cohort life expectancy at birth 2010. 
 
 
"Life expectancy is an estimate of 
how long a resident can expect to 
live from birth." 
 
"Life expectancy is then based on 
combining the age-specific mortality 
for each year of life to develop a 
projection of all the ages at which 
those born now might die, then 
taking an average of those ages of 
death." 
 
New Zealand Institute 2010 
NZ Ahead project  
Highlighted summary explains 
period data as if it were a justified 
expectation of an individual. 
 
Further explanation confuses a 
period measure both as a projection 
of the future and as a measure for 
the cohort of those born now. 
 
More detailed paragraphs correctly 
explain derivation of the period 
measure as "based on age-specific 
mortality tables < on the recent but 
historical experience of the 
population" and correctly state that 
"Life expectancy is more relevant to 
a population than to predicting the 
life span of a specific individual." 
 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 3 
60 
Much of the confusion appears to stem from a casual interpretation of life 
expectancy as the lifespan someone should expect.  It is possible that the 
confusion between individual expectation and population average was set 
when the life expectancy measure was first defined. The Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED) traces life expectancy back to the first recorded use of the 
term "expectation of life" in one of the earliest works on annuities by the 
mathematician de Moivre: 
"The expectation of life is that duration which may be justly 
expected from a life of a given age."   
de Moivre (1725) p. iv, as cited in OED (second edition 1989, 
accessed online 28 July 2010) 
 
However, the OED extracted only part of de Moivre's definition.  The full 
paragraph in the original text is as follows: 
"The expectation of life is that duration which may be justly 
expected from a life of a given age; and is properly a medium 
between the longer and shorter durations of a great number of 
preceding lives, from the time of their having attained the age 
given, to the time of their extinction.  With the present value of this 
expectation, the proprietor of a life may be said, in some sense, to 
have purchased an annuity for life, of which the rent is paid him in 
actual duration, and thereby to have taken his chance of an 
uncertain duration, as an equivalent for the fixt duration he is 
entitled to by the right of his expectation." 
de Moivre (1725) p. iv (emphasis added) 
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The full definition makes it clear that expectation of life was the result of 
an averaging calculation for a defined population (the "medium" of a "great 
number of preceding lives") and de Moivre sets out the calculation in later 
pages (pp. 74-80).  Further, the definition refers to expectations in the sense of 
a real entitlement not to a length of life, but to a financial contract; an annuity.  
At the time, "expectation" was commonly used as a legal term for the prospect 
of inheriting money.  The primary purpose of de Moivre's paper was to set out 
for the first time the formulae to calculate the cost of annuity purchase.  The 
definition of expectation of life was a secondary product of the mathematics 
required for the annuity calculation.  Thus 'life expectancy' descends from a 
term intended to convey a specified population average but confusingly 
defined in the context of an individual's entitlement to a payment for the rest 
of life.  Modern usage of life expectancy is not often in the context of a financial 
contract, but in the sense of potential future lifespan for an individual or the 
average for a population.  The uncertainties around the mean inherent in a 
population average measure are often lost, and 'life expectancy' is often 
wrongly interpreted to mean what lifespan an individual can or should expect.  
If the other phrase de Moivre coined for remaining lifespan "the Complement 
of Life" (de Moivre 1725 p. 75) had been adopted instead, some confusion may 
have been avoided. 
 
3.1.3 Inadequate measure as mortality compresses 
Life expectancy at birth is the average value along the curve of deaths.  The 
average value along a curve is most useful when the curve is symmetric.  
However, over time, the shape of the curve of deaths has changed significantly 
and is not symmetric.  As explained in section 2.2, the changing shape of the 
curve of deaths and the rectangularisation of the survival curve as mortality 
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shifts and compresses has occurred for all developed countries, as was shown 
for the UK on page 26.  The curve of deaths for New Zealand females is shown 
in Figure 3.1.  Data for the total population is not available for the full time 
period, but an earlier line added for the Non-Māori population in 1934-38 
illustrates the higher childhood and newborn mortality at that time.   
 
Figure 3.1: Curve of deaths from 100,000 births for females in New Zealand 
from three period tables, with mean, median and mode 
 
Source: Calculated from Statistics New Zealand period life tables.  Note life 
table for 1934-38 is for the Non-Māori population only.  Total population life 
tables were not produced for that period.  For the two later periods, total 
population data is shown.  Period measures are used as cohort life tables are 
not available for birth years since late 1930s.  The three symbols for each time 
period show, reading left to right, mean, median and mode. 
 
In recent decades, compression of mortality has shifted the second modal 
age at death to the right, and the peak has narrowed as more people have 
survived to older ages but maximum lifespan has not increased so 
significantly.  Over the period shown in Figure 3.1, the curve of deaths has 
changed from being clearly bimodal to a practically single mode distribution 
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concentrated at the higher values.  The curve of deaths is less symmetric than 
it was when the peak for newborn deaths was higher, and the use of the 
average - that is, life expectancy at birth - is therefore questioned (Canudas-
Romo 2010). 
 
Gains in life expectancy at birth have come from improvements in 
mortality rates at different ages: in the first half of the 20th century from young 
ages and in the second half of the 20th century mortality improvements were 
concentrated at older ages.  Life expectancy, especially period life expectancy, 
does not distinguish well between the age at which mortality is improving 
most, and the way in which it changes to mortality rate change varies as the 
shape of the curve of deaths changes.  Even if large improvements in mortality 
rates at older ages occur in a population that is well advanced on the path to 
mortality compression, life expectancy at birth will not change as much as it 
did when there was large improvement in mortality at younger ages.  An 
alternative expression of this is that the increase in life expectancy at birth 
from the same rate of improvement in age-specific death rates would be 
expected to be smaller in a population further down the pathway to mortality 
compression than another.  The compression of mortality acts as a brake to 
gains in life expectancy at birth.   
 
Which mortality change at older ages - mortality shifting or mortality 
compression - currently dominates in developed countries or will dominate in 
future is debated.  Recent data for Canada, France, Japan, and the US suggests 
that the female peak age at death has increased and variability above the peak 
reduced, that is, mortality shifting has been most in evidence (Ouellette and 
Bourbeau 2011).  Life expectancy, especially life expectancy at birth, does not 
give full information to explain these mortality trends.  Further, the period life 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 3 
64 
expectancy indicator has been criticised for misleading analysis of these trends 
because by ignoring the potential for future mortality improvement it tends 
towards showing mortality compression rather than shifting (Ediev 2011).  
Thus, the usefulness of life expectancy as an indicator of mortality trends 
reduces for developed countries well advanced on the path towards mortality 
compression (recognising that this description itself may turn out to be 
inaccurate if mortality shifting is also a significant element).  This conclusion 
supports the assertion of Olshansky et al that: 
"<life expectancy at birth is not an adequate metric of mortality 
declines when life expectancy at birth approaches 80 years"  
Olshansky et al 1990 p. 638.   
 
If life expectancy should not be the only measure used for investigating 
trends in mortality, other measures of central tendency of the population age 
at death can be considered.  In actuarial science, the distribution of deaths 
around a modal age is considered an insightful measure of mortality trends 
(Benjamin 1982).  Demographers have suggested that trends in life expectancy 
at birth, the median and adult modal ages at death together provide a basis for 
better explanation of mortality trends in developed countries than any one of 
those measures alone (Canudas-Romo 2010; Cheung and Robine 2007).  This is 
because each of these measures of central tendency changes differently to 
mortality changes above or below the measure in an era when mortality rates 
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Table 3.2: Effects on measures of longevity of changes in mortality when 
mortality is generally improving 
Measure 
Changes at ages 
below the measure 
Changes at ages 
above the measure 
Life expectancy 
(average age at death) 
Yes Yes 
Median age at death Yes No 
Modal age at death No Yes 
Source: Based on Canudas-Romo 2010 Table 1.  "Changes" mean reductions in 
age-specific mortality rates. 
 
Measures of central tendency for the age at death distribution are also 
marked on Figure 3.1.  These measures are in the same order for each period: 
mean (that is, life expectancy at birth), median and mode.  The figures are 
shown in Table 3.3.  The measures exhibit the pattern consistent with that in all 
developed countries as a result of the age profile of mortality rate changes over 
the period (Canudas-Romo 2010): the three measures converge over time, 
staying in the same order, and the increase in the modal age accelerates in the 
later years.  This can be seen in the New Zealand data as an extension to the 
right of the range of the three points.  The shift to the right of modal age at 
death reflects mortality rate improvements at the oldest ages.   
 









Average (e0) 68.5 73.8 82.2 
Median 74.3 77.9 85.4 
Mode 80.2 81.8 89.3 
Source: Calculated from Statistics New Zealand period life tables. 
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In common with other developed countries, New Zealand has had recent 
mortality improvements at the oldest ages, life expectancy at birth exceeds the 
benchmark of 80 years, and modal age at death is extending to near 90 years.  
The mode changes when mortality rates change at the oldest ages, which is the 
age range of interest in ageing populations.  Modal age at death is rarely used 
yet could go some way to mitigate the underestimation of lifespan that use of 
period life expectancy at birth produces.  While cohort life expectancy is the 
intuitively and technically preferred measure of individual lifespans, modal 
age at death, even from a period life table, provides a simple and easily 
available indicator of population lifespan of a similar order to the cohort 
measure. 
 
3.2 Framework for mortality analysis 
As highlighted in the literature review of Chapter 2, international comparisons 
are urged as a rich source of insight in demography and specifically for 
projections of future mortality.  This study builds on the premise that 
comparisons of New Zealand's mortality with that of other relevant countries 
will add valuable insights to projections of future mortality in New Zealand; 
and thus yield a deeper understanding of future lifespans in New Zealand 
than exists in official projections.   
 
Best practice mortality projections have been described by Janssen and 
Kunst (2007, referring to Li and Lee 2005).  One recommendation is to compare 
data on past mortality trends across like countries and for the two genders 
within a country to gain insights to use in future mortality projections.  The 
process suggested is partly qualitative - do the relativities in past and future 
trends across compared populations look reasonable? - and part quantitative: 
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mortality for males and females can be extrapolated separately using factors 
which constrain the difference between average mortality for those two groups 
to be constant.  In this study, I have rejected imposing any constraint on 
mortality levels in favour of using the qualitative insights gained from 
comparative analysis of past mortality trends between countries and between 
subgroups of New Zealand population.  Specifically, given the importance of 
the Māori and migrant populations within New Zealand, the mortality of 
subgroups defined by ethnicity and birthplace is considered.  Additionally, 
emerging demographic theories on variance of mortality are explored, 
following the suggestion from Tuljapurkar and Edwards (2011) that change in 
variance will have an impact on extrapolation.  A qualitative approach is 
necessary as the demographic theories linking variance in age at death with 
changes in mortality rates and life expectancy may be able to add insight, but 
are not yet fully formed to be definitive.   
 
Other recommendations for best practice in mortality extrapolation are to 
explore specific causes of death, and to review whether the mortality trends of 
younger cohorts differ from that of older cohorts.  In this study, mortality rates 
are considered by age, so that mortality of younger cohorts can be considered 
directly.  Mortality risk or cause of death trends are not considered further, 
because of limitations in relating cause and effect.  However, the potential 
consequences of a commonly cited mortality risk - obesity - are covered 
qualitatively. 
 
The dependence on qualitative insights from comparative analysis of past 
trends in average population mortality adds some judgement to the mostly 
mathematical approach of extrapolation.  However, qualitative theorising is 
not new in demography.  It allows exploration of a range of plausible 
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outcomes.  Models of potential future longevity postulated from observed 
mortality trends at population level add to demographic theory, even if 
somewhat qualitative (Burch 2003; Caldwell 1996; Hoem 2008).  The 
philosophy I adopted for this study is that of 'less computation, more 
cogitation' in the making of projections, as urged by Hajnal (1955). 
 
The new framework developed in this thesis for this study has three main 
analytic building blocks:  
 Comparing past mortality between countries: Identifying the notable 
features of New Zealand's mortality trends relative to those of similar 
countries. 
 Comparing future mortality projections between countries: Taking the 
findings from the between-country mortality trend analyses to test the 
consistency and plausibility of New Zealand's mortality projections.   
 Assessing within-country trends: Learning from emerging theories of 
mortality variance and assessing available empirical evidence to test 
whether mortality trends within subgroups of the New Zealand 
population are likely to disturb the path of projected future total 
population lifespans.  Further detail on the theory behind this part of 
the framework is in Chapter 6. 
 
The question is not whether each country has followed a suitable method 
of projection.  Rather, given the relative performance of past mortality trends 
do the relative projected future mortality trends appear reasonable?  Are there 
notable trends within New Zealand's mortality which could cause future 
mortality to behave differently relative to the group of countries, or which 
could disturb the extrapolation of New Zealand's total population mortality?  
What does this imply for New Zealand's mortality projections: do they appear 
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relatively optimistic or pessimistic; what is a plausible benchmark for future 
population lifespans in New Zealand?   
 
For the purposes of comparing mortality trends between countries, long 
time periods can be used where consistent data exist.  Seminal theories in 
demography have used over 100 years of data.  For example, Oeppen and 
Vaupel (2002) demonstrated world-record life expectancy from 1840.  A 
comparison between the populations of New Zealand and England and Wales 
of life expectancies at various ages was able to be made for birth cohorts from 
1876 because both countries have developed cohort life tables from historic 
mortality data (O'Connell and Dunstan 2009).  However, more recent data has 
been the basis for other relevant theories. For example, Tuljapurkar et al (2000) 
confirmed there has been a constant rate of mortality improvement among G7 
countries since 1950.  Analysis of mortality by birth cohort has been carried out 
using data since the 1950s or 1960s (Andreev and Vaupel 2005; Gallop 2008).   
 
The purpose of international analysis in this thesis is not to investigate a 
widely-applicable demographic theory on a world-wide basis, but rather to 
isolate trends and theories relevant to one country.  This perspective is less 
well documented in demographic literature.  A recent example is a study for 
the US National Research Council which used twenty-five years of data from 
1980 to investigate causes for the differences between longevity in the US and 
other high-income countries (Crimmins et al. 2010b).  Given the change in pace 
of improvement in older age mortality since the 1990s, recent data on mortality 
trends is likely to be more relevant for the purposes of developing projection 
scenarios than historical data.   
 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 3 
70 
For this study, the recent period during which mortality compression 
becomes a feature is most relevant.  Therefore, the decision was made to use 
data from 1961 to 2006.  This time period fits with the production of New 
Zealand total population period life tables which are published every five 
years.  For this study, the analysis period starts with the 1960-62 table and 
ends with the most recently published at the time of writing which covers the 
period 2005-7.  Prior to the 1950-52 tables, life tables were produced only for 
the non-Māori population.  A consistent time series therefore needed to start 
after that date, and a decision was made to start in 1960-62, allowing insight 
into the decades 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s and 1996-2006.  This study 
therefore provides a modern narrative of mortality in New Zealand and its 
comparison with the selected countries.  A longer term history of the tables 
and trends is in Statistics New Zealand (2009c). 
 
3.3 Selection of comparator countries 
The choice of comparative countries is made to keep the analysis relevant and 
focused.  The Preston curve (Bloom and Canning 2007; Preston 1975) 
demonstrates that life expectancy varies little between the world's richest 
countries, including New Zealand.  This establishes that a relevant comparison 
of New Zealand's mortality can be made restricting the comparison to 
developed countries.  Countries of similar economic development have had 
similar mortality trends on average in the recent past, although the differences 
can be illuminating (Leon 2011; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000; White 2002).  Janssen 
and Kunst (2007 p. 323) recommend using the mortality experience of 
countries with similar socio-economic, cultural and medical technology 
developments to "create a broader empirical basis for the identification of the 
most likely long-term trend".   
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New Zealand, by population count, is majority European in ancestry, and 
within that group predominantly British. The United Kingdom (UK) was the 
dominant source country for migration to New Zealand for one hundred and 
fifty years, up to the 1950s (Phillips and Hearn 2008).  From the 1960s, 
emigration to New Zealand has become more ethnically diverse, with 
significant inflows from Pacific Island nations, primarily Polynesia.  Migration 
from Asian countries, always present, increased from the 1980s and recent 
migration has come from the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.  People 
continue to settle in New Zealand from countries with large populations of 
European descent, and migration from the UK continues.  Australia, Canada 
and the United States (US) are also British settler countries which have had to 
some extent similar social histories.  For example, public health initiatives and 
health services that can be assumed to affect mortality have developed 
similarly, although the US health system in its lack of universal health care is 
the most different.  Therefore, the UK and the British settler countries 
Australia, Canada and the US offer themselves as suitable mortality 
comparators to New Zealand. 
 
All these countries publish detailed population and mortality data.  In 
New Zealand mortality projections are produced solely by a national statistics 
agency working within the demography discipline.  In the four other countries 
mortality projections are produced either separately by an actuarial office 
within a government department or jointly between the two offices (for further 
detail, see section 5.1).  Thus, these selected comparator countries offer new 
insights available from supplementing existing demographic methods with an 
actuarial approach.   
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The following data tables offer evidence that this group of five comparator 
countries has a sufficiently interesting range of difference on demographic and 
economic measures, even though there is a similar British dominance in 
population mix.  Table 3.4 shows population data.  Net migration rates will be 
volatile and hide flow sizes, but on the basis of the partly-projected figures 
estimated here, all countries have higher net migration than New Zealand.  
The proportion of overseas-born residents in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand is roughly double that of the UK and US.  In each settler country 
people born in China constitute the first, second or third largest overseas-born 
group and is likely to be rising in each case as Chinese migration continues.  
The importance of the number of migrants from the UK is confirmed as UK-
born people comprise the first or second largest overseas-born group in each 
British settler country except the US.  Birth country gives some comparable 
information on population mix, but does not necessarily signal ethnicity.  
Ethnic mix is more difficult to compare as the purpose and definition of 
measures of ethnicity vary between countries.  While a full analysis of the 
ethnic differences between each of the British settler countries examined here 
is out of scope for this study, some data points are offered to illustrate in Table 
3.5.   
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(a) 4.37m (2010) 
 













61.8m (2009).  
54.8 million in 
England and 
Wales. 














Sources and notes: Compiled from data downloaded from official statistical agency 
websites 17 February 2010.  Net migration rate data from United Nations (2011) 
estimates (Medium variant).  China includes Taiwan and Hong Kong except where 
data unavailable due to small size. 
Australia: ABS (2010), birth country data for 2008.  
New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand Tourism and migration 2007 statistics, data 
from Census 2006, as per cent of census usually resident count population shown at 
(b). (a) is estimated resident population.   
Canada: Statistics Canada, data from 2006 Census.   
UK: Birth country data is 2009/10 estimated from Annual Population Survey (APS) 
and Labour Force Survey (LFS), ONS. 
US: Census Bureau 2009 American Community Survey (Brief issued October 2010). 
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Table 3.5: Summary of available statistics which illustrate ethnic mix for 
selected countries  





Resident indigenous population estimated at 




Nearly 100 per cent of residents identify with 
the Canadian ethnic group or one denoting a 
European country, estimating from Census 
data similarly to the New Zealand method 
with multiple responses allowed.   
"Visible minority population" estimated at 16 






80 per cent of the usually resident New 
Zealand population identified with the 
"European" ethnic group (including New 
Zealander and individual European countries, 
mainly British), 15 per cent with Māori, 9 per 
cent Asian and 7 per cent Pacific peoples.  Note 
that the term "European" has a common use in 
New Zealand not found in other countries. 




2001 92 per cent of the UK population was in the 
"White" ethnic group and 8 per cent in the 






2010 Demographic profiling is by "race" and 
"Hispanic or Latino".  16 per cent are in the 
latter group.   
By "race alone or in combination with one or 
more other races": 75 per cent are "White", 14 
per cent "Black or African American", 6 per 
cent Asian. 
Sources: Compiled from data downloaded from official statistical agency websites 17 
February 2010:  ABS, Statistics Canada, Statistics New Zealand, ONS, US Census 
Bureau (downloaded 1 September 2010). 
* Figures do not add to 100 per cent because multiple responses are allowed (for race 
in the case of the US).  Figures for smaller categories not given. 
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Table 3.6 shows economic and summary life expectancy data.  Again, the 
US is seen as an outlier in the size of its GDP and the highest level of income 
inequality and the worst life expectancy of this selected group.  New Zealand 
has the lowest GDP and GDP per capita of the group.  It is in the middle of life 
expectancy ranking, with Australia providing a relevant high life expectancy 
country for comparison.   
 






















Australia 877 39,918 30.5 (2006) 4 6 
Canada 1,276 37,873 32.1 (2005) 9 8 
New 
Zealand 









14,044 45,087 45.0 (2007) 25 22 
Sources and notes: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita: Estimated, expenditure 
approach, US $, current prices, current PPPs, OECD statistics extracted 
February 2011. 
Gini index for distribution of family income. Takes value zero if perfect 
equality; 100 if income were distributed with perfect inequality.  Extracted 
from CIA World Factbook February 2011.   
Total population life expectancy ranking (unweighted average of male and 
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Comparison with European countries and other geographically closer 
countries was considered but not pursued.  European countries such as 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, as well as Japan offer good data that has been 
extensively analysed.  These countries are demographically interesting in part 
because of high life expectancy.  Japan leads the world on life expectancy at 
birth, and Norway and Sweden rank in the top ten of the OECD.  However, 
these countries have less history to share with New Zealand than does Britain, 
and are more ethnically homogenous than New Zealand.  Further, current 
projection methods have been compared for European Union (EU) countries 
by Lutz (2009), so new insights can be obtained by investigations outside of EU 
countries.  Finally, no EU country other than the UK undertakes detailed 
actuarial analysis by which additional insight could be obtained.   
 
The comparison with the United Kingdom was the basis for New 
Zealand's first mortality studies.  The first compilation of New Zealand 
mortality rates for a continuous period was by George Leslie in 1895, who 
found "very favourable - so favourable indeed as to be remarkable" mortality 
rates among non-Māori compared to select sub-groups within England and 
Wales (Leslie 1895 p. 7).  Lessof (1949) favourably compared the infant 
mortality at ages between 4 weeks and under 12 months of non-Māori in New 
Zealand with that in England and Wales.  Early studies such as these were 
limited by excluding data on Māori mortality.  However, they provide some 
insight into the development of settler mortality in New Zealand, and establish 
the precedent of comparing with British mortality. 
 
The hypothesis is that having shared some social and genetic history, 
these British settler countries have followed similar mortality trajectories in the 
past so that differences identified by comparative analysis would be 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 3 
77 
informative.  The mortality projections made in each country can therefore add 
insights to inform the others.  Specifically, the mortality projections of the 
other countries can help to critique New Zealand's in the context of findings 
from the comparative analysis of historical mortality.   
 
3.4 Selection of statistics 
The first section in this chapter cautioned against the common practice of 
relying on life expectancy - and particularly period life expectancy at birth - as 
the single measure to compare mortality levels and trends across countries and 
over time.  For this analysis, a range of statistics is selected to provide a more 
detailed empirical base of mortality data.  This section explains the rationale 
for the selection. 
 
Levels of mortality 
Period life expectancy at birth is a simple summary of mortality rates across a 
population at a point in time.  It therefore provides a useful summary 
comparison of mortality across countries.  Because of the emphasis in this 
thesis on superannuation policy, and the importance to that of later life 
mortality, life expectancy at age 65 and age 80 will be compared between 
selected countries, as well as life expectancy at birth.  
 
However, as discussed in section 3.1, the life expectancy measure can hide 
critical detail on what has happened or is happening in mortality rates at 
individual ages.  Cohort life expectancies are not produced as frequently as 
period life expectancies.  The Human Mortality Database contains past 
mortality rates and life expectancies on a period basis, but only past mortality 
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rates on a cohort basis (which are just a reorganising of period mortality rates 
into generational labels).  Cohort life expectancies for current and future 
generations require assumptions of future mortality rates and are generally 
produced as part of mortality projections.  These are therefore considered in 
Chapter 5, while to supplement the analysis of period life expectancy here, 
actual mortality rates will be additionally examined, as well as past trends in 
those rates.  
 
Demographers and actuaries use mortality rates, either qx or mx, as the 
smallest unit for measuring the probability of death (for definitions see section 
1.5).  Both q-type and m-type mortality rates can be used for comparison of 
past trends or projecting future trends.  Here, qx are compared across 
countries.  These are the most convenient consistent mortality rates available 
from each country's life tables.  In order to compare the level of mortality rates 
qx across all ages (x) direct standardisation is used (Rowland 2006 p. 125).  This 
technique converts each country's overall mortality rate for an age group to a 
comparable number as if all had the same age profile, thus removing any 
differences in numbers of deaths from population number differences at each 
age. 
 
Trends in mortality rates 
In any comparison of mortality rates, different patterns may be seen along 
different axes.  An 'age effect' is noted where mortality rates in a specific 
period change in a defined way with increasing age.  A 'period effect’ defines 
where age-specific mortality rates change at about the same pace over time.  A 
'cohort' effect describes the situation where members of a cohort sharing the 
same birth period share a particular mortality trend as they age.  As Hobcraft 
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et al (1982) point out, age-period-cohort effects are the core of the 
interpretation of demographic data, but rarely provide a unique explanation.  
Often these effects describe observed variations rather than causes; for 
example, it is not the period of time itself influencing mortality rates but 
something that happened during that period.  Further, it is usually a matter of 
opinion which of the trends is predominant.  For example, if a period effect 
has different impact on different ages, then it may appear to be a cohort effect 
but cannot be proven either way.  Therefore, any comparison from different 
countries of trends in a demographic variable like qx for defined ages and 
period may not provide a definitive explanation for the cause of the trends and 
the relative position of the countries.  
 
The presence of, and explanation for, cohort effects have controversially 
dominated the analysis of recent national mortality trends.  As discussed in 
section 2.2, the ‘golden cohort’ born between 1923 and 1940 in the UK (or, 
more precisely, much of the analysis has used data for the region England and 
Wales) has consistently experienced more rapid improvement in mortality 
rates throughout life than those born before or after.  This observation has 
been debated most prominently among actuaries.  Given actuarial input to the 
national population projections in the UK, and the timing of the discovery of a 
golden cohort near pension age coinciding with a pension policy focus 
(Pensions Commission 2004, 2005), the golden cohort made its mark on 
national population projections.  There was a rapid increase in the optimism of 
the mortality assumption for the UK's national population projections, 
including an assumption that the golden cohort would continue to keep its 
mortality improvement advantage until death (Dunnell 2008; Gallop 2008; 
ONS 2006; Willets 2004).   
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Andreev and Vaupel (2005) sought patterns in mortality rates by age and 
time since the 1950s for various countries, and identified a cohort effect 
superimposed on a predominantly period pattern for England and Wales.  
They also found cohort effects in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and West Germany and predominantly period 
effects in the USA and Canada.  In Australia and New Zealand they identified 
'age shifting' effects where over time the highest rates of mortality 
improvement shift from younger to older ages.  O'Connell and Dunstan (2009) 
compared New Zealand's mortality rates with those of England and Wales for 
periods since 1961 to conclude that a golden cohort was apparent in both 
countries.  However, although both claims to a golden cohort were debatable, 
that of England and Wales appeared the stronger.   
 
Murphy (2010) has suggested that too much emphasis has been placed on 
cohort effects in explaining population-level mortality trends and argued for 
more thought to be given to what macro-level factors cause mortality trends, 
focusing on the disadvantaged groups rather than those with high mortality 
improvement rates.  However, Murphy's analysis did not deny the presence of 
the cohort patterns in data from Japan and England and Wales, nor did it 
derive new explanations for the causes.  Further, given the cohort's current 
age, the unexpected longevity has an immediate current and negative 
economic impact on the cost of pension funds and public pensions so there is a 
compelling policy rationale for the analytic emphasis on the golden cohort.  
Therefore, despite the controversy over the relative significance of apparent 
cohort effects, they merit consideration alongside age and period effects in this 
comparative mortality analysis. 
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The literature on cohort effects in mortality trends suggests a framework 
for comparative analysis across countries.  In all the above-mentioned papers, 
the measure of mortality change over time used is the annual rate of change in 
the mortality rate, shown here for a q-type rate: 
 
       
    
      
                      
 
This measure has not been defined in the literature, but is here defined as QXI, 
to denote 'qx improvement'.  This is because the prevailing trend in all selected 
countries for the majority of time periods and ages has been mortality 
improvement, which gives a positive value for QXI as defined.  A negative 
value for QXI denotes a mortality rate at age x increasing over the time period 
t, that is, worsening mortality.  An m-type or q-type QXI is the basis for 
projecting mortality in national population projections, as discussed further in 
section 5.1.  In this study, following the international comparison of the levels 
of mortality rates, a comparison of QXI over time for each age x is made to 
examine trends in mortality and age-period-cohort effects.  
 
In many papers investigating QXI, Lexis maps are the preferred method.  
A Lexis map plots the derivative of smoothed age-specific mortality rates (or 
their logarithms) with age and calendar time on two axes, so that a birth cohort 
is represented along the diagonal.  The plots are therefore a continuous 
representation of the above equation for QXI.  The rate of mortality change is 
coloured to show visually age-period-cohort defined areas of greatest 
mortality improvement, and a golden cohort is shown by a strongly-coloured 
diagonal.  However, other papers have used simple tables of QXI.  O'Connell 
and Dunstan (2009) compared QXI of New Zealand and England and Wales, 
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following Gallop (2008), noting that the greater detail of Lexis maps did not 
yield more valuable insights.  For the purpose of identifying differences in 
national population mortality trends that are inevitably unable to be fully 
explained by underlying cause, the greater complexity of Lexis maps does not 
appear justified.  Further, while Lexis maps use smoothed data that prevents 
year by year variations disturbing a view of the long-term trend, an analysis of 
QXI uses smoothed mortality rates from life tables which usually represent 
more than one year's data.  Therefore the convenience and simplicity of 
tabulated numeric QXI are preferred here, and the methodology of O'Connell 
and Dunstan (2009) is extended to the selected comparator countries.   
 
Age at death measures 
The assertion that life expectancy at birth is not an adequate measure of 
mortality trends for a population in which the indicator approaches 80 years 
(Olshansky et al. 1990) applies to the selected countries in this analysis.  
Following the suggestion that trends in life expectancy at birth, the median 
and adult modal ages at death together provide a basis for better explanation 
of trends than any one of those measures alone (Canudas-Romo 2010), all these 
measures will be analysed for each of the countries.  Median and modal ages 
at death are identified from further columns in the life table.  In a period life 
table, the probability of dying aged x (qx) is applied to the hypothetical 
number of lives left at age x, lx.  The starting number of lives (radix of the 
table), l0, is set at an arbitrary number, usually 100,000.  Then it follows that the 
number of deaths at each age x for that radix is  
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The median age at death is the age at which the number of surviving lives 
lx falls below half of the radix.  The adult modal age at death is the age at 
which the highest number of deaths dx occurs among adult ages.  It is 
necessary to stipulate adult ages so as to exclude the case where there may be 
a higher number of deaths at age zero (newborn).  Formulae to enable these 
two measures to be calculated with decimal point precision are given in 
Canudas-Romo (2010) Appendix A: 
 
Median age at death at time t =  
   
          
             
 
where x and x+ 1 form the age interval in which lx crosses half of the radix 
of the life table at time t, radix = 1. 
 
Modal age at death at time t =  
   
             
                            
 
where x is the age with the highest number of deaths, x>0. 
 
Because mortality rates at the oldest ages are based on smaller samples, 
smoothing and approximation becomes more important.  Therefore, 
comparisons of qx and QXI at older ages may be distorted by methods used to 
smooth.  Some analysis is therefore truncated at older ages, but analysis of life 
expectancy at older ages and of modal ages at death yield further insight on 
mortality at older ages. 
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3.5 Selection of mortality projections 
Reports on past mortality trends and on future mortality projections from both 
demographic and actuarial agencies in the selected countries provide data and 
background context for what follows in the next two chapters.  These source 
materials are referenced in Table 3.7.  Each set of projections is the latest 
available at the time of analysis for this thesis (2009-10) so they form a set 
contemporary with the projections of New Zealand mortality available at the 
time of the survey of subjective lifespans. 
 
Each of the mortality projections considered from the sources in Table 3.7 
uses the extrapolation techniques discussed in section 2.3.  However, the 
details of each method vary.  Different specific techniques or formulae for 
extrapolation are used.  Extrapolation, although essentially formulaic, requires 
judgement about, for example, how long a past trend should be assumed to 
carry forward, and how far it should be allowed to trend before levelling off.  
In order to decide on the parameters for extrapolation formulae, agencies 
supplement the information from past trends in different ways.  For example, 
the assumptions for the projections by the UK's Office for National Statistics 
are influenced by the views of an expert panel on what future mortality trends 
might be.  However, none of the agencies develop a biodemographic rationale 
for adjustments to pure extrapolation, or give a rationale based on 
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Table 3.7: Main demographic and actuarial sources of national population 
projections in selected countries 
 Demographic Actuarial 
Australia Population Projections, 
Australia 2006 to 2101 
Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) 
ABS (2008) 





Canada Population Projections for 
Canada, Provinces and 
Territories 2009 to 2036 
Statistics Canada (2010) 
Canada Pension Plan 
Mortality Study 
Actuarial Study No. 7 




New Zealand National Population 
Projections: 2009 (base)–
2061 






(UK) (Note 3) 
2008-based National Population Projections 





2008 National Population 
Projections 
US Census Bureau (2008) 
 
2010 OASDI Report (The 
2010 Annual Report of the 
Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance and 
Federal Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds) 
OASDI Board of Trustees 
(2010) 
(Note 4) 
Notes for Table 3.7: 
Note 1: The Canadian Pension Plan Mortality Study gives mortality data for 
Canada less Québec. 
Notes continue on following page. 
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Notes for Table 3.7, continued: 
Note 2: The Government Actuary in New Zealand has a regulatory role for 
superannuation schemes and KiwiSaver, but does not produce mortality data 
or population projections. 
 
Note 3: Population projections in the UK have a strong actuarial influence.  
The Government Actuary's Department (GAD) was responsible for producing 
the UK's official national population projections from 1954 until 2006.  
Responsibility for the production of the official national population projections 
and associated demographic data then transferred to the ONS.  A specialist 
unit for mortality data is staffed jointly by demographers and actuaries. 
 
Note 4: The population base for the OASDI report comprises beneficiaries and 
future beneficiaries of the OASDI program. 
 
 
Further, none of the sources give sufficient detail about the methods used 
or judgements made to allow a reader to reproduce the calculations or fully 
critique the assumptions underlying the results.  The number of assumptions 
and complexities by age, gender and time period would be too demanding.  
However, it is not necessary for this purpose to replicate each calculation or 
compare the methodology of each projection in detail.  Here, the comparison 
of New Zealand's mortality projections to those of other countries can be 
described by a comparison of assumptions and results, and by setting these in 
context with the comparison of past mortality trends in the selected countries.   
 
Focusing the choice of projections for comparison 
For this study, it is preferred to use cohort measures to compare future 
estimates of population mortality across countries.  Cohort life expectancy is 
more relevant to meaningful individual lifespan prospects, rather than period 
measures, as discussed in section 3.1.  The actuarial agencies of Australia, 
Canada and the US publish projected future cohort life expectancy, whereas 
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the statistical agencies of those countries only publish period measures.  The 
UK's statistical agency publishes cohort measures.  Statistics New Zealand 
publishes official population projections using period life expectancy 
measures, but has made available estimates of future cohort life expectancy 
consistent with the assumption scenarios of the official projections (obtained 
through personal communication with Statistics New Zealand November 
2009).     
 
There is often more useful detail on the assumptions for and results of 
mortality projections in the actuarial agency reports than in the statistical 
agency projections.  For example, in Australia, the projections from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics are made by assuming a simple future rate of 
increase in life expectancy at birth which is a marked exception from the usual 
practice of extrapolating age-specific mortality rates.  Generally, estimates of 
future life expectancy are published only in summary for few future years by 
statistical agencies, whereas the actuarial reports present or make freely 
available more data.  Mortality is only one part of the total population 
projections carried out by the statistical agencies, but is often more important 
in the work of the actuarial agencies, especially if the projections are carried 
out for the national pension or social security plan, as they are in Canada and 
the US.  Because the most useful detailed data using cohort measures is 
available in the actuarial projections for Australia, Canada and the US, it is 
these projections (that is, sourced from the right hand column in Table 3.7) that 
are compared with the actuarially-influenced projections of the UK and the 
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A potential disadvantage of this approach is that the actuarial mortality 
projections for Canada and the US are made for a different purpose and do not 
cover the entire national population that was the basis for the international 
mortality comparison in Chapter 4.  However it does not appear to be the case 
that distinctive mortality characteristics of these sub-populations would distort 
the analysis here.  The actuarial mortality projections for the OASDI report in 
the US (see Table 3.7) are made using National Center for Health Statistics data 
on deaths and Census estimates of population, and so reflect national 
mortality characteristics and for practical purposes can be taken to cover the 
total population (OASDI Board of Trustees 2010 p. 79).  The actuarial 
projection in Canada is for the Canada Pension Plan in Canada less Québec.  
Mortality improvement rates which formed the basis of the projections were 
checked for consistency with national data (OCA 2009 p. 27).  Canada less 
Québec is estimated to comprise 77 per cent of the national population in 2009 
(Statistics Canada 2010 Table 8).  Nearly all other provinces or territories 
within Canada differ on period life expectancy in 2006 and 2036 for males and 
females from the national average by greater amounts than Québec (Statistics 
Canada (2010) Table 1.3).  The actuarial mortality projections of Canada and 
the US have been compared with the national mortality projections of the UK 
before for the purpose of comparing methods and population mortality 
patterns (Gutterman 2008). This present study uses more recent data, adds 
national mortality projections from the Australian Government Actuary and 
Statistics New Zealand, and extends the analysis to question the source of 
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3.6 Conclusions 
Literature reviewed in Chapter 2 raised the prospect of individual and 
population average lifespan being underestimated in an era of continuing 
mortality improvement, as a consequence of the methods used to produce 
estimates of future longevity.  This chapter identifies further reasons why 
lifespans are underestimated: the most common measure of life expectancy is 
constructed without taking age- and time-dependent mortality change into 
account, yet is routinely misrepresented as if it were an indicator of what 
individuals should expect their lifespan to be.  Further, life expectancy (and 
especially period life expectancy at birth) is commonly used to show time 
trends of population mortality or lifespan, yet is increasingly inadequate for 
that purpose especially in high life expectancy environments like New 
Zealand.  Once the construction of period life expectancy is understood, these 
results are intuitive, as is the superiority of cohort life expectancy as an 
indicator of realistic lifespans and mortality trends.  Yet the use and analysis of 
cohort life expectancy lags behind that of period life expectancy. 
 
This thesis develops a view on plausible future average lifespans in New 
Zealand so that actual expectations can be assessed against a likely reality.  
This is the basis for understanding whether longevity risk exists.  In this study, 
a framework is developed to review existing mortality projections for 
plausibility.  This framework builds on the understanding of the flaws in 
common measures of lifespan, on the encouragement to use comparisons of 
mortality trends between-countries and within-country as inputs to projecting 
future mortality, and on learning from emerging demographic theories of 
mortality variance. 
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The first two parts of this framework collect empirical evidence on New 
Zealand's past and projected future mortality compared to other countries, to 
draw inferences by comparison.  The comparative analysis is made for 
mortality experience since the 1960s for the selected British settler countries.  
The countries were selected because of the social and ancestral similarities 
with New Zealand, as well as each other country providing robust actuarial 
data, the analysis of which is new to New Zealand.  Significant mortality 
issues within New Zealand are also covered insofar as they affect the 
extrapolation of mortality projections.  The time period for analysis follows 
other studies to focus on the decades since 1960 so that a modern history is 
examined.   
 
The evidence to be collected and interpreted involves more than the usual 
single measure of life expectancy.  The measures used here supplement the 
flawed period life expectancy measure by additionally examining the level of 
age-specific mortality rates and their annual rate of improvement.  The 
contribution of younger cohorts to future mortality is considered by specific 
analysis of mortality improvement rates by age and cohort.  Older age 
mortality is additionally assessed by the use of median and adult modal ages 
at death. 
 
The analytic framework designed here to enhance interpretation of the 
extrapolative method used in New Zealand's mortality projections is an 
original approach which builds on previous literature in order to develop a 
new view of New Zealand's likely future mortality. 
 
 




Chapter 4: New Zealand mortality in international 
context 
This chapter gives the empirical results from the first part of the analytic 
framework set out in the previous chapter: comparative analysis of New 
Zealand's and selected countries' past mortality trends.  Each section covers a 
different mortality indicator with the concluding section highlighting the 
notable features of New Zealand mortality. 
 
4.1 Level of mortality rates 
The mortality rates for males at the beginning of the comparison period are 
shown in Figure 4.1 and for the end of the period in Figure 4.2.  Equivalent 
figures for females follow.  For all life table data in this chapter, the statistics 
were obtained from the life tables in the Human Mortality Database (HMD; 
www.mortality.org) except for New Zealand data which was taken directly 
from life tables published by Statistics New Zealand (downloaded from 
www.stats.govt.nz).  This was for ease of use; the data is consistent between 
the two sources.  HMD contains mortality rates for each calendar year, taken 
from published life tables which may span a longer period.  Thus "1961" and 
"2006" are used to denote the entries from those years from HMD, but the New 
Zealand data is from the period life tables of 1960-62 and 2005-7 respectively. 
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Figure 4.1: Mortality rate at age x (qx) for ages 0 to 100 years for selected 
countries, logarithmic scale, males, 1961 
 
Source: New Zealand mortality rates from Statistics New Zealand life tables.  
Other mortality rates from Human Mortality Database life tables (downloaded 
August 2010). 
 
Figure 4.2: Mortality rate at age x (qx) for ages 0 to 100 years for selected 
countries, logarithmic scale, males, 2006 
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Figure 4.3: Mortality rate at age x (qx) for ages 0 to 100 years for selected 
countries, logarithmic scale, females, 1961 
 
Source: As Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.4: Mortality rate at age x (qx) for ages 0 to 100 years for selected 
countries, logarithmic scale, females, 2006 
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The selected countries have similar levels of age-specific mortality rates, 
similar patterns by age and gender and similar trends over time.  The shape of 
the graphs is the classic one for all developed countries: the mortality rate at 
birth is higher than that at age 1, then the curve falls rapidly to low levels for 
young children.  It rises steadily as age increases interrupted only by the 
'accident hump' of higher mortality at late teen ages and twenties, especially in 
males.  A sharper accident hump appears for females around age 20 in 2006 
compared to 1961 for all countries because of a more rapid fall in mortality 
rates either side of the apparent hump.  Female mortality rates are lower than 
those for males at all ages and both time periods.  From 1961 to 2006 mortality 
rates have fallen.  Differences between the countries appear to have widened 
slightly by 2006 compared to 1961.  New Zealand's mortality rates are in the 
middle of the group of countries.  There is little apparent difference between 
countries except that US mortality rates are noticeably higher (worse) from age 
20 until age 70 when they cross over to become lower (better). 
 
Table 4.1 shows standardised mortality ratios for the same two periods.  
The all-ages figures (up to age 80 shown here) confirm that New Zealand's 
mortality is in the middle of the selected group of countries.  Against the UK 
and Canada, the relative all-ages position of New Zealand has changed little 
over the last forty-five years.  New Zealand had in 2006 better mortality than 
the US and UK for both males and females.  Male mortality in New Zealand is 
on a par with that in Canada.  New Zealand mortality is worse than Canada 
for females, and for both genders compared to Australia.  The improvement in 
Australia's relative position between 2006 and 1961 is striking. 
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New Zealand's improved position has been especially marked against the 
US at all ages except for females aged 1-20.  New Zealand's relative mortality 
appears to have improved at ages over 40 but worsened at younger ages, 
compared to both Canada and the UK, especially for males.  Compared to 
Australia, New Zealand's relative mortality has worsened at all ages except for 
males aged 0 to 20.  The mortality of females at ages 1-20 appears to have 
worsened in New Zealand considerably from 1961 to 2006 relative to all the 
comparator countries. The mortality of New Zealand newborns (age 0) 
appears to be similar or slightly worse in the 2006 comparison with Australia, 
Canada and the UK relative to 1961 but improved compared to the US.  
Newborn mortality requires detailed examination within the first year of life, 
outside the scope of this study. 
 
Table 4.1: Directly standardised mortality ratio in year shown, standardised 
to New Zealand 2006 population 
1961 
    Male Australia Canada UK US 
Age 0 89% 122% 101% 115% 
Age 1-20 99% 103% 80% 98% 
Age 21-40 108% 106% 84% 128% 
Age 41-60 110% 104% 108% 128% 
Age 61-80 105% 91% 116% 99% 
Age 0-80 105% 97% 111% 108% 
     Female Australia Canada UK US 
Age 0 92% 125% 103% 116% 
Age 1-20 92% 92% 76% 94% 
Age 21-40 94% 90% 87% 116% 
Age 41-60 94% 93% 99% 111% 
Age 61-80 96% 91% 107% 94% 
Age 0-80 95% 93% 103% 99% 
Table continues, with notes, on following page. 
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Table 4.1: Directly standardised mortality ratio in year shown, standardised 
to New Zealand 2006 population, continued 
2006 
    Male Australia Canada UK US 
Age 0 93% 98% 98% 132% 
Age 1-20 71% 81% 71% 117% 
Age 21-40 88% 85% 94% 148% 
Age 41-60 90% 106% 117% 162% 
Age 61-80 91% 101% 114% 118% 
Age 0-80 90% 100% 112% 130% 
     Female Australia Canada UK US 
Age 0 91% 104% 103% 136% 
Age 1-20 69% 76% 68% 97% 
Age 21-40 82% 86% 92% 145% 
Age 41-60 79% 97% 108% 141% 
Age 61-80 83% 97% 113% 120% 
Age 0-80 82% 96% 110% 125% 
 
Source: New Zealand mortality rates from Statistics New Zealand life tables.  
Other mortality rates from Human Mortality Database life tables (downloaded 
August 2010). 
Notes: 
Table 4.1 shows mortality rates qx to age 80 from period life tables for each 
country standardised to the New Zealand 2006 Estimated Resident Population 
(from Statistics New Zealand), as a ratio to that for New Zealand mortality 
rates.  The standardised measure averages across ages to yield one measure for 
the population.  The use of the same population for comparison removes the 
effect of different population age structures between countries and time 
periods.  A ratio greater than 100 per cent implies New Zealand mortality was 
lighter (better) than the compared country and a ratio of less than 100 per cent 
means that New Zealand mortality was worse.  Analysis was cut off after age 
80 as mortality rates above that age are less stable. 
 
  




4.2 Life expectancy 
Figure 4.5 compares period life expectancy at birth for 1961 for males and 
females in the selected countries and Figure 4.6 does so for 2006.  Note that the 
scales on these graphs are truncated to allow focus on the differences in value 
between countries.  As period life expectancy is calculated using mortality 
rates at each age at that point in time, it is a summary measure of all ages 
mortality.  The figures confirm that the selected countries have similar levels of 
mortality, and that New Zealand is a relatively healthy country compared to 
other settler nations.  In 1961, New Zealand mortality appeared better than all 
selected countries for male life expectancy at birth, although only slightly (by 
0.04 of a year) compared to Canada.  For females, New Zealand mortality was 
slightly better than that in both the UK and US but more significantly behind 
that in Australia and Canada.  Since then, life expectancy at birth in Australia 
markedly improved to take first place for both males and females.  Compared 
to Canada, the relative mortality position of female New Zealanders did not 
change and there was a slight deterioration in that of male New Zealanders.  
Life expectancy in the US lags throughout the period. 
  




Figure 4.5: Period life expectancy at birth for selected countries, in years, 
1961 
 
Source: New Zealand data from Statistics New Zealand life tables.  Other 
mortality rates from Human Mortality Database life tables (downloaded 
August 2010). 
 
Figure 4.6: Period life expectancy at birth for selected countries, in years, 
2006 
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Further insights on age-related changes in the comparison of mortality can 
be seen by looking at life expectancy at ages 65 and 80.  These measures 
incorporate the life table mortality rates from those ages until the table ends 
into one number, therefore smoothing out potential distortions in mortality 
rates at the highest ages caused by small numbers.  Table 4.2 shows the life 
expectancy measures, including life expectancy at birth for completeness, with 
additional statistics on the difference between each country and New Zealand. 
 
The ranks of New Zealand life expectancy measures have not changed 
over the period, with two exceptions.  The first is the rank of male life 
expectancy at birth which fell from number 1 (highest life expectancy, best 
mortality) in 1961 to 3 in 2006.  This was due to relative improvements for both 
Canada and Australia, while the gap to the UK changed little, and mortality in 
the US worsened relatively.  The second is the increase in rank for female life 
expectancy at age 65 from 4 to 3.  This is due to the changing position of US life 
expectancy at age 65 over the period, from rank 2 in 1961 to rank 4 in 2006.  
The 1961 rank is anomalous for relative US mortality at younger ages.  By 2006 
the effect on mortality at older ages has lessened, so that the rank of New 
Zealand's life expectancy at age 65 returns to the rank for life expectancy at 
birth.  However, the effect is still present in life expectancy at age 80 so that for 
the US ranks best for females in 2006, and third for males.  This pushes New 
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Table 4.2: New Zealand period life expectancy at birth, at age 65 and at age 
80 compared to selected countries, 1961 and 2006 





At age 65 At age 80 
1961 Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Australia 74.5 68.1 15.9 12.6 7.1 5.8 
Canada 74.5 68.4 16.3 13.6 7.3 6.3 
NZ 73.8 68.4 15.5 12.8 6.4 5.5 
UK 73.7 67.8 15.1 11.9 6.3 5.2 
US 73.7 67.0 16.2 13.1 7.2 6.1 
NZ rank 3 1 4 3 4 4 
       2006 
      Australia 83.8 79.2 21.7 18.6 10.0 8.3 
Canada 82.9 78.3 21.3 18.2 10.2 8.3 
NZ 82.2 78.0 20.6 18.0 9.5 8.0 
UK 81.5 77.2 20.0 17.2 9.2 7.7 
US 80.7 75.5 20.2 17.5 9.9 8.4 
NZ rank 3 3 3 3 4 4 






At age 65 At age 80 
1961 Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Australia 0.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.3 
Canada 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 
UK -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.9 -0.1 -0.3 
US 0.0 -1.4 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.6 
       2006 
      Australia 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Canada 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.3 
UK -0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 
US -1.5 -2.5 -0.4 -0.5 0.4 0.4 
Table continues, with notes, on following page. 
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Table 4.2: New Zealand period life expectancy at birth, at age 65 and at age 
80 compared to selected countries, 1961 and 2006, continued 





At age 65 At age 80 
1961 Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Australia 1.0% -0.6% 2.9% -1.5% 9.6% 5.6% 
Canada 1.0% -0.1% 5.4% 6.3% 13.7% 14.9% 
UK -0.1% -0.9% -2.7% -7.3% -1.4% -4.9% 
US -0.1% -2.1% 4.7% 2.2% 12.6% 10.9% 
       2006 
      Australia 2.0% 1.4% 5.1% 3.5% 5.4% 3.9% 
Canada 0.9% 0.3% 3.1% 1.1% 7.2% 4.1% 
UK -0.8% -1.1% -3.1% -4.0% -3.1% -3.4% 
US -1.8% -3.3% -1.9% -2.6% 4.0% 5.4% 
Source: New Zealand data from Statistics New Zealand life tables.  Other 
mortality rates from Human Mortality Database life tables (downloaded 
August 2010). 
 
The magnitude of the gap between New Zealand's life expectancy at birth 
and that of other countries in 2006 is consistent with what was found from the 
mortality rate analysis in Table 4.1: a small gap to the better measure in 
Canada, and a larger gap to the even better measure in Australia; and small 
and large gaps to the UK and US in the other direction.  The gaps are roughly 
symmetrical for males, that is, New Zealand all ages mortality is as better 
compared to the UK as it is worse compared to Canada, and similarly for the 
US and Australia. For females, New Zealand's relative position is better, so all 
ages mortality is closer to the higher ranking Australia and Canada than to the 
laggards of the UK and US. 
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This shape of mortality position changes at higher ages, as seen by the size 
of the difference between New Zealand's and other countries' life expectancy 
at ages 65 and 80.  The difference widens for all countries, with the US 
difference changing signs, as noted above.  This is consistent with Table 4.1  as 
while life expectancy at age 65 is calculated with reference only to mortality 
rates from age 65, life expectancy at birth is calculated from mortality rates at 
all ages, but gives less weight to mortality rates at ages 65 and over.  Table 4.1 
therefore gives a better comparison of the absolute level of mortality rates in 
age bands.   
 
White (2002) showed that over the period 1955-1995, the period life 
expectancy at birth for 21 high income countries (including the five selected 
here) converged; that is that the average difference from the average life 
expectancy at birth was lower in 1995 than in 1955.  Moreover, he showed that 
the change in life expectancy at birth over the period for any country was 
partially predicted by that country's level of life expectancy relative to the 
group mean.  These conclusions do not hold for the smaller group selected 
here, over the later and slightly longer time period than White's.  The average 
deviation from the group mean life expectancy at birth is shown in Table 4.3.  
It has increased over the period, although a large part of the increase can be 
attributed to the worsening relative position of the US. 
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Table 4.3: Average absolute deviation from average life expectancy at birth 
for the selected countries, 1961 and 2006, in years 
 
Including US  Excluding US 
 
Females Males  Females Males 
1961 0.4 0.4  0.4 0.3 
2006 0.9 1.0  0.8 0.6 
Source: Calculated from life table data following White (2002) Table 3 for the 
UK and British settler countries selected here.  New Zealand data from 
Statistics New Zealand life tables.  Other mortality rates from Human 
Mortality Database life tables (downloaded August 2010). 
 
White's conclusions suggest that the US would catch up with the group, 
having started from a spell of lower than average life expectancy.  However, 
the US appears to be a special case.  Not only has the gap between US and 
other countries' life expectancy at birth widened in recent decades, but the 
international ranking of US life expectancy crosses over from unfavourable to 
favourable from age 65 to age 80.  US demographic literature recognises data 
quality issues for the highest ages (Crimmins et al. 2010b).  Further, many 
researchers have pointed out that the US has a health problem which is not a 
result purely of a difference in health provision or insurance, despite issues 
with those (see review in Banks et al. 2010 p. S220).  The health problem is 
characterised as one of Americans becoming sicker at younger ages than 
Europeans.  It is thought that more persistent higher levels of smoking 
behaviour in the US, especially higher smoking prevalence in lower socio-
economic groups, plays a large part.  Contributions from other health causes, 
such as obesity, are possible but do not as yet have a firm evidence base 
(Crimmins et al. 2010b).  Moreover, the US is thought to be exceptional in the 
extent to which income inequality is consistently negatively associated with 
population health.  A review of nearly 100 epidemiological studies found that 
for other rich countries including Australia, Canada and New Zealand there 
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was little or no effect on aggregate health from income inequality, with 
evidence on the UK inconclusive (Lynch et al. 2004).  The mortality indicators 
in this study are consistent with the position of the US as a special case and 
therefore the US appears not to provide a plausible role model for New 
Zealand's mortality. 
 
4.3 Rate of mortality improvement 
In this section, the annual rates of improvement in mortality rates, QXI, are 
examined to give more detail on how New Zealand changed its relative 
mortality position over the last forty-five years.  The results of the analysis are 
shown at an overall all ages level by country, then the following section shows 
more detail by age.  Table 4.4 summarises to show average annual QXI in each 
past decade and over the whole period.  Again, age standardisation is used so 
that the all ages figures from different countries and time periods can be 
compared without any effect from different age structures. 'All-ages' here 
refers to all ages up to and including age 90.  
 
The five selected countries have had different QXI over the forty-five 
period but each has been positive.  Mortality has had a long-term trend of 
improvement.  Tables in the next section show that some mortality rates 
worsened for a few five year age bands in the 1960s (all countries) and in the 
1980s (all except Canada, and females in New Zealand and the UK).  However, 
these mortality rate increases were limited in size and to a small number of age 
bands, so that the overall population trend was a reduction in mortality rates 
over each decade with one exception: males in the US in the 1960s.   
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For all countries the 1960s were a poor decade with the all ages QXI being 
less than 1 per cent per annum for both males and females in all the five 
countries except UK females.  The general picture is of constant improvement, 
but at a slower pace in the first decade of this analysis, that is, a strong period 
effect in the 1960s. 
 
Table 4.4: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality (QXI) 
















        Australia 0.2% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 3.6% 
 
2.2% 
Canada 0.4% 2.1% 2.7% 2.8% 2.5% 
 
2.0% 










-0.3% 2.3% 1.0% 2.4% 1.9% 
 
1.3% 
         Females 
        Australia 0.3% 3.5% 2.0% 2.5% 2.6% 
 
2.1% 
Canada 0.6% 2.5% 2.3% 1.7% 1.9% 
 
1.8% 










0.3% 2.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2% 
 
1.3% 
Source: Calculated from mortality rates qx.  New Zealand mortality rates and 
population from Statistics New Zealand.  Other mortality rates from Human 
Mortality Database life tables (downloaded August 2010). 
 
Notes: The last decade shown 1996-2006 begins in the middle of the previous 
decade, 1991-2006. Each country's mortality rates at each time period are age-
standardised to the New Zealand Estimated Resident Population of June 2006.  
To explore whether the choice of standard population would affect the results, 
an alternative standardisation to the UK population made (details not shown).  
The resulting QXI by decade do not change by more than one decimal place, 
and the interpretations below based on relative rankings do not change. 
 
 




Mortality improvement has been at the same pace for males and females 
within each country over the entire period except for Australia and Canada 
where improvement in male mortality has been faster.  The ranking of QXI by 
country is the same for males and females.  Australia has seen the fastest 
improvement with QXI over 2 per cent per annum for both males (2.2 per cent) 
and females (2.1 per cent) over the forty-five year period.  Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK are close, with QXIs over the period being in the range 1.6 
per cent to 1.8 per cent except Canadian males appear to have done better with 
QXI of 2 per cent.  Mortality improvement has lagged in the US with QXI of 1.3 
per cent for both males and females.  The results of the previous section can 
now be put in some context.  The change in the relative position of New 
Zealand's mortality was caused by relatively faster mortality improvement in 
Australia, and to a lesser extent in Canada, and slower mortality improvement 
in the US.  New Zealand's average mortality improvement over the last forty-
five years ranks in the middle for this group of countries, just ahead in 
absolute terms of that for the UK. 
 
A more complex picture emerges decade by decade.  In the 1960s, New 
Zealand's QXI was poor, as was that in Australia and the US. In the 1970s, QXI 
increased for all countries, but New Zealand's was the worst for both males 
and females at 1.5 per cent (female) and 1.6 per cent (male).  In the next 
decade, QXI for male New Zealanders decreased, but that for females 
increased to rank equal second to Australia.  In the 1990s, QXI in New Zealand 
was the highest of all the selected countries at 2.6 per cent (female) and 3.3 per 
cent (male).  This momentum carried on into the beginning of the next decade, 
with the New Zealand QXI for females in 1996-2006 being the highest at 2.7 
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per cent and the male QXI at 2.5 per cent only second to an outperformance in 
Australia. 
 
The QXI measure for New Zealand has gained momentum throughout the 
forty-five year period, with female mortality improvement accelerating in the 
1980s before that of males in the 1990s.  Australia had a poor decade in the 
1960s, but has had relatively fast and constant improvement thereafter.  In 
Canada, the shape of QXI for males is similar to that in Australia, but for 
females there has been a slower pace of improvement since the 1990s.  QXI in 
the UK has been relatively constant after the 1960s, although the 1990s were 
better for males than females.  The US has not shown a consistent pattern.  
 
4.4 Mortality improvement by age and cohort 
Further insights can be seen from examining QXI in more detail by age.  QXI 
by five year age bands are summarised for the entire period in Figure 4.7 and 
Figure 4.8.  The average rates of mortality improvement over the forty-five 
year period follow a similar pattern by age in each country.  QXI are highest 
(around 3 to 3.5 per cent per annum for both sexes) at the youngest ages then 
fall to a low at ages 20 to 30 for males and ages 15 to 20 for females.  QXI for 
males climb to a higher level centred on 2 per cent per annum around age 60 
before falling back to 1 per cent at the oldest ages.  For females, QXI are flatter 
from age 30.  The countries with highest and lowest QXI overall, Australia and 
the US, generally achieve the highest and lowest QXI at most ages for both 
males and females.  The remaining three countries - Canada, the UK and New 
Zealand - take different rankings at different ages.  The relatively greater 
improvement in New Zealand after age 40, lagging only Australia, can be seen 
for both males and females.   
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Figure 4.7: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 
(QXI), 1961-2006, all ages to age 90, in five year age bands, males 
 
 
Source: See Table 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.8: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 
(QXI), 1961-2006, all ages to age 90, in five year age bands, females 
 



































Now looking within the whole period, QXI from each country by five year 
age bands for each decade are shown in Table 4.5.  The table shows further 
information as cells are highlighted where the value is above the average for 
ages 20 and over in that period plus one standard deviation.  These cells show 
the age bands at which mortality rates improved most rapidly in that period, 
relative to the other five-year gender-specific adult age bands for that country.  
These are referred to as significant QXI.  A lack of highlighting in any column 
indicates mortality improvement was evenly spread across adult ages.  Ages 
under 20 were not included in the range because rates of improvement have 
been high at these ages in most periods and most countries, and the focus of 
this analysis is to identify any cohort trends at adult ages.  This analysis uses 
the methodology of that in O'Connell and Dunstan (2009), as described in 
section 3.4.   
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 4 
 
110 
Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 
(QXI) by country and decade for five year age bands starting at age shown 
 
Source: See Table 4.4.  
Notes: Average shown is standard weighted average, all ages 0 to 90.  
Standard weights for five-year age bands and all ages average from New 
Zealand Estimated Resident Population 2006. 
Cells with bold figures in a box are those with a value higher than the simple 
average plus one standard deviation of the values for that time period for ages 
20 and over.  The calculation is carried out using unrounded QXI values.  QXI 
values are rounded to one decimal place in the table. 
 
Table continues on following pages. 
Australia, males 
 















0 1.8% 4.2% 5.0% 2.9% 5.1% 3.6% 
5 0.6% 3.0% 5.3% 3.4% 4.2%  3.3% 
10 1.5% 4.4% 3.1% 2.8% 5.5%  3.3% 
15 -1.7% 2.7% 2.9% 2.8% 5.0%  2.2% 
20 -1.4% 2.0% 1.7% 2.4% 4.3%  1.6% 
25 0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 1.5% 4.5%  1.4% 
30 0.9% 2.1% -0.7% 0.9% 3.4%  1.2% 
35 0.1% 3.2% 0.2% 1.6% 2.6%  1.4% 
40 1.4% 2.3% 2.7% 1.4% 1.8%  1.9% 
45 -0.1% 2.8% 3.6% 2.2% 1.2%  2.0% 
50 0.1% 2.2% 4.1% 3.5% 2.4%  2.3% 
55 -0.2% 2.4% 3.8% 3.2% 3.0%  2.4% 
60 0.1% 2.6% 2.5% 3.8% 4.0%  2.4% 
65 0.0% 2.3% 2.5% 3.7% 4.1%  2.3% 
70 -0.1% 1.9% 2.7% 3.0% 4.2%  2.1% 
75 -0.4% 1.9% 2.0% 2.8% 3.4%  1.8% 
80 -0.2% 1.3% 1.3% 2.5% 3.0%  1.3% 
85 -0.4% 1.6% 1.3% 0.9% 2.5%  1.1% 
Average 0.2% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 3.6%  2.2% 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 2.0% 5.1% 4.4% 2.8% 3.3% 3.3% 
5 1.8% 5.2% 2.9% 3.5% 1.6%  3.0% 
10 3.5% 0.9% 3.5% 3.1% 8.8%  3.3% 
15 -3.6% 4.2% 2.1% 3.7% 0.8%  1.3% 
20 -0.4% 2.8% 0.6% 2.5% 0.7%  1.5% 
25 1.3% 2.4% -0.4% 3.8% 2.6%  1.8% 
30 -0.1% 4.7% 0.5% 1.3% 2.3%  1.8% 
35 0.9% 4.2% 1.2% 1.0% 2.2%  1.9% 
40 -0.6% 4.4% 2.4% 0.5% 1.5%  1.9% 
45 -0.7% 3.4% 3.3% 2.2% 1.1%  1.9% 
50 0.0% 3.6% 2.0% 2.5% 2.6%  2.1% 
55 -0.6% 3.0% 2.4% 2.3% 3.1%  2.0% 
60 0.1% 2.7% 2.0% 3.3% 3.2%  2.1% 
65 0.8% 2.5% 1.7% 3.2% 3.5%  2.2% 
70 0.2% 3.2% 1.5% 2.7% 3.3%  2.1% 
75 0.2% 3.2% 1.5% 2.8% 3.2%  2.0% 
80 0.2% 2.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3%  1.5% 
85 -0.1% 2.1% 1.5% 1.1% 2.0%  1.2% 
Average 0.3% 3.5% 2.0% 2.5% 2.6%  2.1% 
For notes see page 110. 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 4 
 
112 
Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 3.4% 4.6% 4.4% 3.0% 3.0% 3.7% 
5 1.0% 5.2% 5.1% 4.1% 2.3%  3.6% 
10 1.2% 2.4% 4.3% 5.3% 2.7%  3.0% 
15 -1.6% 0.7% 3.4% 2.8% 1.6%  1.5% 
20 -0.6% 1.2% 2.6% 2.9% 1.8%  1.4% 
25 0.4% 0.8% 0.9% 3.4% 2.6%  1.4% 
30 0.1% 1.6% 0.4% 2.9% 3.9%  1.4% 
35 0.6% 2.0% 1.0% 2.3% 3.5%  1.5% 
40 -0.4% 2.5% 2.5% 1.8% 2.6%  1.6% 
45 0.1% 2.0% 3.0% 1.9% 1.3%  1.7% 
50 0.4% 1.9% 3.1% 2.0% 1.8%  1.8% 
55 0.5% 1.6% 2.8% 2.6% 2.3%  1.9% 
60 0.6% 1.5% 2.2% 2.5% 2.6%  1.8% 
65 0.3% 1.2% 1.9% 2.7% 3.2%  1.7% 
70 0.4% 1.2% 1.6% 2.1% 3.4%  1.5% 
75 0.4% 0.9% 1.2% 2.0% 2.7%  1.3% 
80 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 1.6% 2.6%  1.0% 
85 0.3% 0.9% 0.2% 1.1% 2.1%  0.8% 
Average 0.4% 2.1% 2.7% 2.8% 2.5%  2.0% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 2.5% 5.2% 5.1% 2.1% 3.5% 3.7% 
5 0.0% 4.4% 4.2% 2.9% 3.3%  3.0% 
10 -0.8% 4.0% 2.7% 3.1% 2.1%  2.2% 
15 -1.7% 1.8% 2.1% 1.9% 0.9%  1.0% 
20 -0.2% 2.7% 2.2% 1.3% 0.5%  1.3% 
25 1.5% 1.0% 1.9% 2.6% 1.3%  1.7% 
30 0.3% 3.1% 1.6% 1.4% 2.6%  1.7% 
35 0.6% 3.0% 1.7% 0.7% 1.8%  1.6% 
40 -0.4% 2.3% 2.4% 1.3% 2.2%  1.4% 
45 0.6% 1.7% 2.5% 1.1% 1.2%  1.4% 
50 1.4% 1.2% 2.4% 1.5% 1.1%  1.5% 
55 1.0% 1.4% 1.8% 1.8% 2.3%  1.5% 
60 1.6% 1.2% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9%  1.5% 
65 2.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.3% 1.9%  1.6% 
70 1.9% 1.7% 1.3% 1.2% 1.9%  1.6% 
75 2.1% 2.0% 0.9% 1.4% 2.0%  1.6% 
80 1.5% 1.7% 1.0% 1.1% 2.1%  1.4% 
85 1.2% 2.0% 0.6% 0.6% 1.6%  1.2% 
Average 0.6% 2.5% 2.3% 1.7% 1.9%  1.8% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 
(QXI) by country and decade for five year age bands starting at age shown, 
continued 
New Zealand, males 
 















0 2.4% 2.9% 2.6% 4.6% 3.2% 
 
3.1% 
5 1.6% 2.7% 2.7% 5.1% 3.7% 
 
2.9% 
10 1.5% 3.4% -0.1% 3.3% 2.2% 
 
2.3% 
15 -2.7% 1.2% 0.3% 3.5% 4.4% 
 
1.0% 
20 -1.0% -0.8% -0.9% 5.0% 3.7% 
 
0.7% 
25 0.2% -0.9% -0.3% 2.3% 3.5% 
 
0.7% 
30 0.2% 1.1% 0.0% 1.2% 3.0% 
 
1.1% 
35 -0.4% 2.4% -0.1% 2.4% 1.0% 
 
1.1% 
40 -0.6% 2.1% 2.2% 1.9% 0.6% 
 
1.3% 
45 0.0% 1.5% 2.7% 2.9% 1.9% 
 
1.8% 
50 -0.4% 2.0% 2.3% 3.6% 3.0% 
 
1.9% 
55 -0.7% 1.5% 2.7% 3.9% 3.8% 
 
2.0% 
60 -0.4% 1.5% 2.8% 3.5% 4.1% 
 
2.0% 
65 -0.5% 1.2% 2.5% 3.3% 4.1% 
 
1.9% 
70 -0.3% 1.0% 2.1% 2.8% 3.8% 
 
1.7% 
75 -0.4% 0.9% 2.0% 2.5% 3.2% 
 
1.5% 
80 -0.1% 0.9% 1.3% 2.4% 2.8% 
 
1.3% 
85 0.2% 0.8% 1.8% 1.0% 1.8% 
 
1.1% 
Average 0.0% 1.6% 1.3% 3.3% 2.9% 
 
1.7% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 
(QXI) by country and decade for five year age bands starting at age shown, 
continued 
New Zealand, females 
 















0 2.3% 2.5% 5.3% 1.6% 2.2% 2.9% 
5 1.4% 3.9% 0.5% 3.7% 3.3%  2.8% 
10 0.9% 2.6% 3.3% 0.9% 3.7%  2.1% 
15 -1.5% -0.4% 2.0% 3.8% 2.9%  0.7% 
20 -0.3% -1.3% 1.8% 2.8% 4.1%  0.9% 
25 0.9% 0.7% 1.1% 1.4% 4.9%  1.7% 
30 0.7% 2.0% 1.1% 2.0% 1.5%  1.5% 
35 0.7% 2.7% 1.3% 2.9% 1.1%  1.6% 
40 -0.5% 2.1% 2.1% 3.0% 1.0%  1.5% 
45 -0.6% 0.6% 2.9% 3.3% 2.1%  1.6% 
50 -0.2% 1.3% 1.2% 3.6% 3.3%  1.6% 
55 0.4% 0.6% 1.8% 2.8% 3.5%  1.6% 
60 0.5% 1.2% 1.7% 2.1% 3.2%  1.7% 
65 0.3% 0.7% 2.4% 2.2% 2.9%  1.6% 
70 0.7% 1.3% 1.9% 2.6% 2.6%  1.7% 
75 0.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.1% 2.5%  1.8% 
80 0.9% 1.8% 1.5% 2.1% 2.1%  1.6% 
85 0.4% 2.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.5%  1.3% 
Average 0.4% 1.5% 2.0% 2.6% 2.7%  1.7% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 2.5% 3.7% 3.4% 4.6% 3.3% 3.3% 
5 1.1% 4.6% 2.6% 5.7% 1.0%  3.0% 
10 0.5% 2.7% 2.6% 3.1% 2.1%  2.2% 
15 -0.2% 1.4% 0.8% 3.1% 2.6%  1.4% 
20 1.2% 1.1% -0.4% 0.9% 2.1%  1.0% 
25 1.8% 0.2% -0.4% 0.3% 1.6%  0.6% 
30 1.5% 1.1% -0.4% -0.8% 0.6%  0.4% 
35 1.4% 1.9% -0.4% 0.5% 0.2%  0.7% 
40 0.3% 1.8% 1.6% 0.9% 0.9%  1.1% 
45 0.0% 1.9% 2.5% 1.0% 1.1%  1.4% 
50 0.3% 1.3% 2.8% 2.2% 1.3%  1.6% 
55 1.1% 0.8% 3.1% 2.6% 2.5%  1.9% 
60 1.2% 1.2% 2.3% 3.1% 2.9%  2.0% 
65 0.7% 1.4% 1.6% 3.5% 3.6%  2.0% 
70 0.4% 1.1% 1.7% 2.8% 3.9%  1.8% 
75 0.8% 0.6% 1.6% 2.2% 3.1%  1.6% 
80 0.7% 0.3% 1.3% 2.2% 2.5%  1.3% 
85 1.1% 0.3% 1.0% 1.5% 2.4%  1.2% 
Average 0.9% 1.8% 1.5% 2.2% 1.9%  1.6% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 2.4% 3.8% 3.1% 3.7% 1.3% 3.0% 
5 1.1% 3.6% 2.1% 3.2% 2.4%  2.9% 
10 0.7% 2.1% 2.3% 3.3% 1.0%  1.9% 
15 0.0% 1.7% 0.9% 1.8% 2.4%  1.2% 
20 1.9% 1.7% 0.4% 0.8% 1.9%  1.4% 
25 1.6% 1.3% 1.5% 0.9% 1.0%  1.1% 
30 1.9% 1.8% 1.4% 0.8% 1.7%  1.5% 
35 1.6% 2.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.2%  1.4% 
40 0.9% 2.1% 2.3% 0.5% 1.2%  1.5% 
45 0.2% 2.0% 2.4% 1.2% 1.1%  1.4% 
50 0.3% 1.1% 2.7% 1.4% 1.4%  1.4% 
55 0.3% 0.4% 2.3% 2.0% 2.0%  1.3% 
60 1.2% 0.4% 1.2% 2.7% 2.4%  1.5% 
65 1.6% 0.6% 0.8% 2.9% 3.0%  1.6% 
70 1.7% 1.1% 1.1% 2.0% 3.1%  1.7% 
75 1.7% 1.3% 1.3% 1.6% 2.3%  1.6% 
80 1.6% 0.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.9%  1.4% 
85 1.5% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 1.6%  1.2% 
Average 1.1% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7%  1.6% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 2.0% 3.3% 2.6% 3.3% 2.9% 2.8% 
5 0.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.7% 3.5%  2.7% 
10 0.8% 2.9% 1.4% 3.3% 3.5%  2.2% 
15 -2.5% 2.4% -0.1% 3.3% 2.2%  0.8% 
20 -2.3% 1.7% 1.2% 1.7% 0.0%  0.4% 
25 -1.8% 0.6% 0.4% 2.9% 0.2%  0.3% 
30 -1.2% 1.5% -1.4% 3.8% 2.4%  0.6% 
35 -1.0% 2.7% -1.7% 2.7% 2.9%  0.9% 
40 -0.2% 2.6% 0.1% 1.4% 1.9%  1.0% 
45 -0.1% 2.5% 1.6% 0.6% 0.9%  1.1% 
50 0.6% 2.2% 2.1% 1.3% 0.2%  1.3% 
55 -0.1% 2.3% 1.9% 2.0% 1.4%  1.4% 
60 0.4% 2.2% 1.5% 2.1% 2.3%  1.6% 
65 0.3% 1.9% 1.6% 1.9% 2.2%  1.5% 
70 -0.3% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 2.4%  1.3% 
75 -0.1% 1.6% 1.2% 1.3% 1.9%  1.2% 
80 0.4% 1.0% 0.9% 1.4% 1.6%  1.0% 
85 0.4% 1.1% 0.6% 1.2% 2.0%  0.9% 
Average -0.3% 2.3% 1.0% 2.4% 1.9%  1.3% 
For notes see page 110. 
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Table 4.5: Average age-standardised annual improvement in mortality rates 



















0 2.2% 3.6% 2.3% 3.3% 2.6% 2.8% 
5 1.0% 3.9% 2.3% 2.7% 2.8%  2.5% 
10 0.3% 3.2% 2.0% 1.5% 3.2%  1.9% 
15 -1.9% 2.4% 0.4% 2.0% 1.9%  0.8% 
20 -1.0% 2.2% 1.2% 1.2% -0.4%  0.7% 
25 0.0% 2.4% 0.7% 1.2% 0.4%  0.9% 
30 0.4% 3.3% -0.2% 1.1% 1.4%  1.1% 
35 0.1% 3.8% 0.3% -0.1% 1.0%  1.1% 
40 -0.1% 3.5% 1.5% -0.7% 0.0%  1.0% 
45 0.1% 2.7% 1.8% 0.1% -0.3%  1.0% 
50 0.4% 2.1% 1.4% 1.0% 0.4%  1.1% 
55 0.0% 1.7% 0.9% 1.3% 1.3%  1.0% 
60 1.2% 1.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.8%  1.2% 
65 1.2% 1.4% 0.6% 0.7% 1.5%  1.1% 
70 0.9% 2.0% 0.7% 0.6% 1.4%  1.1% 
75 1.1% 2.4% 0.7% 0.2% 1.1%  1.2% 
80 1.2% 1.8% 1.2% 0.2% 0.8%  1.2% 
85 1.0% 1.8% 1.0% 0.2% 1.0%  1.0% 
Average 0.3% 2.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.2%  1.3% 
For notes see page 110. 
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The detailed data by country in Table 4.5 shows some similarity in 
patterns of age difference in mortality rates over the different time periods.  
The 'normal' pattern for these countries is a diagonal of highlighted cells 
centred within age bands starting at ages 45 to 55 in 1981-91 for males and ages 
40 to 55 for females.  In addition, most countries have high mortality 
improvement rates at young ages, around age 20-30 since 1991 for both males 
and females, and at older ages, 65 to 85 in the earliest decade of this analysis 
for females.  The UK is unusual in not having either of these patterns for 
young or old ages.  New Zealand is unusual in additionally having 
significantly high QXI for the age 85 age band in the 1960s.  In the following, 
the diagonal pattern is discussed first, followed by the patterns at young and 
old ages. 
 
The diagonal: the golden cohort 
The diagonal provides the evidence for the 'golden cohort' already discussed 
in section 3.4: the cohort of people born just before and during World War II 
who have experienced higher rates of mortality improvement (QXI) than 
people born before or after them in every time period since birth.  More 
precisely, the highlighted cells in this analysis identify at which adult ages 
there was a significantly high QXI among all adult QXI in each period, and the 
diagonal imputes the potential existence of a golden cohort.  The golden cohort 
has been analysed in detail for the UK (or one region within the UK, England 
and Wales), and New Zealand, with some references to other countries 
(Andreev and Vaupel 2005; Dunnell 2008; Gallop 2008; Murphy 2010; 
O'Connell and Dunstan 2009; Willets et al. 2004).  This analysis extends 
consideration of the existence of the golden cohort to a wider context of British 
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settler countries; and additionally comments on its interpretation where there 
are significant rates of mortality improvement at other ages. 
 
The cohort diagonal can be seen in all countries, for both genders, 
although faintly for some.  It is strongest for the UK males and females, as 
there are no cells highlighted off the diagonal.  In most cases, the diagonal 
extends across the whole time period.  Even if not all the cells on the implied 
diagonal are highlighted, inspection of the data reveals that the QXI are high, 
and close to the average plus one standard deviation used as an indicator.  The 
UK has the strongest golden cohort as the highlighted cells make a tidy 
diagonal, although even here it falters between the first and second decades.  
This confirms the experience of the golden cohort noted in the UK; that the 
cohort has kept their mortality improvement advantage throughout life.   
 
Looking at the decade 1981-91 only, the ages of the clearest golden cohort 
for each country vary within the range of age bands starting 45 to 55 for males 
and ages 40 to 55 for females at that time.  Table 4.6 summarises the 
approximate birth dates of the golden cohort estimated by this analysis for 
each country.  As a compelling indication that other countries share the golden 
cohort hitherto given attention only in the UK, the range implied across all 
countries is very close to that taken as the definition of the golden cohort and 
used in official mortality projections in the UK, that is birth years 1923 to 1940.  
For males, the golden cohorts of the UK and US appear the oldest.  For 
females, the oldest would be in the UK, but the youngest complete cohort is in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
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Table 4.6: Approximate birth years of golden cohort, by country and gender 
 
Males Females 
Australia 1922-1936 1932-1936 
Canada 1922-1936 1927-1941 
New Zealand 1927-1936 1932-1936 
UK 1922-1931 1922-1941 
US 1924-1931 1927-1941 
Range  1922-1936 1922-1941 
Source: Possible birth years (inclusive) for age bands with significantly high 
rate of mortality improvement in decade 1981-91 indicated in Table 4.5.  For 
calculation of significance see text.   
 
 
Young and old ages: not just the golden cohort 
The strength of the UK golden cohort is partly explained by the UK being 
unusual in not having significant QXI at young or old ages in the pattern 
shared by other countries of this analysis.  All other countries have had 
significant mortality improvements at young ages for males and females in the 
decades starting 1991 or 1996 and at old ages for females in the decades 
starting in 1961.  The significant QXI at old ages is largely of historical interest, 
as the youngest group showing this effect is the US female cohort born in 1897-
1901.  The significant QXI at young ages in recent decades are more relevant 
for considerations of future mortality as they may indicate the beginnings of a 
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Table 4.7: Approximate birth years of possible new young ages golden 
cohort, by country and gender 
 
Males Females 
Australia 1967-1976 1962-1966 
Canada 1957-1971 1962-1966 
New Zealand 1967-1971 1967-1976 
UK n/a n/a 
US 1952-1966 1967-1971 
Range  1952-1976 1962-1976 
Source: Possible birth years (inclusive) for age bands with significantly high 
rate of mortality improvement in decade 1991-2001 or 1996-2006 indicated in 
Table 4.5.  For calculation of significance see text.  Approximate only as an 
indication for a golden cohort. 
 
This analysis is far from predicting further golden cohorts as there are 
insufficient time periods of data on which to base such a conclusion.  
However, it is suggestive enough for the possibility to be worth considering 
for projections of future mortality.  It is consistent with the analysis of Murphy 
(2010) who suggested that a more interesting question for the UK than why the 
golden cohort existed was why other ages had missed out on such high 
mortality improvement rates.  Indeed, not only does the UK miss out on the 
putative younger golden cohort on this definition, but the absolute level of 
mortality rate improvement at these ages in the UK appears low relative to 
what has been achieved in other countries.  For example, the UK male QXIs in 
age bands 20 to 35 in the decade 1996-2006 range from 0.2 per cent to 2.1 per 
cent, but in Australia they range between 2.6 per cent and 4.5 per cent, in 
Canada 1.8 per cent to 3.9 per cent and in New Zealand 1.0 per cent to 3.7 per 
cent.  Further, looking at QXI for age bands 5 to 15, the UK appears to have the 
lowest absolute values.  Therefore, whether or not any new young golden 
cohorts are confirmed with later data, there is greater momentum for mortality 
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improvement in cohorts younger than the established golden cohort in all 
these countries, including New Zealand, compared to the UK. 
 
The final column in Table 4.5 identifies the adult age bands that 
experienced significantly faster mortality improvement compared to other 
adult ages over the whole forty-five year period.  For males, the significant 
QXI age bands are between starting age 50 and 65 for all countries.  The female 
significant QXI are more variable, being the band starting age 65 in Australia, 
65 to 75 in the UK, and age 75 only for the US and New Zealand.  In Canada, 
the most significant QXI were at age bands starting 25 and 30.  This again 
confirms that New Zealand has had strong QXI at older ages compared to 
other countries.  Inspection of QXI in the latest decade for the oldest three age 
bands, older than the golden cohort, shows that New Zealand's lags only 
Australia's. 
 
Another way of looking at improvement in mortality rates over time is to 
consider trends in the summary mortality measure, life expectancy.  The rate 
of improvement is a function of both the rate of improvement in mortality 
rates at each age and the weighting that each age takes in the life expectancy 
calculation.  Table 4.8 shows the rate of improvement over the analysis period 
in life expectancy at birth, and at older ages for the selected countries.   
 
  




Table 4.8: Improvement in life expectancy at birth, at age 65 and at age 80 in 





At age 65 At age 80 
Years Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Australia 9.3 11.1 5.8 6.0 2.9 2.5 
Canada 8.5 9.9 4.9 4.6 2.9 2.0 
NZ 8.4 9.6 5.2 5.2 3.1 2.5 
UK 7.9 9.4 4.9 5.4 2.9 2.5 
US 7.0 8.5 4.0 4.4 2.6 2.3 
 
      
Per cent      
Australia 12% 16% 36% 48% 42% 43% 
Canada 11% 14% 30% 34% 39% 32% 
NZ 11% 14% 33% 40% 47% 46% 
UK 11% 14% 33% 45% 45% 48% 
US 9% 13% 25% 34% 36% 38% 
       Source: Calculated from life table data.  New Zealand data from Statistics New 
Zealand life tables.  Other mortality rates from Human Mortality Database life 
tables (downloaded August 2010). 
 
New Zealand's rate of improvement of life expectancy at birth is 
consistent with the foregoing mortality analysis.  New Zealand's rate of 
improvement of life expectancy at birth is less than Australia's, on a par with 
Canada's and ahead of that in the UK and US.  By age 65 New Zealand's life 
expectancy improvement rate is pulling ahead of all countries including, by 
age 80, Australia.  This comparison suggests that New Zealand's rate of 
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The overall pattern by age may in part reflect the focus of medical 
technologies and the impact of public health initiatives.  The attention of both 
these factors has been concentrated at young ages (the care of newborns and 
very young children) and at middle to older ages (progress in the prevention 
and treatment of cancers and cardiovascular disease).  At teenage and young 
adult ages, mortality rates are low and relatively more subject to accident rates 
rather than health issues.  The rankings of mortality improvement of each 
country at each age group could reflect varying success rates of different 
medical technologies or public health initiatives.   
 
Alternatively, there could be an underlying environmental cause elevating 
or depressing QXI at all ages.  The sustained positions of Australia and the US 
across age bands point to this.  The US health problem was discussed earlier.  
The reasons why Australia has sustained a relatively low mortality trend have 
not been subject to such scrutiny.  Contributory factors may include a healthy 
environment, high level of economic development and associated good quality 
healthcare or a high level of people born overseas bringing with them 
selectively good mortality (see Table 3.4).  These factors are to some extent 
shared with New Zealand.  Given the proximity of the two countries, 
Australian mortality appears an appropriate comparator for New Zealand. 
  




4.5 Median and modal age at death 
Similar patterns for the change in shape of the curve of deaths and the 
convergence of the three measures of central tendency exist for both males and 
females in the selected countries of this analysis.  Figure 4.9 shows the curve of 
deaths for males in the selected countries for 1961, restricted to ages 56 to 95 to 
allow the detail of the adult modal peak.  Figure 4.10 shows the same for 2006.   
 
Figure 4.9: Curve of deaths for males from 100,000 births, from period table 
1961, selected countries, ages 56 to 95 
 
Source: Calculated from period life table data.  New Zealand data from 
Statistics New Zealand life tables.  Other mortality rates from Human 






















Figure 4.10: Curve of deaths for males from 100,000 births, 2006, selected 
countries, ages 56 to 95 
 
Source: As Figure 4.9 except UK figures revised November 2010 to smooth an 
obvious anomaly in dx at ages 86-7 (data still appear somewhat unsmoothed). 
 
The consistent change in shape across countries is evident, but the 
consistency prevents more insightful comparison.  Following the suggestion of 
Canudas-Romo (2010), a simultaneous comparison of the three measures of 
central tendency, and the rate of change of each, is provided by Table 4.9.  The 
rate of improvement in life expectancy at birth was shown in Table 4.8, and is 
also included here. 
 
The analysis of the improvements by age in mortality rate in the previous 
section showed that New Zealand has had particularly strong improvement in 
mortality over age 40 over the full period considered.  The comparison of 
improvements in life expectancy at age 80 suggested New Zealand has had 
comparatively strong improvement at the oldest ages.  Because the modal age 
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measure (see Table 3.2), a strong improvement in the mode indicates strong 
increase in mortality rates above the modal age.  Table 4.9 does indeed show a 
comparatively strong rate of improvement for New Zealand in modal age at 
death.  New Zealand has the highest female modal age at death and third 
highest male mode, only slightly behind Australia and Canada.  New 
Zealand's percentage increase in modal age ranks second to Australia and 
equal to that of the UK.  The significance of this is indicated by the greater 
range in improvement rates of modal age at death across the countries (7 
percentage points for males; 6 percentage points for females) compared to that 
for average and median (3 percentage points only).  The larger range is itself 
indicative of the current momentum in QXI at the oldest ages. 
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Table 4.9: Three measures of central tendency for the age at death 
distribution and the increase in years and per cent, 1961 to 2006, selected 
countries 
 
Australia Canada NZ UK US 
Life expectancy at birth (average age at death) 
Males 
     1961 68.1 68.4 68.4 67.8 67.0 
2006 79.2 78.3 78.0 77.2 75.5 
Increase 11.1 9.9 9.6 9.4 8.5 
 
16% 14% 14% 14% 13% 
Females 
     1961 74.5 74.5 73.8 73.7 73.7 
2006 83.8 82.9 82.2 81.5 80.7 
Increase 9.3 8.5 8.4 7.9 7.0 
 
12% 11% 11% 11% 9% 
Median age at death 
   Males 
     1961 71.8 72.9 72.6 71.3 71.1 
2006 82.4 81.5 81.5 80.3 79.2 
Increase 10.6 8.7 8.9 8.9 8.2 
 
15% 12% 12% 13% 12% 
Females 
     1961 78.3 78.6 77.9 77.4 78.1 
2006 86.7 86.0 85.4 84.4 84.0 
Increase 8.4 7.4 7.5 6.9 5.9 
 
11% 9% 10% 9% 8% 
Modal age at death 
    Males 
     1961 74.5 79.1 76.6 76.2 75.7 
2006 86.4 86.4 86.4 86.1 83.6 
Increase 11.9 7.3 9.7 9.9 7.9 
 
16% 9% 13% 13% 10% 
Females 
     1961 79.2 84.3 81.8 79.5 83.5 
2006 88.6 89.7 89.3 86.4 88.3 
Increase 9.5 5.4 7.5 6.9 4.8 
 
12% 6% 9% 9% 6% 
Source: see Figure 4.10. 
 




Empirical data on the level of mortality rates and life expectancy at birth from 
the most current data and forty-five years earlier show New Zealand in the 
middle of the selected group of comparator countries.  There is slightly better 
mortality in Canada and obviously better mortality in Australia.  There is 
slightly worse mortality in the UK and obviously worse mortality in the US.  
Mortality in New Zealand is relatively better at ages over 40 than below, and 
this strength has become more apparent over the last forty-five years.  New 
Zealand compares least well for mortality at ages 1-20 for both males and 
females indicating a problem with accidental deaths at young ages.  New 
Zealand is notable for high modal age at death, indicating relatively low 
mortality at ages over 80.   
 
The selected countries share a similar picture of mortality rate 
development over the period 1961-2006.  Mortality rates have continuously 
improved and female mortality rates are staying below those for males.  
Australia and Canada are examples of low mortality/high life expectancy/fast 
improvement countries; the US is higher mortality/lower life 
expectancy/slower improvement, albeit with apparently better mortality at the 
highest ages which is likely due to country-specific features.  New Zealand 
and the UK rank in the middle of the group for the pace of mortality 
improvement.  In the UK mortality improvement has been strong, especially at 
the 'golden cohort' of those now aged over 60.  However, New Zealand has 
shown even stronger mortality improvement more recently.  The persistent 
rate of mortality change confirms that past period life expectancies cannot be a 
relevant contemporary lifespan measure. 
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This analysis has built on previous research to draw new conclusions 
about 'golden cohorts' in all the countries analysed.  The selected countries 
share to a greater or lesser significance a golden cohort who have experienced 
throughout their adult life in this time period significantly higher mortality 
improvement rates than immediately older or younger generations.  The 
golden cohort are generally aged 45 to 55 in 1981-91 for males and ages 40 to 
55 for females.  In addition, most countries have had high mortality 
improvement rates for a younger cohort born around the 1960s and early 1970s 
and also for an older cohort of females aged around 65 to 85 in the 1960s.  The 
UK is unusual as both these patterns for young and old ages are absent while 
the main golden cohort appears more strongly.  New Zealand is unusual for 
additionally having had significantly high mortality improvement rates for the 
age 85 age band in the 1960s.   
 
For this group of countries, the general shapes of all life table measures are 
similar and the pattern of comparison between countries consistent, which 
means that a difference in one country is notable.  Where the patterns can be 
explained, hypotheses for future trends can be developed.  For example, it has 
been suggested that because a large part of the gap in life expectancy between 
the US and other high-income countries appears to be caused by smoking, so 
future relative improvement in US longevity can be expected with a time lag 
reflecting the pace at which smoking prevalence declined.  However, 
prevalence of smoking and the highly correlated death rate from lung cancer 
can both be measured, whereas other causal factors for specific causes of death 
can only be hypothesised.  This analysis does not therefore allow specific 
future mortality trends for any one country to be identified. 
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However, this analysis does identify new insights about New Zealand's 
mortality that can be used to enhance extrapolative methods of projecting 
future mortality.  The comparison with other countries suggests the most 
similar countries whose mortality trends New Zealand may follow.  The 
country with the closest level and average improvement rate of mortality to 
New Zealand's has been the UK.  However, since the 1980s for females and the 
1990s for males, New Zealand's rates of mortality improvement have been 
higher than the UK's and more like Australia's.  As the rate of mortality 
improvement is the basis for future mortality projection, it would appear that 
the UK and Australia have the best claims as models for New Zealand.   
 
In addition, this analysis isolates notable features of New Zealand's 
mortality that can be specifically allowed for in future projections.  These 
features include that New Zealand has had relatively strong recent momentum 
in mortality improvement over the forty-five year period at older ages: over 40 
and especially over 80.  This positive trend is diminished by relatively poor 
mortality at ages 1-20, although mortality improvement has been relatively 
strong for ages 15-25 in the last decade.  The role of these and other factors is 
developing scenarios for New Zealand's future mortality is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Future longevity in New Zealand 
This chapter reports on the second part of the analytic framework developed 
in Chapter 3.  Building on the insights in the last chapter from setting past 
mortality in New Zealand in the context of that in like countries, the mortality 
projections of the selected countries are now compared.  The aim is to test 
whether the set of assumptions underlying the future projections from the 
group of selected countries is internally consistent and plausible.  The question 
is not whether each country has followed a suitable method of projection, but 
rather, given the relative performance of past mortality trends do the relative 
projected mortality trends appear reasonable?  In particular, what does this 
imply for New Zealand's mortality projections: do they appear relatively 
optimistic or pessimistic against the projections of other countries?   
 
This chapter first compares the assumptions made in the mortality 
projections of each of the comparator countries.  It then compares the results of 
those projections.  The third section reflects New Zealand's relative past 
mortality experience in the context of the relativities in the national 
projections.  The next section considers potential adverse trends before a 
concluding section draws together findings to reinterpret existing New 
Zealand mortality projections. 
  




5.1 Assumptions in international mortality projections  
This section sets out what is known about the assumptions made by each 
agency making the actuarial mortality projections selected in section 3.5.  
Extrapolative methods are used for all these projections.  Although the detail 
of the extrapolation varies, the fundamental building blocks of each mortality 
projection are the same: the annual rate of improvement of age-specific 
mortality rates - QXI, as defined in section 3.4.  In New Zealand, the US and 
UK mortality projections are published on at least three sets of assumptions or 
variants, resulting in 'high', 'medium' and 'low' projections.  Australia 
publishes only two variant projections, and Canada just one set.  Statistics 
New Zealand's labelling is dropped in this chapter as other countries usually 
label their variant projections by the outcome of mortality assumptions on life 
expectancy.  So in this chapter, a 'high' projection refers to a low mortality 
assumption resulting in high life expectancy (Low Mortality in the 
terminology used elsewhere in this thesis for Statistics New Zealand's 
projection). 
 
In order for each projection to result in future cohort life expectancy 
measures, mortality rates for each age and sex need to be projected for each 
future year that members of the cohorts are alive.  Each of the actuarial 
projections calculates mortality rates for each calendar year up to 2050 and 
some have projection periods which continue beyond.  The mortality rates are 
calculated from the assumed QXI for each age, sex and year.  The assumptions 
for QXI are informed by past QXI trends and by judgements on, for example: 
how long a period of past trends is extrapolated; whether QXI are made to be 
age- or cohort-specific throughout the period of projection, or whether some 
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age groups share a QXI; whether QXI continue at the same rate for the course 
of the projection period in a straight line, or are shaped to a judgement that 
rates of improvement will lessen over time.  It is therefore complex to describe 
each set of assumptions, but possible to summarise the pattern of QXI 
assumed.   
 
In some cases, the assumption for future QXI is a single number, as the 
agency involved has made the judgement that QXI would be the same for all 
ages for a number of future years.  For example, in the UK, a target QXI is 
assumed to apply for all ages from twenty five years out from the start of the 
projection period and for the remainder of the projection period.  Before then, 
QXI vary by age in a way chosen so that the QXI of the last year with actual 
data transition to the target QXI on a path that reflects past age-specific past 
trends in QXI.  The projections for Canada and the US take a similar approach 
with a slightly different target date and with two different QXI in the second 
period for ages above and below age 85 or age 65 respectively.  Table 5.1 
explains the assumptions for QXI in the selected mortality in a highly 
summarised way; Table 5.2 describes the rationale given for the choice of 
assumptions.   
 
Each of the projections is illustrative rather than exact, and the variants 
within a country are arbitrary.  As is apparent from Table 5.2, the assumptions 
underlying each projection depend on many judgements, the full complexity 
of which is not always explained in published reports.  The rationale for a 
particular choice of assumption is often not described or insufficient 
information is available to enable it to be inferred.  Yet as Table 5.1 reveals, the 
key assumption is often asserted as one, rounded number.  For example, after 
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the first twenty five years of the projection period in the UK the annual 
reduction in mortality rates is assumed to be a constant 0, 1 or 2 per cent for all 
ages.  Given the nature of mortality trends - that despite being influenced by a 
large number of processes operating somewhat randomly population average 
mortality has still declined in a fairly linear way - it is not surprising that 
decisions are taken to project mortality using a highly summarised straight 
line assumption.  However, the great detail of past mortality experience data 
in combination with simplified assumptions can present the appearance of 
more accuracy in the projection that is actually present.  All the projections are 
'what-if' scenarios essentially assuming a simplified continuation of the 
historic average mortality trend. 
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Table 5.1: Summarised assumptions for the annual rate of change in 
mortality rates in population projections of selected countries 
  




High LE variant 
Australia 1.8% (m)  2.2% (f) n/a 
 
2.7% (m)  2.2% (f) 
Canada n/a Varies by age to 
2029 then 0.7% for 
all ages under 85, 






1% (m)  1.3% (f) 
 
1.6% (m)  1.8% (f) 2.1% (m)  2.4% (f) 
UK Varies by age until 
reaches 0% by 2032.  
Thereafter, 0% all 
ages 
Varies by age until 
reaches 1% by 2032.  
Thereafter, 1% all 
ages.   
Average 2008-2083: 
1.3% (m) 1.4% (f) 
 
Varies by age until 
reaches 2% by 2032.  
Thereafter, 2% all 
ages 
US Varies by age to 
2034 then 0.5% for 
all ages under 65, 
0.3% for ages 65 
and over 
Varies by age to 
2034 then 1% for all 
ages under 65, 0.7% 
for ages 65 and over 
 
Varies by age to 
2034 then 1.5 % for 
all ages under 65, 
1.2% for ages 65 and 
over 
Note: The figures shown in the above are those given by the statistical agency 
for the annual rate of change in mortality rates, averaged over ages and time 
periods, for the duration of the projection period or part-period as shown.  For 
Australia, averages weighted by population count of the given QXI have been 
calculated.   m = male; f=female.  Low and high variants named to reflect lower 
or higher life expectancy result (higher or lower mortality).  These labels may 
not be those used in original cases and are not those used in New Zealand.  
Each country labels variants differently. 
Source: Extracted and summarised from source documents: AGA 2009; OASDI 
Board of Trustees 2010; OCA 2009; ONS 2009; Statistics New Zealand 2009a.  
Original analysis by author first published in O'Connell (2011b). 
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Table 5.2: Given rationale for the assumptions underlying population 
projections of selected countries 
 Summary comment on assumptions for annual rate of 
mortality improvement (QXI) for medium projection, with 
high and low as variations (where relevant) 
Australia Historic average age-specific QXI applied to current qx (2005-
7) cumulatively for each future year of projection period.   
 
Low variant uses average from 100 prior years.   
High variant uses average from 25 prior years.   
 
Canada  Future QXI set by judgement informed by historic time series 
of age specific QXI 1989-2004.  Pivot year set as 2029.  
For 2029 and after: QXI set equal for all ages below age 85.   
Until 2029: age-specific QXI set by linear interpolation 




Future age-specific QXI 2006 and 2061 "essentially driven" by 
age-specific death rates in cohort life tables for 1876-2007 
birth cohorts.  Extrapolation by curve-fitting, but with some 
judgements to give plausible death numbers by age-sex in the 
initial years of the projection period.  QXI vary by age and 
future year of projection period. 
 
High and low variants set by arbitrary +/- 3 years (m) 2.5 
years (f) for period life expectancy at birth 2061. 
Additional "Very low mortality" variant asserts period life 




Future QXI set by judgement informed by historic time series 
of age specific QXI, primarily 1967-2007.   
Pivot year set as 2032/3 when target QXI reached, same for all 
ages thereafter. Target QXI of 1 per cent per year equal to the 
average over whole of 20th century for both males and 
females.   
 
Table continues, with notes, on the following page. 
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Table 5.2: Given rationale for the assumptions underlying population 
projections of selected countries, continued 
 Summary comment on assumptions for annual rate of 
mortality improvement (QXI) for medium projection, with 
high and low as variations (where relevant) 
UK, 
continued 
Until 2032/3: QXI transitions each year from 2008 to target in 
2033 assumed to be more rapid at first for males, less rapid 
for females to reflect recent trends.  Specific assumptions for 
cohort born 1923-40 to allow continued relatively high 
improvement rates. 
 
For low variant, target QXI set to zero (so mortality rates do 
not change after 2032); high variant set equidistant from 
medium projection at 2 per cent per year. 
 
US Future QXI set by judgement informed by historic time series 
of age-specific QXI (1900-2006) and of cause of death trends 
(1976-2006).   
Pivot year set as 2034 when target QXIs reached, then kept 
constant thereafter. QXI set for all ages below 65 at 1 per cent 
per year and at 0.7 per cent per year for ages 65 and above, 
reflecting slower reductions in historic mortality rates for 
older ages.  These QXI are on average lower than the average 
QXI of 1900-2006 and for 1979-2006. 
Until 2034: age-specific "rapid change" transition of QXI is 
assumed from observed 2006 values to 2034 target.  
 
For low and high variants, age-specific QXI levels are set at 50 
per cent or 150 per cent of the medium projection QXI. 
 
Note: QXI is annual rate of mortality improvement.  See section 3.4. 
See also notes for Table 5.1. 
Source: Extracted and summarised from source documents: AGA 2009; OASDI 
Board of Trustees 2010; OCA 2009; ONS 2009; Statistics New Zealand 2009a 
and personal communication Statistics New Zealand.  
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Each projection is based on an assumption that age-specific mortality rates 
for both sexes decrease in future.  Only the low variant in the UK is based on 
an assumption that after an initial period of improving mortality, the rate of 
improvement slows to zero.  No projection involves mortality worsening in 
future.  This means that lifespans are assumed to continue to lengthen over 
time.  Differences between projections of different countries and between 
variants within a country are due to different assumptions on the pace and 
shape of future mortality improvement.   
 
For each country, there is a rationale for the assumption based on actual 
past mortality in that country.  However, the judgements behind each 
assumption mean that it is possible the choices made on mortality 
assumptions are made with varying degrees of optimism or pessimism.  But it 
is not possible to identify this accurately.  A direct comparison of the summary 
assumptions for future QXI for each country from Table 5.1 with the average 
of past QXI from Table 4.4 is not sufficient.  The weightings over ages are not 
the same in each table, and the average QXI over the projection period in Table 
5.1 are in most cases given without information on how the shape of QXI 
changes over time.  However, the mortality projections for Australia and New 
Zealand appear to assume sustained mortality improvement at a higher rate 
than the other countries.  The medium projection in Canada, the US and UK 
assumes that mortality improvement rates transition after a period to the order 
of 0.7 to 1 per cent per year.  In the medium projection for New Zealand and in 
both projections in Australia the pace of improvement is sustained at rates 
around 1 per cent higher.  This appears to suggest that the assumptions in 
Australia and New Zealand are relatively optimistic and consistent with an 
assumption that mortality rates in the selected countries would diverge; or 
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that the assumptions for Canada in particular are relatively pessimistic, 
consistent with convergence of mortality rates.  
 
A caveat to the above is that the shape of the QXI over the projection 
period will affect the resulting mortality rates and lifespan measures for future 
years.  The summarised picture hides this detail, and the published reports of 
the projections do not give enough information to describe fully the path of 
QXI.  However, a difference between countries in the assumed shape of future 
QXI is revealed.  In the New Zealand projections, the average QXI for females 
over all ages and years 2006-61 is 1.8 per cent.  But this has within it an 
assumption of increasing pace of improvement: the average QXI for 2006-31 is 
1.7 per cent which rises to 2.0 per cent for the remainder of the projection 
period to 2061 (personal communication from Statistics New Zealand).  For 
males, the assumption averaged over all ages for the two phases of the 
projection period are the same at 1.6 per cent.  Conversely, in the UK, the QXI 
are generally higher prior to 2033 than later in the projection period (ONS 2009 
p. 27).  This assumption of 'flattening' QXI over time can be inferred to 
underlie the projections for Canada and the US, while Australia assumes a 
different pattern, with the same QXI applying each year of the projection 
period at each age.  The agencies making assumptions about the future path of 
mortality hold different implicit or explicit views on the trajectory of that path.   
 
  




5.2 International projections of lifespan 
More optimistic QXI assumed at the start of the projected period, especially at 
young ages, are likely to result in higher life expectancy measures than 
projections with less optimistic QXI at the start, even if these have higher QXI 
at the end of the period.  Therefore, there is a limit to what can be interpreted 
by examination of projection assumptions.  The results of the projections, 
which are measured by life expectancy, need to be examined.  The fact that 
these countries all assume continued mortality improvement confirms that 
projected period life expectancies cannot be relevant future lifespan measures.  
This supports the use of cohort life expectancies to report on the results of the 
projections.  However, the first illustration explores the summary commonly 
presented.  Table 5.3 shows period life expectancy for the beginning of the 
projection period and a selected long-term point in 2050 from the medium 
projection only (both of the two Australian variants are shown as a single best 
estimate is not provided).   
  




Table 5.3: Period life expectancy at birth and at age 65 for years 2010 and 
2050 from medium mortality projections in selected countries, in years 
 2010 2050 











































Low 79.5 18.6 84.2 21.9 84.0 21.5 88.3 24.7 



















UK 78.7 18.5 82.6 20.8 85.0 23.5 88.5 25.8 
US 75.8 17.3 80.4 19.7 80.3 19.9 84.0 22.0 
Note: As there is no medium projection for Australia, both 'High' and 'Low' 
life expectancy variants are shown.  See Table 5.1 and text for further 
explanation.  Canada is Canada less Québec.  UK 2010 data is for the year 
midpoint 2010 to midpoint 2011; for 2050 the annual average for 2046-2051 is 
given.   
Source: Extracted from source documents and supplementary tables to: AGA 
2009; OASDI Board of Trustees 2010; OCA 2009; ONS 2009 and personal 
communication from Statistics New Zealand for New Zealand data. 
 
Inspection of the ranking of the measures in Table 5.3 shows that the 
assumptions made under the Australian 'High' variant imply Australia keeps 
its relative position as the highest period life expectancy at birth and at age 65 
for both males and females over the period to 2050.  However, the UK's 
medium projection overtakes the 'Low' variant for Australia.  New Zealand's 
relative position improves and Canada's declines, while the US retains the 
lowest ranking.  There is therefore a divergence in period life expectancy over 
the projection period across the countries.   
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Divergence appears starkly in the comparison between the UK and New 
Zealand.  In 2010, all the period life expectancy measures shown here are 
within 0.1 of a year across the two countries.  However, by 2050, the UK 
measures are projected to overtake New Zealand's by up to one year for 
female life expectancy at birth and 1.4 years for female life expectancy at age 
65.  Relatively then, the assumptions underlying the UK medium projection 
are optimistic compared to those of New Zealand.  Reference to Table 5.1 
shows that it must be the greater momentum in QXI in the early projection 
years which making this difference, as the overall average QXI over the whole 
period are not strongly dissimilar.  The mortality projections are highly 
sensitive to the QXI assumptions; both their level and their shape over the 
projection period.  Yet, as Table 5.2 described, some assumptions are made 
arbitrarily. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the implied increase in period life expectancy over the 
forty year projection period considered here.  Leaving aside the high variant 
from Australia, the range of increases in life expectancy at birth is wide: 3.8 to 
6.3 years for males and 2.8 to 5.9 years for females.  The ranges of life 
expectancy at age 65 are even wider relative to the absolute levels: from 2.6 to 
5.0 years for males and 2.0 to 5.0 years for females.   
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Table 5.4: Increases in period life expectancy at birth and at age 65 from 2010 
to 2050 from selected mortality projections, males and females, in years 























Low 4.5 2.9 4.1 2.8 











UK 6.3 5.0 5.9 5.0 
US 4.5 2.6 3.6 2.3 
Notes and sources: See Table 5.3. 
 
To investigate how relative positions of the measure more important for 
this study - average cohort lifespan - have changed in the past and could 
change in future, analysis now turns to using cohort measures of life 
expectancy.  Figure 5.1 shows cohort life expectancies at birth in calendar year 
2010 (so for the cohort born in 2010) and Figure 5.2 shows the same measure 
for births in calendar year 2050.  Figure 5.3 shows cohort life expectancies at 
age 65 in 2010, that is, remaining lifespan as at 2010 for the cohort born in 
calendar year 1945.  Figure 5.4 shows the same for calendar year 2050, 
referring to the cohort born in 1985.  These cohorts are not yet extinct, so 
require projections of future mortality.  The range of projections shown for 
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Figure 5.1: Cohort life expectancy at birth in calendar year 2010 for selected 
countries, main projection variants 
 
Source: See Table 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.2: Cohort life expectancy at birth in calendar year 2050 for selected 
countries, main projection variants 
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Figure 5.3: Cohort life expectancy at age 65 in calendar year 2010 for selected 
countries, main projection variants 
 
Source: See Table 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.4: Cohort life expectancy at age 65 in calendar year 2050 for selected 
countries, main projection variants 
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The ranges of projected cohort life expectancy within each country (except 
where not available for Canada) illustrate the level of uncertainty about the 
future course of longevity.  The UK shows the largest range, and the most 
optimistic projections for both lifespan at birth and at age 65.  The higher 
variant for the UK appears more optimistic compared to that of other countries 
than the lower variant appears more pessimistic.  This does not mean that the 
UK is more likely to achieve better lifespans than the other countries, or that 
there is any more uncertainty about longevity in the UK, but is a function of 
the largely arbitrary decisions on where to place the high and low variants.   
 
There are large differences in projected average lifespan across countries, 
even for the 2010 cohort measures.  For example, the expected average lifespan 
for boys born in 2010 ranges from 82 years in the US to 89 years in the UK, 
with the more optimistic of the two Australian projections at 92 years.  The 
2050 measures show an even larger range, so that the boundaries for all the 
variants across countries imply average lifespan for the cohort born in 2050 
from 80.2 years for US males and 110.6 years for UK females.  Remaining 
lifespan for those aged 65 in 2050 ranges from 18.6 years to 32.8 years (for the 
same groups). 
 
The wide range in cohort lifespan measures reflects increasing uncertainty 
as assumptions of future mortality are made over the projection period, and 
the compounding of the relative differences in assumptions between countries.  
However, the projected future cohort measures underline again that all of 
these projections assume that mortality will continue to improve and that 
females will continue to live longer than males on average.  Because of the 
assumption of continued mortality improvement, the cohort life expectancies 
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are higher than relevant period life expectancies.  Use of the period life 
expectancies will imply lower expected lifespans than the cohort life 
expectancies more realistically portray.  Table 5.5 shows the difference 
between period and cohort measures, taking the projection period measures in 
Table 5.3 as the benchmark, therefore based on the medium projection for all 
except Australia. 
 
Table 5.5: Excess of cohort life expectancy over period life expectancy at 
birth and at age 65 for years 2010 and 2050 from medium mortality 
projections in selected countries, in years 
 2010 2050 











































Low 6.5 1.1 6.3 1.1 5.6 0.8 5.1 1.0 



















UK 10.1 2.8 9.8 3.1 8.8 1.7 8.4 1.9 
US 6.6 0.8 5.6 0.7 5.0 0.8 4.8 0.9 
Notes and sources: See Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.5 shows that using period life expectancy to suggest average 
population lifespan would underestimate significantly from the more realistic 
figure given by the medium projection of cohort life expectancy.  The 
underestimation reduces as the projection period increases as the period 
measure contains more estimation of future mortality improvement, so 
becomes more like the cohort measure.  Across the countries, the potential 
underestimation from any confusion between period and cohort measures 
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ranges from 4.7 to 10.1 years for the cohort born in 2010; and is a still 
important 1 to 2 years for remaining average lifespan for people aged 65 in 
2050.  This underlines the inherent potential for underestimation of lifespans 
using period measures instead of cohort measures of life expectancy.  
Underestimation could also come from using a medium projection when the 
high variant is more plausible, as the data for Australian variant projections in 
Table 5.5 suggest.   
 
The increase in cohort life expectancy from 2010 to 2050 is less than that 
for period life expectancy; again because cohort measures in 2010 contain 
relatively more allowance for improving mortality than period measures.  
Table 5.6 shows the equivalent of Table 5.4 for cohort measures.  The projected 
increases are 1 to 2 years less for cohort life expectancy at birth compared to 
period life expectancy at birth and generally less than half a year less for 
remaining lifespan at age 65 on a cohort basis compared to a period basis.  
Therefore, when increases in period life expectancy over 2010 to 2050 are 
presented, they tend to overestimate the extent of realistic change in average 
lifespans, albeit starting from an unrealistically low base.  This may mitigate to 
some extent the underestimation inherent in period life expectancy measures, 
but the level of underestimation in expected lifespan compared to using cohort 
life expectancy is still more significant. 
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Table 5.6: Increases in cohort life expectancy at birth and at age 65 from 2010 
to 2050 from selected mortality projections, males and females, in years 























Low 3.6 2.6 2.9 2.7 











UK 5.0 3.9 4.5 3.8 
US 2.9 2.6 2.8 2.5 
Notes and sources: See Table 5.3. 
 
To complete the comparison of mortality projections between these 
selected countries, trends in past and projected future cohort life expectancies 
are now examined.  This takes further the assessment of the implications for 
the choices of assumptions considered in Table 5.2, and illustrates that the 
divergence of period measures shown in Table 5.3 also holds for cohort life 
expectancy measures.  For this comparison, England and Wales (E&W) is used 
instead of the UK.  England and Wales has a longer history of cohort data and 
the relevant available measures differ very little from those of the UK.  
Australia is not included in this analysis as there are few available data points 
for the years selected, and no medium projection which for ease of 
presentation is the only variant shown in the following.  The figures following 
show cohort life expectancy at birth for cohorts 1930 to 2050, first at birth and 
then at age 65. 
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Figure 5.5: Cohort life expectancy at birth in years, by year of birth 1930 to 
2050, for selected countries, medium projections, males 
 
Notes and sources: See Table 5.3. Additional England and Wales data in 
personal communication from ONS. 
 
Figure 5.6: Cohort life expectancy at birth in years, by year of birth 1930 to 
2050, for selected countries, medium projections, females 
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Figure 5.7: Cohort life expectancy at age 65 in years, by year of birth 1930 to 
2050, for selected countries, medium projections, males 
 
Notes and sources: See Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.8: Cohort life expectancy at age 65 in years, by year of birth 1930 to 
2050, for selected countries, medium projections, females 
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The early cohort measures in Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.8 contain more actual 
mortality data and fewer projected estimates than the later measures.  The data 
extends for a longer period than previously shown estimates, as Figure 5.7 and 
Figure 5.8 are estimated remaining lifespans for people born in 2050, reaching 
age 65 in 2115.  The figures show fairly close expectations of life across the 
selected countries up to around birth cohort 1970, but then the projections 
diverge.  The divergence is not unexpected given the very long time frames 
over which the differences between assumptions compound.  However, there 
is no theory or empirical evidence to suggest that over such a long period, the 
actual experience would be anything other than the cohort life expectancy of 
the countries continuing on similar tracks.  The divergence of medium 
projections suggests a mutually inconsistent set of assumptions across 
countries.  Insofar as the variant projections are intended to provide a 
boundary of potential outcomes, then continued close expectations of life 
across countries are possible, as Figure 5.1 to Figure 5.4 show.  However, the 
medium projections are the estimates most often presented or referenced, 
usually exclusively.  Further, the variant projections are an arbitrarily 
determined set of what is possible.  This analysis emphasises that each of these 
singular pathways for the possible future of longevity in each country has to 
be understood as one potential scenario, based on only one suggestion for 
what past trends imply. 
 
The position of New Zealand in the cohort life expectancy projections of 
Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.8 changes over time relative to that of England and 
Wales in particular.  From the 1930 birth cohort New Zealand cohort life 
expectancies are greater than the E&W equivalents.  From 1950, the E&W 
estimates exceed those of New Zealand and continue with an increasing gap of 
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subsequent cohorts.  This result is consistent with the changing position of UK 
and New Zealand period life expectancy projected over calendar years in 
Table 5.3, but the use of cohort life expectancies for successive birth cohorts 
reveals it happening sooner.  This impression is a result of cohort life 
expectancies anticipating assumed mortality improvements.   
 
This analysis adds to the comparison of past and future cohort life 
expectancies between England and Wales and New Zealand in O'Connell and 
Dunstan (2009).  This study compared cohort life expectancies at birth and at 
ages 45 and 65 for the two countries for cohorts born in the years from 1876 to 
1991.  It identified that New Zealand had consistently higher life expectancies 
at birth than E&W for both males and females for every cohort born to 1937.  
Cohort life expectancies at ages 45 and 65 were about the same for the two 
countries, with a small advantage to New Zealand again until the late 1930s.  
However, this remarkably consistent pattern, over a long time frame and for 
both sexes, was not expected to continue according to the projections of the 
statistical agencies.  Later cohort life expectancies at all the ages analysed - 
consisting of an increasing proportion of future mortality estimates over actual 
mortality data - diverged, with E&W having the longevity advantage.  
O'Connell and Dunstan pointed out that there was no obvious reason why this 
divergence should happen, especially as recent mortality improvement had 
been faster in New Zealand than in E&W. 
 
The comparison of historic QXI in Chapter 4 of this paper shows that New 
Zealand's recent mortality improvements have continued to outshine those of 
England and Wales, and high improvement rates have been spread over a 
wider range of ages.  This analysis uses a later set of New Zealand projections 
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that that available for the earlier paper: 2009-base instead of 2006-base.  For the 
2009-base projections, Statistics New Zealand changed its projection method 
and assumed more optimistic future mortality improvement than in the 2006-
base (Statistics New Zealand 2009a).  The degree to which a gap opens up 
between projected cohort life expectancies between the two countries is 
attenuated.  However, as the analysis of this chapter shows, the different 
assumptions made for the two medium mortality projections result in longer 
estimated lifespans on average in the UK than in New Zealand.  Further, the 
variants presented suggest a range of outcomes for longevity that are balanced 
more towards optimism in the UK than is the case in New Zealand.  
 
This analysis of past and future cohort life expectancies also adds 
estimates from Canada and the US to compare with that from New Zealand 
and England and Wales.  This additional data confirms the general shape of 
improvements expected in average lifespans for successive birth cohorts.  All 
of these countries anticipate ever longer average lifespans, with the shape of 
the curves in Figure 5.5 to Figure 5.8 being very similar across countries.  
However, the ranking of future cohort life expectancies projected for the four 
countries appears somewhat inconsistent.  Not only does England and Wales 
look relatively optimistic, but Canada's projections suggest undue pessimism, 
given the strong mortality improvement seen in Canada.  The projections in 
Canada assume the rate of mortality improvement slows down to a level less 
than half what Canada has actually experienced in the last forty-five years, 
although there is no rationale for why this should be so.  The projections for 
the US keep the US at the bottom of the ranking for life expectancy in this 
group of countries and this appears likely in the absence of any different 
policies for change. 




5.3 Reflecting New Zealand's relative mortality experience 
The comparative international analysis in Chapter 4 showed that, despite 
many similarities in the level of and trends in mortality rates, New Zealand is 
notable for its fast rate of mortality improvement at ages over 40 and 
especially over 80; and for its relatively high mortality at ages under 20 with 
high recent mortality improvement at ages 15-25.  Further, while the UK has 
had the closest level and average improvement rate of mortality compared 
with New Zealand, in the last two or three decades New Zealand's rates of 
mortality improvement have been more like Australia's.  This section takes 
these notable features of New Zealand's relative mortality experience and 
discusses how this might influence the interpretation of the relative position of 
New Zealand's mortality projections.  The nomenclature for Statistics New 
Zealand variant projections now switches back to Low, Medium and High 
Mortality rather than the low, or high life expectancy labels used for 
international comparisons in Table 5.1. 
 
Relatively strong momentum in mortality improvement  
In absolute terms, and compared to its peers, New Zealand has had 
particularly strong improvement in mortality in the last twenty-five years.  
The New Zealand total population annual rate of change in mortality rates 
(QXI) gained momentum throughout the forty-five year period of the 
comparative analysis, with female mortality improvement accelerating in the 
1980s before that of males in the 1990s (Table 4.4).  Because future mortality 
projections are estimated by extrapolating forward the past mortality trend, 
the changing pace of New Zealand's QXI is intriguing.  If the last twenty-five 
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years of mortality trend were judged to provide the basis for New Zealand's 
future trend, then projections would result in higher projected lifespans than if 
the past forty-five years were used.  On this basis, the Low Mortality variant of 
Statistics New Zealand mortality projection appears to be a useful benchmark 
for a plausible likely future for New Zealand mortality.  
 
The average rate of mortality improvement over the last twenty-five years 
in New Zealand was of the order of the average QXI assumption for the Low 
Mortality variant (see the high life expectancy variant of Table 5.1).  Moreover, 
the Australian projections are carried out using QXI from the past 100 years 
and the past twenty-five years.  The former still uses QXI higher than New 
Zealand's medium projection, with the latter QXI similar to those in Low 
Mortality.  Using Australia as a role model would therefore reinforce Low 
Mortality as plausible.  Finally, the UK's similar past QXI also points to using 
future QXI assumptions more like the UK's which differ in shape: the UK 
projections favour early high QXI which then flatten out.  Low Mortality gives 
similar projections of cohort life expectancy to the medium projections for the 
UK (Figure 5.1 to Figure 5.4).    
 
Low Mortality uses a lower QXI for men compared to women whereas the 
reverse is true for Australia.  Past QXI for New Zealand men were lower than 
for women in the 1980s, although male mortality improvement recovered 
some ground in the next decade.  In the UK, QXI assumptions are similar by 
gender, although the 1980s were similarly relatively poor for men.  The 1980s 
were an unusual decade for New Zealand, in that variance in age at death for 
men increased markedly (see section 6.3).  Therefore, there is an argument for 
male mortality in New Zealand to continue at a rate of improvement similar to 
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that for females in future, which would add to future QXI being overall higher 
than the medium variant and more like the overall effect of Low Mortality. 
 
New Zealand's more recent rate of mortality improvement was relatively 
strong across all ages, particularly so over age 40, and with a putative golden 
cohort emerging for birth years 1967-71 for males and 1967-76 for females.  The 
strong mortality improvement at older ages is significant as in countries like 
New Zealand which some way on the path of mortality compression, the 
change in life expectancy measures increasingly comes from mortality 
improvement at older ages.  Therefore, the momentum in mortality 
improvement in New Zealand is operating at the ages where it can have most 
effect on lifespan measures.  The emerging golden cohort at younger ages is 
important as it suggests that New Zealand is better positioned for future 
mortality improvement than the UK, which is the only country among those 
analysed not to shows signs of a young golden cohort.  Thus, the age profile of 
mortality improvement in New Zealand gives reasons to be optimistic about 
future mortality improvement and relatively optimistic compared to the UK, 
which itself makes optimistic assumptions about future continued mortality 
improvement.  Again, this implies a plausible future of mortality in New 
Zealand which is better than the Medium Mortality and more like the Low 
Mortality projection. 
 
Relatively poor mortality for children and young adults 
Although New Zealand generally has favourable mortality compared to 
comparator countries, its mortality for children and young adults appears 
relatively poor in the results of Chapter 4's analysis.  This section briefly sets 
some international context for what is known about mortality at these ages, 
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before considering how New Zealand's mortality profile at young ages may 
change in future. 
 
The level of childhood mortality is poor in all the British settler countries 
considered in this thesis relative to other developed countries.  The five 
selected countries had the highest probability of dying between birth and age 5 
(the under five mortality rate) in the OECD in 2001-4: 6.0 per 1,000 live births 
for New Zealand and Australia, 6.5 for Canada and the UK and 8.0 for the US.  
The ranking of these countries on this measure has worsened since the 1960s 
(Collinson et al. 2007).  Globally, research and policy attention has focused 
more on childhood mortality than mortality in adolescents and young adults.  
However, in most countries over the fifty years to 2004 adolescent (ages 15-24) 
death rates have not fallen as much as those for children.  This is because 
mortality rates from accidents have remained static or risen and violence and 
suicide have increased while the rate of mortality from diseases affecting 
childhood mortality has reduced (Viner et al. 2011).  In New Zealand, across 
ages 1 to 19, nearly 60 per cent of deaths result from external causes, especially 
transport and other accidents.  In the 15-19 age group, the proportion is 74 per 
cent as the rate of involvement in traffic accidents increases and intentional 
self-harm appears as a cause of death (Ministry of Health 2010 Tables 2 and 3).   
 
Mortality rates at ages 1-20 are very low in developed countries including 
those considered in this thesis.  In 2010, there were 284 deaths in New Zealand 
of New Zealand residents aged between 1 and 19 inclusive (Statistics New 
Zealand data).  The probability of living from age 1 to age 20 is 99.3 per cent 
for males, and 99.6 per cent for females (Statistics New Zealand 2009c).  The 
analysis in Chapter 4 used mortality rates from life tables where the data were 
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smoothed.  It is possible comparison of actual death rate data even in the same 
years would attenuate the significance of differences between countries.  
Further, the low current mortality rates at young ages mean that assumed 
reductions in future would make little difference to the overall projections of 
population average mortality.  For example, period life expectancy at birth for 
New Zealand males is projected to increase by 5.6 years from 2010 to 2050 (as 
per Table 5.4).  In that projection, an assumption will have been made for 
continuing mortality rate improvement at ages 1-19 in the order of past 
improvement rates between 1 to 3 per cent a year (Table 4.5).  An 
unanticipated further improvement in mortality rates at that age of twenty per 
cent would result in a further increase in period life expectancy at birth of 
around 0.09 years (calculated using 2005-7 life tables from Statistics New 
Zealand 2009c).  Therefore, the apparent notable poor mortality in New 
Zealand at ages 1-20 should not be a reason to adjust existing projections of 
population mortality. 
 
5.4 Impact of potential adverse trends 
A common pessimistic theme in mortality forecasting is the increasing 
prevalence of obesity and the mortality risk from its sequelae.  Olshansky et al 
(2005) suggested that obesity may cause a halt or reversal to the rise in life 
expectancy in the US.  Stewart et al (2009), again for the US, forecast that 
obesity trends could hold back the increases in life expectancy brought by 
declines in smoking.   
 
These forecasts have been criticised.  Preston (2005) listed objections to the 
reasoning in the Olshansky article that apply equally to the methods used by 
Stewart et al.  The studies did not allow for medical improvements or 
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behavioural changes to mitigate the mortality risk from obesity; for the fact 
that forecasting by extrapolation already includes an implicit assumption that 
the mortality effect from the past increase in prevalence of obesity continues; 
or for mortality from non-obesity related conditions to continue to improve.  
These points were reiterated in a later review of US mortality (Crimmins et al. 
2010b), which further suggested that the mortality risk associated with obesity 
may have declined as the increase in obesity prevalence has levelled off, 
although a cohort of obese may be working through.  Incorporating more data 
on smoking, obesity and other mortality trends than the previous forecasts, 
King and Soneji (2011) forecast that declines in smoking would outweigh the 
effect of obesity so that US life expectancy would continue to rise throughout 
their projection period to 2030.  Compared with the Olshansky and Stewart 
predictions, this forecast is more in line with knowledge that life expectancy 
has only ever declined when countries have experienced specific severe direct 
assaults on mortality such as the significant HIV/AIDS epidemic in parts of 
Africa or the change in social order in post-Soviet states (Wilson 2011).  
 
Knowledge of the effect of obesity on future lifespans is not complete.  
There appears to be a "J-shaped" relation between Body Mass Index (BMI) and 
mortality from cardiovascular disease, some cancers and all causes.  Most of 
the cardiovascular mortality risk is caused not by high BMI itself but is 
mediated by other associated risk factors: diabetes, elevated blood pressure 
and elevated serum cholesterol (Huxley and Jacobs Jr 2011).  Data on the 
prevalence of these four risk factors from 1980 to 2008 worldwide is analysed 
here to put New Zealand's risk position in context with those of the other 
countries of this analysis.  Figure 5.9 and following show the data for the latest 
year available. 
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Figure 5.9: Age-standardised mean BMI in kg/m2 by country in 2008, with 
95% uncertainty intervals, male (left) and female (right) 
 
Source: Finucane et al (2011).   
 
Figure 5.10: Age-standardised diabetes prevalence by country in 2008, with 
95% uncertainty intervals, male (l) and female (r) 
 
Source: Danaei et al (2011b). 
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Figure 5.11: Age-standardised mean systolic blood pressure in mmHg by 
country in 2008, with 95% uncertainty intervals, male (l) and female (r) 
 
Source: Danaei et al (2011a). 
 
Figure 5.12: Age-standardised mean serum total cholesterol in mmol/L by 
country in 2008, with 95% uncertainty intervals, male (l) and female (r) 
 








The US has one of the highest age-standardised mean BMI in the world, 
with few countries in the Pacific and Middle East having higher.  Over the 
period of the available data (1980 to 2008), mean BMI has increased globally.  
Mean BMI is within the range of 'overweight' (BMI 25-29.9 kg/m2) rather than 
'obese' (>=30 kg/m2) in all five countries considered in this analysis.  Of these, 
New Zealand has the second highest mean BMI, but is closer to the lower 
levels of the others than to the outlier of the US.  Only Canada has had a lower 
increase in BMI for males, although for females the New Zealand increase is 
the same as that in the US, with only Australia higher.   
 
Diabetes prevalence increased globally from 1980 to 2008.  The Pacific 
region has the highest levels.  As with BMI, New Zealand is second to the US 
of these five countries for prevalence and increase for females, but third after 
Australia for increase for males.  A different picture prevails for blood 
pressure and cholesterol as the UK has the highest mean, with New Zealand 
second, and in all five countries the means are falling.  This commentary 
summarises the relative positions of the means, but the uncertainty interval is 
large enough to change rankings, with a particularly large interval for 
diabetes.   
 
There is therefore a mixed picture, with mean BMI and diabetes 
prevalence rising in New Zealand and other countries, while the other risk 
factors decline.  Judging from the situation and momentum on these risk 
factors, New Zealand appears to have lower obesity-related risk potential than 
the US, and similar to Australia and the UK, the role models for mortality 
extrapolation.  Although the UK has lower diabetes prevalence, it has higher 
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mean blood pressure and cholesterol.  In all countries an increase in mean BMI 
has been in past mortality data, so implicitly the impact on future mortality 
should be taken into account in extrapolation.   
 
In New Zealand, Māori and Pacific people have a higher prevalence of 
obesity and diabetes compared to the total population.  Asian people are less 
likely to be obese, but more likely to have diabetes than the population 
(Ministry of Health 2008).  There is the possibility that diabetes risk changes as 
a result of future migration patterns.  On average for the total population, age-
standardised death rates from diabetes have gradually declined in New 
Zealand from the late 1990s (Ministry of Health 2010).  Age-standardised 
obesity prevalence increased from 1997, but there was no statistically 
significant increase from 2002/03 to the latest figures in 2006/07 (Ministry of 
Health 2008).  This may indicate that New Zealand is following the trend in 
the UK and US where detailed surveys suggest obesity prevalence has levelled 
off since 2000 (Wang et al. 2011).   
 
Obesity-related mortality risk can be prevented or diminished by medical 
treatment and behavioural change (The Lancet 2011).  Even small weight 
losses can make a significant difference to the risk outlook (Wang et al. 2011).  
US data suggests the mortality risk associated with Class I obesity (BMI 
between 30.0 and 34.9) appears to have reduced in the 1990s compared to 
earlier decades (Mehta and Chang 2011).  Future mortality risk from obesity 
may therefore depend on the effectiveness of treatment and prevention.  
Health policy is being directed towards this goal because of the significant and 
increasing economic cost of obesity and related conditions.  Based on the latest 
forecasts from the US, the comparator country with the highest risk from 
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obesity and related conditions, and assuming New Zealand does participate in 
a global trend to reduce obesity prevalence and its effect on mortality, it is 
hard to see obesity as a major influence on New Zealand's projected 




The projections of New Zealand's future life expectancy are based on an 
extrapolation of past internal trends, as are those in the other countries 
selected for this analysis.  All of these countries have experienced continued 
improvement in mortality rates, and mortality rates are assumed to continue 
to improve in future.  No projection involves mortality worsening in future.  
This means that in all projections for the selected countries lifespans are 
assumed to continue to lengthen over time.  The difference between 
projections of different countries is the assumed trajectory of future mortality 
improvement.  This shared assumption of continued mortality improvement 
confirms that current or projected period life expectancies cannot be relevant 
future lifespan measures, and cohort life expectancies are preferred here to 
report on the results of the projections.  
 
The possible causes of past mortality trends have been examined in great 
detail and the potential future path of mortality similarly discussed at length.  
Some of this qualitative theorising was covered in Chapter 2.  Data for past 
mortality levels and trends and lifespan measures for the selected countries 
were presented in Chapter 4.  Official projections of future mortality are 
undertaken with more data available for each country. This combination of 
detailed revealed and unrevealed data of the past and theorising about future 
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trends gives the appearance of more accuracy in the projections that is actually 
present.  The assumptions identified here that underlie each set of projections 
are generally very simple and somewhat arbitrary, particularly about 
decisions on the range of variant projections presented and the shape of 
mortality improvements assumed.  All the projections are 'what-if' scenarios 
essentially assuming a simplified continuation of the historic average mortality 
trend.  
 
The agencies making assumptions about the future path of mortality hold 
different implicit or explicit views on the trajectory of that path.  Convergence 
or divergence in mortality levels between these countries has not been stated 
as considered explicitly by any of the agencies, although long-term 
convergence is a valid hypothesis given long-term past trends.  It seems 
plausible that the US would retain the lowest ranking, as the causes of its 
relatively low mortality have been investigated with no reason why it should 
overtake other countries in mortality improvement suggested.  However, there 
has been no reason identified for why the other countries should change 
relative position; why Canada should fall behind, why the UK should jump 
forward, and especially why New Zealand and the UK should diverge when 
current and past life expectancy measures have been close.  The assumptions 
behind the projections provide a reason why they turn out this way, but not a 
rationale.   
 
Instead, the relative performance of past mortality trends imply that New 
Zealand's official mortality projections seem relatively pessimistic.  The 
assessment of New Zealand's recent relative mortality position in Chapter 4 
gives several reasons why New Zealand's future mortality could be better than 
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assumed in the main projection.  New Zealand's fast mortality improvement in 
recent decades is more consistent with that of Australia which has more 
optimistic future mortality assumptions.  Relative to the UK, notwithstanding 
the long history of similarity in mortality levels, divergence if it occurs would 
be likely to give the advantage to New Zealand which has a young cohort with 
high mortality improvement that the UK does not have.  The UK projections 
appear relatively optimistic because high mortality improvements are 
assumed in the short term - a path which based on recent experience New 
Zealand may be better placed to follow.  The projections in Canada appear 
pessimistic because they assume the rate of mortality improvement slows 
down to a level less than half what Canada has actually experienced in the last 
forty-five years, with no apparent rationale for why this should be so.  By 
comparing the assumptions and outcomes of these relevant comparator 
projections, the Low Mortality variant of Statistics New Zealand's projections 
appears plausible.   
 
Factors that made New Zealand a relatively healthy country a century ago 
- clean air, low population density and benign climate - are still present. In all 
countries considered here increasing obesity prevalence has been in past 
mortality data, so the impact on future mortality will have been taken into 
account in existing extrapolative forecasts.  There is not sufficient evidence that 
New Zealand's mortality risk from obesity and related factors would be 
significantly higher than that of Australia or the UK to change the conclusion 
that these countries should be role models for mortality projections.  Mortality 
improvements could slow if healthcare spending were reduced, or if health 
policy were not effective at treatments or modifying behaviour to reduce 
mortality risk from obesity and its sequelae and other causes of death.  
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However, the threat of rising health costs from obesity-related problems 
would suggest policies to prevent and treat these risks will be increasingly 
adopted.  Knowledge about how known risks such as obesity and smoking 
may play out in future is limited, as is knowledge about how other health risk 
or improvements may combine to affect population average mortality.  
Therefore, while negative factors exist, there is no evidence to contradict a 
conclusion that future longevity in New Zealand is likely to reach at least the 
Medium Mortality estimate of Statistics New Zealand's projections and, more 
plausibly from the comparative analysis presented here, to follow the Low 
Mortality variant.  
 
 




Chapter 6: Mortality within New Zealand 
This thesis focuses on a plausible future for population average lifespans and 
how individual expectations and policy assumptions at the national 
population level differ from that.  In projections of mortality by national 
agencies, variance in mortality or lifespan is not explicitly considered.  
However, mortality variation is an important subject for policy and theoretical 
reasons.   
 
The third part of the mortality analysis framework developed in this thesis 
considers mortality within New Zealand.  The questions asked are: given past 
mortality trends for the different sub-populations, does the projection of future 
total population mortality look plausible?  Are there unusual trends in one 
sub-population which could disturb the extrapolation of mortality in the total 
population?  Answers are sought to these questions by testing the mortality of 
subgroups within New Zealand against emerging demographic theories on 
mortality variance.   
 
In this chapter, the demographic theory of mortality variance is first set in 
the context of the epidemiological approach to mortality inequalities.  The 
second section reports on the contribution of mortality variance to the 
mortality analysis framework used here.  The third section briefly compares 
mortality variance in New Zealand with that of the peer countries of this 
analysis. 
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6.1 Theories of mortality variation  
There is a large literature on the variation of life expectancy or mortality 
between and within countries in the fields of epidemiology and public health.  
The focus in these disciplines is on avoidable health inequalities, also referred 
to as inequities or disparities, in particular the association of inequalities with 
socio-economic position (Marmot 2005; WHO 2008).  The theory of 
fundamental causes holds that those of higher socio-economic status 
accumulate resources that contribute to good health and longevity (Phelan et 
al. 2010).   
 
The work on the socio-economic determinants of health is not without 
criticism (for example, Cutler et al. 2006; Epstein et al. 2009; Oliver and 
Nutbeam 2003).  The theory of fundamental causes predicts women would 
have higher mortality and shorter lifespans than men on average, yet that is 
not the case in all but a few less developed countries.  The extent to which 
national income inequality is directly associated to population health appears 
to vary markedly by country, if at all (Lynch et al. 2004).  New evidence is still 
adding to theory.  For example, income inequality may be related to avoidable 
causes of death among children and working age adults but appears unrelated 
to life expectancy losses from the diseases of old age (Shkolnikov et al. 2011a).  
Causality between socio-economic indicators and health inequalities is not 
proven and it is unlikely that socio-economic factors provide a full explanation 
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Within demography, the variance of mortality has a smaller literature, 
largely to do with the relationships between population average life 
expectancy, population average mortality rates and variance in age at death.  
This literature shows three relevant mathematical rules, which are explained 
below.  First, that there is inherent variation in mortality or lifespan in a 
population.  Second, that variation in lifespan is inversely correlated to levels 
of life expectancy, except at older ages.  Third, that gains in life expectancy 
depend on how far a population is on the path to mortality compression.   
 
Inherent variation in mortality or lifespan 
The most enduring of attempts to theorise the shape of average mortality in a 
population is Gompertz Law which has been proven to hold for different 
populations and periods at all ages except the very youngest and oldest 
(Gompertz 1825; Olshansky and Carnes 1997).  Gompertz Law posits that the 
force of mortality increases in geometric progression as age x increases 
arithmetically.   
     
   
 
The force of mortality μx can be considered a further variant of a mortality 
rate, being almost consistent with the mortality rate at age half a year less 
except at the oldest ages.  In the above equation, k is a constant and β is the 
slope of the graph of the logarithm of the force of mortality drawn with age, 
sometimes called the rate of ageing.   
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Tuljapurkar and Edwards (2011) show that the variance in age at death for 
a population following Gompertz law is a function only of the parameter β, 
and that the rate of ageing is inversely related to the variance in length of life.   
                                
 
Why this should be so, or what this means for future trends, is unclear.  
However, since β is a finite number, and Gompertz Law applies for human 
populations at most ages, it does imply that there will be some non-zero 
variance in mortality in national statistics.  This can be seen as a natural or 
inherent variance in age at death within a population, or a reminder that there 
is an element of chance in the way biological processes operate.  Some variance 
in age at death will be present in all populations, and not all variance will be 
avoidable inequity.   
 
Variance in lifespan correlated to life expectancy  
Empirical evidence shows that variance in total length of life is negatively 
correlated to life expectancy, except for populations of older survivors.  Smits 
and Monden (2009) demonstrated a high negative correlation between life 
expectancy at age 15 and absolute inequality in age at death from a database of 
212 countries dating back at least to 1950 and for some countries to the 18th 
century.  A long-term trend in most developed countries on the path to 
mortality compression has been that as life expectancy at birth has increased 
variance in age at death has decreased.  A corollary important when 
comparing variance in longevity or mortality across countries is that 
differences in variance should be interpreted only between populations of the 
same life expectancy at birth (e0), so at similar points on the path to mortality 
compression. 




The inverse correlation between life expectancy and variance breaks down 
at older ages however.  In low mortality countries, mortality compression 
appears to be tempered by mortality shifting, so that as the curves of deaths 
shifts to the right, the peak does not continue to narrow endlessly (Ouellette 
and Bourbeau 2011).  Engelman et al (2010) examined the changing 
distribution of ages at death from 23 national populations over the last 5 
decades, and found that while the variance in mortality reduced for the full 
population, and for survivors to age 10, the variance in longevity among 
survivors to older ages slightly increased.  They attribute this to a shifting of 
health disparities from younger to older ages as a result of the success of early 
life mortality improvements.  There is a wider range of frailty among older 
survivors in high life expectancy populations compared to lower life 
expectancy populations.   
 
Thus for developed countries with the highest life expectancy, variation in 
total lifespan might reduce as the survival curve rectangularises while 
heterogeneity in age at death for the oldest survivors increases.  This is 
possible even given the Tuljapurkar and Edwards equation as Gompertz Law 
breaks down at older ages, and the equation needs to be modified.  Countries 
further on the path to compression of mortality at older ages would be 
expected to have greater variance in age at death among older survivors.   
 
Gains in life expectancy depend on path to mortality compression 
The definition of mortality inequality in a population is that too many people 
die too young.  In a high life expectancy population well advanced along the 
path to mortality compression, deaths are concentrated at ages around a 
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narrow mode.  There is less variance in age at death than a low life expectancy 
population with more deaths at younger ages and a less rectangular survival 
curve.  Compression of mortality limits gains in life expectancy when it is 
already high, even if mortality rates at older ages are declining at a fast pace.  
This is in keeping with the discussion in section 3.1.3 for why life expectancy 
at birth becomes a less suitable measure for trends in longevity as it exceeds 80 
years of age.  The increase in life expectancy at birth from the same rate of 
improvement in age-specific death rates would be expected to be smaller in a 
population further down the path to mortality compression than another.   
 
One implication is that a narrowing of the life expectancy differential 
between two populations is a possible outcome even if their death rates are 
improving at the same pace; if the age at death distribution for one population 
is more dispersed than the other.  Glei and Horiuchi (2007) demonstrated this 
for men and women.  For the majority of the 29 high-income countries they 
studied, the recent narrowing of life expectancy at birth between the two sexes 
was found to be due primarily to sex differences in the age pattern of 
mortality.  The same rate of mortality decline produced smaller gains in life 
expectancy at birth for women than for men because women's deaths are less 
dispersed across age, that is, there is less variance in female age at death and 
female survivorship is more rectangular.  The same could be true for two other 
subgroups of a population with differently-shaped age at death distributions, 
for example, ethnic groups.  Glei and Horiuchi suggest that (p. 155) "...the 
results of this research seem to illustrate the risk of interpreting observed 
demographic trends without considering mathematical relationships at the 
aggregate level." 
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From this theory, it is assumed here that past trends in the mortality of 
population subgroups may inform the extrapolation of population average 
mortality.  Specifically, it is assumed that if mortality trends in subpopulations 
do not follow the demographic theories of mortality variation, then the 
extrapolation may be questioned.  Table 6.1 summarises the theories relevant 
to this approach, and the following section applies them to subgroups within 
the New Zealand population. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of mortality variance theories as they apply to 
comparing two subpopulations 
  
Subpopulation 1 
(for example females) 
 
Subpopulation 2 
(for example males) 















Survival curve More rectangular 
 
Less rectangular 
Variance in age at 
death 
Lower at younger ages 
Higher at oldest ages 
 
Higher at younger ages 
Lower at oldest ages 
Increase in life 
expectancy at birth for 
same reduction in 
mortality rates 
Smaller Larger 
Contribution to life 
expectancy at birth 
increase over time 
More from  
older ages 
More from  
younger ages 
Source: Summarised from discussion above with key reference texts: Glei and 
Horiuchi 2007; Smits and Monden 2009; Tuljapurkar and Edwards 2011; 
Vaupel 1986.   
  




6.2 Reflecting mortality of subgroups within New Zealand 
New Zealand has a unique ethnic mix and a high level of migration.  Both of 
these features continue to add diversity to genetic, cultural, socio-economic 
and health factors potentially affecting mortality.   
 
6.2.1 Mortality data by subgroup 
New Zealand is unusual in that official period life tables have been produced 
for ethnically defined subgroups of the total population - Māori and non-
Māori - for decades, and 20-year population projections are produced for four 
ethnic groups: European or other (including New Zealander), Māori, Asian 
and Pacific.  Of the other countries analysed in this thesis, there may be 
separate studies of past mortality for subgroups defined by ethnicity or region.  
Only the US produces life tables by "race" ("White", "Black" and "Hispanic 
origin") (Arias 2010a, b).  None of the countries produces historic cohort life 
expectancy by ethnicity or race or other grouping.  Mortality projections are 
for total populations in most countries although in the US population 
projections are produced for "Hispanic", "Non-Hispanic Black" and "Non-
Hispanic all other races" (US Census Bureau 2008).   
 
Age-standardised death rates by ethnic group allow a comparison of 
summary mortality levels in New Zealand.  From Table 6.2 it can be seen that 
both Māori and Pacific peoples have higher mortality and Asians better 
mortality than the New Zealand population on average.  Table 6.3 shows the 
size of the ethnic groups within the New Zealand population.   
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Table 6.2: Age-standardised death rates by ethnic group, 1996-7 to 2005-7 
 
1996-7 2000-2 2005-7 
Māori 11.9 11.2 9.9 
Pacific 9.0 9.1 8.8 
Total New Zealand population 7.5 6.5 5.8 
Non-Māori 7.1 6.1 5.4 
European or other 7.0 6.0 5.4 
Asian 5.3 4.5 3.7 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 2009c Table 2.03.  Mortality rates for each 
group at each time period are age-standardised to the New Zealand Estimated 
Resident Population of June 1996.  Other includes "New Zealander". 
 
Table 6.3: Ethnic groups in New Zealand 
 1991 
 
1996 2001 2006 
European 83% 83% 80% 79% 
Māori 13% 15% 15% 15% 
Pacific  5% 6% 6% 7% 
Asian 3% 5% 7% 9% 
Other 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Source: Census usually resident population count, Statistics New Zealand. 
People can identify with more than one ethnic group so figures do not add to 
100 per cent.   
 
Additionally, there has been significant work in New Zealand on 
estimated mortality differences between groups using a specially-derived 
dataset, the New Zealand Census-Mortality Study.  Estimated absolute and 
relative inequalities in mortality associated with ethnicity and socio-economic 
status have been tracked from 1981-84 to 2001-04 (Blakely et al. 2007; Blakely et 
al. 2008).  The mortality rate for all groups fell, with that for Pacific peoples 
and Māori falling less than for Asians and others.  Absolute differences in age-
standardised mortality across ethnic and income groups (ages 1-74) were 
stable, but relative inequality increased.  However, from 1996–99 to 2001–04, 
relative inequality stabilised and absolute inequality declined, indicating a 
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potential reversal of the previous trend of widening inequality.  The 
underlying reasons for these trends are still being investigated.  Tobias et al 
(2009) found an association of the trend in relative inequalities between Māori 
and non-Māori mortality rates with the trends in social inequalities within the 
population, with a time lag of a few years.  Differential tobacco use, income, 
ethnicity and gender were found to cumulatively contribute to the gap 
between Māori and non-Māori period life expectancy at birth (Carter et al. 
2010). 
 
Despite the availability of some data by ethnic group within New Zealand, 
work to investigate mortality variance is hampered by inconsistent ethnic 
classifications and by a lack of data, especially at older ages.  The Statistics 
New Zealand ethnic life tables provide a robust time series only since 1996.  
Before that date there was inconsistency in the Census of Population and 
Dwellings question and death registration forms used to define ethnicity for 
population numbers and death statistics.  Prior to 1996, the wording of the 
ethnicity question used in the Census changed several times with the "degree 
of blood" or race being asked for prior to 1986.  The "degree of Māori or Pacific 
Island blood, if any" of the deceased person's parents was requested for deaths 
registered prior to 1996 (Statistics New Zealand 2009c pp. 2-3).  Further, there 
is evidence of under-reporting of Māori deaths prior to 1995 and consequently 
over-reporting of non-Māori deaths (Statistics New Zealand 2009c p. 5).  From 
1996, the ethnic concept used for both population and death statistics is a self-
identified concept of belonging.  People can belong to more than one ethnic 
group, regardless of ancestry or birthplace.  Ethnicity is self-identified in the 
Census, but identified by the person registering a death.  It is therefore 
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possible that an individual may change his or her own choice of ethnicity 
during life and then be differently identified at death.   
 
6.2.2 Māori and Non-Māori mortality 
For the purposes of this analysis, the best source of data was taken to be the 
official ethnic life tables.  This is because an analysis of the variance of 
mortality according to the theories outlined in section 6.1 needs a full life table 
for two subpopulations.  Therefore, this analysis can only be carried out for 
Māori and non-Māori groups.  The latest data, for 2005-7, is used but data from 
1960-62 is also shown for consistency with the period covered in the 
international comparison of earlier chapters.  Interpretation will be made with 
care given the concerns over robustness of source data.   
 
The 2005-7 New Zealand life tables show that mortality rates are higher 
(worse) for Māori than non-Māori at all ages for males and females.  Figure 6.1 
shows this on the same logarithmic scale that Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 showed 
a comparison of the mortality rates of 2006 for the countries selected for this 
analysis.  The gap between the average mortality rates of the two largest ethnic 
groups of New Zealand is larger than the gap between the average mortality 
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Figure 6.1: Mortality rate at age x (qx) for ages 0 to 100 years by gender and 
ethnicity, logarithmic scale, New Zealand population, 2005-7  
 
Source: Calculated from 2005-7 life tables Statistics New Zealand (2009c).   
 
Figure 6.2 shows the relative difference in mortality rates by age.  From 
birth to age 40 the age-specific Māori mortality rates are between one and a 
half times to three times that of non-Māori.  However, Table 6.4 shows the 
numbers of deaths in New Zealand in 2010 by ethnicity and demonstrates that 
death rate comparisons at ages below 40 are based on few data points, 
especially for female Māori.  Thus the fluctuations in Figure 6.2 are a data 
artefact of few deaths and very low absolute levels of mortality rates at those 
ages so that interpretations of excess mortality should be made with caution.  
After age 40 mortality rates of Māori men are around 3 times that of non-Māori 
men until around age 60 when they fall to an excess of around ten per cent by 
age 100.  A similar pattern appears for females, except for the overhang of 
fluctuation shown at the start of this age group.  Again at the oldest ages there 
are few deaths, especially in the Māori group, so proportionality of death rates 
















Figure 6.2: Mortality rate at age x (qx) for Māori as a percentage of that for 
non-Māori, ages 0 to 100 years by gender, New Zealand population, 2005-7  
 
Source: Calculated from 2005-7 life tables Statistics New Zealand (2009c).   
 
Table 6.4: Numbers of deaths registered in New Zealand of New Zealand 
residents, by age and ethnicity, 2010 







Age 0 70 115 51 89 325 
Age 1-39 207 492 109 284 1,092 
Age 40-79 1,051 6,333 885 4,508 12,777 
Age 80+ 147 5,808 262 8,027 14,244 
Total 1,475 12,748 1,307 12,908 28,438 
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An alternative presentation to demonstrate the different levels of age-
specific mortality rates in the two ethnic subpopulations is the survival curve 
in Figure 6.3.  This shows that the non-Māori subpopulation is further along 
the transition path to compression of mortality than the Māori population, for 
both males and females.   
 
Figure 6.3: Survival curve from 100,000 births for New Zealand from period 
tables 2005-7 for Māori and non-Māori, males and females  
 
Source: Derived from Statistics New Zealand 2009c 
 
A further comparison of current levels of mortality comes from the 
summary measure, life expectancy.  Period life table data must be used as 
cohort life expectancies are not produced by ethnicity.  Statistics New Zealand 
(2009c) investigated differentials between Māori and non-Māori period life 
expectancy since 1950-52 and concluded that despite data inconsistencies over 
that time period, Māori life expectancies have nearly always been lower than 
those of non-Māori at all ages, but that the gap in period life expectancy at 
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Māori F Non-Māori F 




Table 6.5 gives life expectancies for Māori and non-Māori at selected ages 
for the two time periods used for the international analysis of this thesis.  The 
caveat for comparisons over time is applies here.  However, as expected, 
improvement in life expectancy over that time can be seen for all subgroups 
and at all ages.  The greater of the two increases in life expectancy at each age 
over the period - Māori or non-Māori - for each age/gender pairing is 
highlighted in bold.  The increase in life expectancy at birth was better for 
Māori for both males and females, but for males the improvement was better 
for non-Māori at all the older ages shown here.  For females, greater 
improvement in life expectancy at ages 75 and 65 for non-Māori compared to 
Māori is shown.  Therefore, although the gap in period life expectancy at birth 
between Māori and non-Māori did narrow over that time period for both 
males and females, the gap in male life expectancy at all older ages shown 
widened.  For females, the gap narrowed for ages shown up to 55, but 
widened for ages 75 and 85.   
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Table 6.5: Period life expectancy at selected ages, New Zealand Māori and 
non-Māori and the gap between them, 1960-62 and 2005-7 and change over 
that period 
 0 10 40 55 75 85 
1960-2       
Male       
Māori 59.1 53.4 27.1 16.2 7.0 3.5 
Non-Māori 69.2 61.1 32.7 19.8 7.5 3.9 
Gap 10.1 7.7 5.6 3.6 0.6 0.3 
Female       
Māori 61.4 54.7 27.4 16.7 7.4 4.5 
Non-Māori 74.5 66.1 37.1 23.5 8.9 4.5 
Gap 13.1 11.4 9.7 6.9 1.5 0.0 
2005-7       
Male       
Māori 70.4 61.1 33.2 20.6 8.4 4.5 
Non-Māori 79.0 69.5 40.6 26.7 11.0 5.6 
Gap 8.6 8.3 7.4 6.1 2.5 1.1 
Female       
Māori 75.1 65.7 36.9 23.6 10.2 5.6 
Non-Māori  83.0 73.4 43.9 29.8 13.0 6.7 
Gap 7.9 7.6 7.1 6.2 2.8 1.1 
       
Change over period      
Male       
Māori 11.3 7.7 6.1 4.4 1.5 1.0 
Non-Māori 9.8 8.3 7.9 6.9 3.5 1.8 
Female       
Māori 13.7 11.0 9.5 6.9 2.8 1.0 
Non-Māori  8.5 7.3 6.9 6.3 4.1 2.2 
Source: Derived from Statistics New Zealand complete period life tables 1960-
62 and 2005-7 (Statistics New Zealand 2009c).  Note that data in the two time 
periods are derived from different definitions of ethnicity, so trends over time 
should be interpreted with caution.  Bold figures show the higher of the Māori 
and non-Māori data, unrounded. 
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To examine further the sources of change in life expectancy at birth, Table 
6.6 investigates the age groups from which mortality rate change contributes 
to life expectancy at birth change.  Compared to Māori, the contribution to 
improvements in life expectancy at birth for the non-Māori population is 
weighted more towards improvements in mortality at older ages. 
 
Table 6.6: Percentage contribution to instantaneous change life expectancy at 
birth by age group, New Zealand 2005-7 by ethnic groups and gender 













Age 0 3.7% 3.9% 3.3% 3.4% 3.8% 2.9% 
Age 1-39 12.4% 16.6% 11.1% 7.5% 10.4% 6.4% 
Age 40-80 59.2% 68.7% 58.5% 53.6% 67.6% 52.3% 
Age 81+ 24.7% 10.8% 27.1% 35.5% 18.2% 38.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Calculated from Statistics New Zealand complete period life tables 
2005-7 (Statistics New Zealand 2009c).  Method for calculating contribution to 
life expectancy at birth (marginal instantaneous rate change in life expectancy 
at birth as a ratio to instantaneous mortality rate change, by age) derived from 
that used in OCA (2009) Appendices E and F. 
 
As demographic theories explain, variance in age at death is related to life 
expectancy.  Table 6.7 shows variance in age at death at or above selected ages 
for the sub-populations and ages in Table 6.5 at the two time periods of 
interest.  The greater of the two variances - Māori or non-Māori - for each 
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Table 6.7: Variance in age at death at or above selected ages, New Zealand 
Māori and non-Māori and the gap between them, 1960-62 and 2005-7 
 0 10 40 55 75 85 
1960-2       
Male       
Māori 21.0 14.7 11.0 8.4 4.1 2.0 
Non-Māori 16.0 11.7 9.9 8.3 4.3 7.7 
Female       
Māori 19.4 14.0 11.7 9.2 4.7 2.8 
Non-Māori 14.4 10.2 9.4 8.1 4.7 7.9 
2005-7       
Male       
Māori 14.6 13.2 10.9 9.0 4.8 2.9 
Non-Māori 12.0 10.8 9.3 8.3 5.3 8.4 
Female       
Māori 13.3 11.8 10.8 9.4 5.4 3.2 
Non-Māori 10.1 8.8 8.8 8.0 5.4 8.7 
Source: Derived from Statistics New Zealand complete period life tables 1960-
62 and 2005-7 (Statistics New Zealand 2009c).  Note that data in the two time 
periods are derived from different definitions of ethnicity, so trends over time 
should be interpreted with caution.  Variance calculated as per Engelman et al 
(2010).  Bold figures show the higher of the Māori and non-Māori data, 
unrounded. 
 
The non-Māori subgroup, compared to the Māori subgroup, has lower 
mortality rates, higher life expectancy at birth, a more rectangular survival 
curve, lower variance in age at death at younger ages but higher at older ages, 
a smaller increase in life expectancy at birth and a greater contribution to 
change to life expectancy at birth from older ages.  The comparison between 
the two subgroups is therefore entirely consistent with the tests in Table 6.1.  
The non-Māori population is further along the pathway to mortality 
compression than the Māori population and the relative positions are more 
marked for men than women.   
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This analysis provides no evidence to suggest that the mortality trends 
within the Māori and non-Māori populations, or a comparison between the 
two, would disturb extrapolation of average total population mortality.  Both 
subpopulations are continuing a path towards mortality compression and that 
would be taken into account in total population extrapolation.   
 
The paths can be seen as similar to those of males and females forming 
two sub-populations of the total population.  The female subpopulation is 
more advanced than the male on the path towards mortality compression.  
Because male and female subpopulations each form roughly half of the total 
population, there is sufficient data to make robust projections of each 
subpopulation mortality average.  In the case of Māori, Asian and Pacific 
ethnic groups, official projections are made with a shorter projection period 
than national projections (20 years instead of over 50 years).  The mortality 
assumptions are not described in sufficient detail to understand the rationale, 
but the direction of mortality differentials between groups are preserved with 
apparent narrowing of the gap in period life expectancy at birth, except for an 
increased advantage to Europeans in the Low Mortality scenario (analysis of 
Statistics New Zealand 2006-base ethnic projections to 2009-base national 
projections, 2011-2026).  The main scenario of a narrowing differential between 
all groups and the national average would be consistent with the analysis here.  
However, with the potential for different ethnicities to be chosen throughout 
life and at death, and the changes in ethnicity classification over the recent 
past, the robustness of extrapolation of mortality of each ethnic subpopulation 
is questioned.   
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6.2.3 Mortality of migrants 
Over one-fifth of New Zealand's population aged 65 and over were born 
elsewhere (Census 2006 data).  Therefore the progress of migrants’ mortality in 
their new country is relevant to future longevity in New Zealand, as is any 
change in the characteristics of migrants over time.  No life tables are 
produced for migrant groups.  The implications of variance in mortality by 
birthplace on future total New Zealand population mortality are therefore 
considered more qualitatively than in the case of ethnicity. 
 
A general theory in demography is that migrants are selectively healthy, 
compared to the average of their country of origin, in order to have made the 
migration.  Selection effects can also arise from health, marital or socio-
economic reasons for migration or return; or from migration making a 
difference to health risk factors such as moving from a rural to an urban area, 
or access to health services being made more or less difficult; or from more 
racial discrimination, or closer family support, in the host compared to birth 
country.  In addition, it is also often assumed that the mortality rates of 
migrants converge over time to the average of the host country (Lassetter and 
Callister 2009; Singh and Miller 2004; Wild et al. 2007).   
 
However, the mortality of migrants after long duration of residence in 
their new country has a small literature, as many studies consider only 
mortality changes shortly after migration.  Convergence to host country 
mortality has been suggested for migrants from South Asia to England and 
Wales (Harding 2003), but there was little evidence of this for migrants to 
Australia after fifteen years residence (Young 1991).  Razum and Twardella 
(2002) suggested that the rate of convergence can be slow if the diseases which 
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differ between birth and host country operate at older ages, for example heart 
disease, as most migration occurs at younger ages.  There are therefore many 
unresolved issues about the progress of mortality rates of migrants, 
particularly over long durations, and their influence on a population's average 
mortality.   
 
New Zealand has had a mixture of migrants from countries where 
population health is both better and worse than New Zealand's.  However, 
most analysis on mortality is by ethnic group rather than birth country.  Table 
6.2 showed age-standardised death rates by ethnic groups from which it can 
be hypothesised that mortality is relatively worse for migrants from Pacific 
Islands than the New Zealand average, but better for migrants from Asia.  
Jatrana and Blakely (2008) found a similar result for older New Zealand 
residents.  Given that significant inflows from Pacific Island nations began in 
the 1960s, and that migration from Asian countries increased from the 1980s, a 
large proportion of people identifying with these ethnic groups are likely to be 
first generation migrants.  Reviewing Table 6.2, 7 per cent of people identified 
with Pacific ethnicity and 9 per cent with Asian (multiple ethnicities allowed) 
in 2006.  The aggregate influence on the overall population mortality of the 
higher and lower mortality from these two groups is therefore small. 
 
O'Connell and Dunstan (2009) explored the mortality of migrants from the 
UK.  They concluded that whether or not these migrants had a mortality 
advantage relative to their country of birth, an advantage relative to New 
Zealand's average population mortality persists even decades after migration.  
For all of New Zealand's post-contact history until the 1950s, the United 
Kingdom was the dominant source country for migration to New Zealand 
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(Phillips and Hearn 2008).  The UK is still the largest single birth country of 
overseas-born residents in New Zealand, with six per cent of the resident 
population being UK-born at Census 2006.  The countries chosen for the 
comparative analysis of this paper were selected because they too received 
significant British migration.  However, if New Zealand were now to have a 
different profile of migrants compared to these other countries in future, and 
that affected a significant proportion of the population, then that could result 
in a divergence of mortality across these countries.   
 
There are arguments against such divergence as a result of migration.  The 
countries selected for analysis here have a diverse profile of current migration 
and country of birth of current population, as Table 3.4 showed.  New 
Zealand's profile is most like Australia's in terms of size of overseas born 
population and countries of origin, which provides some reason for New 
Zealand not to be an exception.  However, if it is the case that migrant 
mortality moves to the host country norm, then over the long term of the 
extrapolation period in projections the factors setting the total population 
average mortality will be more important than migration influences; factors 
which apply to all developed countries.  Alternatively, if migrant mortality 
disadvantage or advantage persists long term, then the population average 
will change from that extrapolated only with significant shifts in size and 
profile of the immigrant population.  Such shifts are unlikely to happen in 
such a short time scale that they are undetected when analysing past data for 
extrapolative projections.  Finally, in the case of all the countries selected here, 
migration comes from both relatively healthy and unhealthy populations.  
Migration therefore does not seem likely to be the factor that drives divergence 
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in mortality between countries, or be a reason to adjust New Zealand's total 
population mortality projections. 
 
6.3 Variation in mortality: New Zealand compared 
Demographic theory suggests that mortality variation can only be compared 
across countries with the same life expectancy.  The countries selected for 
comparison in this thesis have different life expectancies, so variance cannot be 
compared simply from one selected country to another.  In order to give some 
insight into New Zealand's comparative position on mortality variance, Figure 
6.4 shows New Zealand's performance on a relative measure of variance in 
lifespan that has been standardised for life expectancy, over the time frame 
covered by the comparative mortality analysis in this thesis.   
 
The source of data was chosen as the most comprehensive recent database 
on length of life variation which includes a measure which standardises for life 
expectancy (at least 50 country*year combinations from at least 10 different 
countries).  Based on a Gini coefficient of inequality, this relative length of life 
inequality (RLI) measure: 
"< represents the deviation from average length of life 
inequality at a certain length of life expectancy in units of one 
standard deviation.  Measured in this way, RLI is not correlated 
with life expectancy and is comparable across different levels of life 
expectancy". 
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Figure 6.4: RLI measure for New Zealand length of life variation 1961-2003 
 
Relative inequality (RLI) measure is the deviation from average length of life 
inequality at a certain level of life expectancy in units of one standard 
deviation: the difference between the Gini coefficient of the country*year in 
question and the mean Gini coefficient of the range. 
Source: Downloaded from www.lengthoflife.org (Smits and Monden 2009), 
August 2010. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows that New Zealand's variation in length of life has 
worsened relative to other countries since 1961.  The measures vary year by 
year, so short-term trends may not be meaningful, but there is an apparent 
trend increase in RLI measure over the period.  The increase appears 
particularly sharp for males during the 1980s.  That decade saw the inequality 
for men increase to what had been the prevailing level on the RLI measure for 
women.  This is consistent with the suggestion of Tobias et al (2009) of an 
increasing contribution of cardiovascular deaths and suicide to ethnic 
mortality inequality for men in the 1980s.  
 
The current and past position of inequality in New Zealand female age at 









1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
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Female 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 6 
 
197 
from other countries informs assessment of relative heterogeneity in age at 
death whereas the usual analysis gives only absolute data within one country.  
The data on the level of New Zealand mortality rates by age and gender in 
section 4.1 highlighted that the mortality of females aged 1-20 in New Zealand 
had worsened considerably from 1961 to 2006 relative to all comparator 
countries, while at the oldest ages New Zealand female mortality compares 
well.  This is consistent with a high degree in variation of age at death for 
female New Zealanders as compared to other countries, and suggests specific 
attention be given to why there appear to be too many early female deaths.  




Mortality research generally uses average measures of mortality rates such as 
life expectancy for a population.  This thesis is concerned with the plausibility 
of projections of average lifespan for the New Zealand population.  Within 
demography, the variance of mortality has a smaller literature which focuses 
largely on theoretical aspects of the variation in lifespan across and within 
populations.  Within epidemiology and public health disciplines the focus is 
avoidable health inequalities, and in particular the association of such variance 
with socio-economic position.  
 
Demographic theory shows that life expectancy, the rate of change in age-
specific mortality rates and mortality variance are linked.  There is some 
inherent variation in mortality or lifespan in a population.  Variation in 
lifespan will decline as life expectancy increases, except at older ages.  For the 
same reduction in mortality rates, gains in life expectancy will be less for a 
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population further advanced in the compression of mortality than another 
with a less rectangularised survival curve.  These characteristics of mortality 
and life expectancy imply that any correct interpretation of observed trends 
requires a theoretical grounding in mortality variation to isolate any true 
deviation from an otherwise expected trend.  There is no consensus on the best 
measure or sets of measures for mortality variation, but more than one 
measure should be used.  Lifespan variance within a population should only 
be compared with that in populations of the same life expectancy at birth; 
which means that, for example, the variance in lifespan of the non-Māori 
population cannot be compared with that of Māori.   
 
For the analytic framework in this thesis, demographic theories of 
mortality variance theories are used to compare mortality rates, life expectancy 
and mortality variance between subpopulations of the New Zealand total 
population.  The Māori subpopulation is less advanced than the non-Māori 
subpopulation on the path to mortality progression, as are males compared to 
females.  Since these pathways, and the supporting empirical data, are to be 
expected then no evidence is available to suggest that mortality changes are 
occurring within the New Zealand population likely to disturb the 
extrapolation of total population mortality trends.  However, data definition 
inconsistencies and fluidity in the ethnic concept for population and death 
registrations make it difficult to interpret trends and absolute values of 
mortality by ethnicity in New Zealand.  Importantly, the reliance on period life 
tables and lack of reliable cohort life expectancies by ethnicity means that 
given life expectancies for Māori and non-Māori understate actual lifespans in 
this current era of improving mortality.  Further, by applying the general 
result of mortality compression that life expectancy improvement slows as life 
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expectancy increases, the gap between realistic lifespans that would be 
indicated by cohort life expectancies by ethnicity if they existed would be 
expected to be smaller than the apparent gap in period life expectancies.    
 
More qualitatively, the changing mix of migrants to New Zealand is not 
likely to disturb the extrapolation of total population mortality trends at least 
in a short to medium timescale.  Further, despite having only a small positive 
impact on average population life expectancy measures (see Chapter 5), efforts 
to tackle early deaths where causes can be isolated, such as policy actions to 
reduce road traffic and other deaths at ages 1-20 where New Zealand has poor 
relative levels of mortality would also help to reduce mortality variance.   
 
Mortality variation, and the way it changes over time, is clearly a complex 
subject.  Demographic theory can help to inform what may be driving changes 
in the relationships between measures and suggests caution in expecting all 
variance can be eliminated.  As life expectancy continues to increase and 
mortality compression continues, there may be apparent increases in mortality 
variance especially at older ages that are not due to policy or environmental 
changes, but a mathematical consequence of the changing shape of the 
survival curve. 
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Chapter 7:  
Surveying subjective lifespans 
Although the existence of longevity risk from individuals underestimating 
their potential lifespans is known theoretically, there are few full surveys of 
adult populations providing data on the extent of potential underestimation 
and its causes.   
 
This chapter first describes the available international evidence, and then 
discusses findings from these studies.  An article based on these first two 
sections has been published as O'Connell (2011a).  Both the methodology and 
the outcomes of the international literature informed my design of a sample 
survey of New Zealanders including questions related to expected lifespan.  
The remainder of the chapter describes this survey.  The survey sampling 
frame, the design of the questionnaire, the wording of the relevant questions 
on longevity expectations, the variables chosen for analysis and the methods of 
analysis are described in subsequent sections.   
 
7.1 International surveys 
The literature on individuals' expectations of their own longevity refers to 
"subjective longevity expectations", which are gathered by surveys and 
measured either by subjective probability of survival to a defined age (SPS) or 
what is usually called "subjective life expectancy" (SLE).  SLE measures 
individuals' expectations of their own lifespan, as they are asked variants of 
the question "How long do you think you will live?"; the answer being 
measured in years.  Potential confusion from the dual meaning of "expectancy" 
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in SLE, and its incorrect application in the term "life expectancy" as discussed 
in section 3.1, will be avoided by defining here individuals' expectations of 
their own likely lifespan as "subjective lifespan" or SLS.  The term "subjective 
longevity expectations" is retained to indicate the general sense individuals 
have for living into later life. 
 
There are at first sight many international reports on aspects of SLS or SPS.  
Studies based on surveys asking for individuals' expectations for their own 
longevity are found in the literature of actuarial science, anthropology, 
demographics, economics, health studies, policy, psychology and statistics.  
O'Brien et al (2005) reviewed the design and findings of over 20 different 
studies of longevity expectations, some of which used the same survey data on 
responses to an SLS or SPS question.  Further searching of journal databases 
revealed 15 more studies.   
 
Many of these studies were based on small samples, selected by region, 
occupation or other restriction, or were investigating discipline-specific 
questions on SLS or SPS not relevant to the broad analysis here.  For example, 
a frequently cited early work in economic literature by Hamermesh (1985) 
used a sample of 411 male white American academic economists and a sample 
of 363 individuals taken at random from a Midwest telephone directory who 
were mostly male.  An influential work in psychology by Tokor and Murphy 
(1967) sampled 48 Caucasian college graduates enrolled in a counsellor trainee 
program.  This thesis is concerned with how the adult population of New 
Zealand estimates subjective longevity, and how that compares with likely 
outcomes.  Therefore, limited or unrepresentative international studies were 
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screened out, to leave those based on a nationally representative adult 
population.   
 
This screening led to the consideration of six main studies: 
 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a national longitudinal study 
in the US.  The question on longevity expectations used is a measure of 
SPS.  Hurd and McGarry (1995) was the first work on longevity 
expectations based on HRS, and others have followed. 
 The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) was developed 
based on the HRS and also uses a question on SPS.  The original work 
on longevity expectations from ELSA is in Banks et al (2004). 
 The Ageing, Status and the Sense of Control (ASOC) survey is a 
national longitudinal study in the US.  The question relevant here is a 
measure of SLS.  Mirowsky (1999) is the original study on longevity 
expectations from this survey. 
 One-off studies have been carried out by inserting questions on 
subjective longevity expectations into surveys organised for other 
purposes.  All the examples here cover Great Britain.  Two (O'Brien et 
al. 2005; Wardle and Steptoe 2003) used a question on SLS.  One 
(Popham and Mitchell 2007) used a question on SPS. 
 
Table 7.1 summarises the critical features of these six studies.   
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Table 7.1: Selected studies of SLS and SPS 








(HRS) first two 
waves, 1992 and 
1994.  Longitudinal 
survey focused on 
health, economic 
and social issues. 
Face to face 
interviews. 
 
Sample size of over 10,000 comprising 
men aged 51-65 and women aged 46-61 in 
first wave. 
Individuals aged 51-61 weighted to be 
representative of the national US 
population. Additional respondents are 
spouses of age-eligible sample.  
SPS: "Using any number from 0 to 10 
where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 10 
equals absolutely certain, what do you think 
are the chances you will live to be 75 [also 
85] or more". 
A visual scale showed 0 and 10 at either 
end, 0 labelled as "absolutely no chance" 
and 10 as "absolutely certain‛.   














Sample size of over 12,000.   
Core sample designed to represent people 
aged 50 and over, living in private 
households in England, drawn from 
existing health-related study.  Additional 
respondents are partners of age-eligible 
sample. 
SPS: "What are the chances that you will 
live to be X?" Reference points are set 
according to age, for example, X=75 for 
those aged 50-64; X=85 for those aged 70-74.   
A visual scale showed 0 and 100 at either 
end, 0 labelled as "absolutely no chance" 
and 100 as "absolutely certain‛.   
Mirowsky 
(1999) 
First wave of 
Ageing, Status and 





Over 2,400 respondents aged 18-95 who 
identified themselves as black or white. 
Sample was a national probability sample 
of US households, but drawn from 
English speakers only, and weighted to 
compensate for over-sampling seniors. 
 
SLS: "To what age do you expect to live?" 
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Table 7.1: Selected studies of SLS and SPS, continued 
Study Survey  Setting Sample SPS or SLS question 





into a consumer 




Over 3,900 British adults aged over 16. 
Sample weighted to be nationally 
representative. 
SLS: ‛I would now like you to think about 
other people of the same age and sex of 
yourself. To what age would you expect 
them to live on average? Estimate if unsure. 
And to what age would you expect 







into the 10th wave 




Survey (BHPS) of 
social and 
economic issues.  
Face-to-face 
interviews. 
Over 4,700 British adults aged 25-64.   
Sample reflects first wave sampling - 
designed to be representative of British 
adults aged 16 and over in 1991 - with 
attrition and boost since then. 
SPS: Respondents were asked whether 
they thought it likely that they would live 
to be 75 or over (very likely, likely, 













Over 1,600 British adults aged over 16.  
Sample was a national probability sample 
of British households. 
SLS: ‚Many people feel that they have 
some idea about their life span.  Thinking 
about your life, what age do you think you 
will live to?"  
Choices given: up to 70, 70 to 79, 80 to 89, 
90 to 99 and over 100.‛ 
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Although both the HRS and ELSA surveys are large, and aim to be 
nationally representative, they are carried out for research into ageing.  They 
sample older adults only, primarily adults originally aged in their fifties and 
older.  The age profile of later waves is likely to be older because these are 
longitudinal studies (although the sample is boosted).  Thus, despite being 
national in coverage, HRS and ELSA may have limited relevance for 
understanding questions of subjective longevity for an entire adult population, 
but were retained here because of their large sample size.  Further, there are 
several reports using HRS data and to exclude it would significantly reduce 
the findings available for study. 
 
Of the one-off studies in Table 7.1 that aim to be representative of a 
national adult population, two (Popham and Mitchell; Mirowsky) have in 
practice limitations to the sample scope, as detailed in the table.  The samples 
of the two remaining studies from Table 7.1 are more likely to be 
representative of a national adult population, but both look at the same nation, 
Great Britain.  Wardle and Steptoe do not analyse the gap between subjective 
life expectancies and population measures, but only look at potential correlates 
with SLS.  This leaves O'Brien et al (2005) as the only study identified of a 
nationally representative adult population that analyses the gap between 
subjective and actual life expectancy, as measured by a population life table.  
This report was self-published by the university department of the researchers. 
It also differs from the other studies as by its question structure it draws 
attention first to the respondents' views on others' lifespans before asking for 
expectations of personal lifespan. 
  




Therefore, while at first sight the quantum of international evidence on 
SLS or SPS appears helpful, it is not necessarily generalisable.  The surveys are 
often based on limited and possibly selective data.  Another adult population 
outside the US or GB, such as that of New Zealand, may have different 
longevity expectations because demographics such as ethnicity or age 
structure, policy messages shaping norms or cultural ways of thinking about 
longevity may all be different.  Further, existing studies have not been made in 
an appropriate context to explore longevity risk for individual retirement 
planning or pension policy. 
 
7.2 Findings from international surveys  
Despite the limitations of the studies described in Table 7.1, their findings 
suggest some common themes and potential areas to explore for analysis of 
longevity expectations of the New Zealand population.  This section 
summarises the findings from international surveys on individuals' subjective 
expectations of longevity.  It covers evidence on: first, how longevity 
expectations compare with population measures; second, whether the 
longevity expectations of individuals with recognised mortality risk factors 
reflect a true assessment of the risk; and third, how individuals think about 
their longevity expectations.   
  




How do longevity expectations compare with population measures? 
From the authors' own summaries of their findings on subjective longevity 
expectations in the US, it may seem that people estimate fairly accurately.  For 
example,  
"We find that generally <*subjective probabilities of survival to 
75 or 85] do aggregate to population probabilities." 
Hurd and McGarry (1995) p. S268 
 
"When compared across age groups, average subjective life 
expectancies track the current-table actuarial estimates well." 
Mirowsky (1999) p. 977 
 
However, the US studies mainly compared subjective lifespan (SLS) or 
subjective probability of survival (SPS) to measures in contemporary period 
tables.  These measures were therefore already underestimates as they did not 
take future mortality improvement into account.  British studies found 
underestimation in SPS and SLS on an aggregate basis, against contemporary 
period tables and cohort tables which made some assumption for future 
improving mortality.  Further, the population aggregate may not be relevant.  
All studies found differences in the gap between SPS or SLS and population 
measure by gender, with men consistently more optimistic.  Therefore, the 
summaries of aggregate data offer only limited insight.  Table 7.2 summarises 
the aggregated findings from the selected studies which compare individual 
responses on SPS or SLS with the equivalent population average, and 
comments on gender differences.   
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 7 
 
209 
Table 7.2: Aggregate longevity expectations compared to population 
measures in selected studies 














US period life 
table 1990 used 




age.  Brief 
consideration of 
period life tables 
1980-2000 in 
first study. 
Compared to 1990 period table men, 
mostly aged 51-61, slightly 
overestimated SPS to age 75, 
although at age 55 appeared 
consistent with the period table 
projected for 2000.  Men 
unrealistically overestimated SPS to 
age 85. 
 
Women in the same age group 
underestimated SPS to age 75, but 
SPS to age 85 was consistent with 
1990 period table. 








GB not stated). 
Both men and women, at all ages 50-
64, underestimated SPS to age 75 
compared to the period table.  




1995 US period life 
table 1992, by 
age, gender and 
"race" (black or 
white). 
Compared to the period table, white 
females' SLS was consistent, black 
females overestimated by 4 years, 
white males by 3 years and black 
males by 6 years. 




2004 GB period and 
cohort life tables 
2004, by age, 
and gender. 
Females' SLS underestimated period 
life table by over 2 years and cohort 
table by 6 years.  Men 
underestimated by 1 year and over 4 
years, respectively. 
Note: A period life table is one which assumes each individual experiences the 
mortality rates of that period throughout remaining life.  A cohort table 
incorporates assumptions for how mortality rates will improve over the course 
of each individual's life.  In the above, US tables are sourced from the Bureau 
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The British studies show a consistent theme of underestimation.  Banks et 
al (2004) graphically showed underestimation for both genders and all age 
groups covered, and reported that the SPS for women aged 60-64 averaged to 
65 per cent, which underestimated the then current average survival 
probability from period life tables of just over 80 per cent.  However, the 
survival probability on cohort measures which assumed some future mortality 
improvement was over 85 per cent (PPI 2004).  O'Brien et al (2005) found a 
similar picture, with SLS slightly below contemporary period life tables, but 
significantly below the population cohort measure.  The authors concluded 
that people had a sense of a prevailing wisdom based on current measures of 
life expectancy but did not appreciate that the future was likely to bring 
improving mortality.  Thus: 
"On average, people under-estimate how long they are likely to 
live [by 4.62 years for males and 5.95 years for females+< they tend 
to ignore expected mortality improvements". 
O'Brien et al (2005) p. 31 
 
The findings for US females in both the Hurd and McGarry (HRS) and 
Mirowsky (ASOC) studies are consistent with the O'Brien et al hypothesis.  
Accuracy compared to an earlier period life table than the survey date implies 
underestimation of actual longevity because of mortality improvement already 
occurred and likely over respondents' remaining lifespan.  However, the 
overestimates of US males in both studies (and black females in Mirowsky) 
appear to contradict this.   
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Neither US study investigated the reasons for respondents choosing an 
SPS or SLS.  Mirowsky hypothesised that the major demographic groups in the 
US "share a common image of normal longevity" (p. 978).  If so, that image 
appeared more consistent with the average contemporary longevity of white 
females than with other groups.  The picture is clearly more complicated for 
individuals than on average for a population.  International studies provide 
mixed evidence that may not be relevant for the New Zealand population.  But 
the evidence does suggest a risk that people underestimate their potential 
longevity, and that women may suffer more from this longevity risk than men. 
 
Are risk factors reflected in longevity expectations? 
The analytic studies of subjective longevity expectations in demography and 
health sciences usually investigate whether people have lower expectations for 
their own longevity if they have higher actual mortality risk.  The evidence is 
limited and mixed, but there appear to be some risk factors more likely to be 
associated with lower longevity expectations.  Table 7.3 shows the risk factors 
that were found to correlate with the direction of SPS or SLS from the selected 
surveys described in Table 7.1.   
 
The comments in Table 7.3 summarise from analyses of whether selected 
other variables in the survey were statistically associated with the response to 
the SPS or SLS question in the survey in question.  The caveats to the use of the 
survey data need to be considered.  These analyses are effectively searching for 
associations to the answer to one question on longevity expectations; the 
power of these tests may be low.  The studies using the HRS study analysed 
responses to SPS at age 75 only.  Table 7.3 is an illustration of what has been 
chosen to study and publish, so does not provide a complete picture.  Only 
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statistically significant effects (p < .05) are shown in both columns.  Where 
different regression models are published, effects that were significantly 
significant on only some models are not shown in either column.  
 
The first column in Table 7.3 shows whether the group of respondents 
with a specific risk factor, as measured by the survey in question, on average 
gave an SPS or SLS that was correctly higher or lower than the overall average.  
'Correct' here means that the risk factor in practice does affect population 
longevity in the same direction.  For example, smokers are known to have 
lower than average longevity so a 'correct' association would show the average 
smoker giving an SLS or SPS lower than the average for the sample.  The 
second column shows where there was no significant difference in SPS or SLS 
from the survey average, when there would be a real life difference.  No 
variable was found in these studies where longevity expectations were 
obviously in the 'wrong' direction.   
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Table 7.3: Significant risk factors affecting direction of longevity 





Risk factors reported in 
correct direction 
 




HRS   
1992 
 





HRS   
1992 
 
Obesity or overweight for 
female non smokers 
Obesity or overweight for 






















Surviving same-sex parent 








Young children at home 





Private health insurance 












Heavy alcohol drinker 
Parent's age  













Manual occupational class 
Education levels 
Income 
Self-rated health  
Moderate to heavy smoker 
Non-manual unskilled 
occupational class 









Eating fruit less than daily 
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None of the found associations is conclusive, with the exception of gender.  
All studies found that on average men gave a lower SLS or SPS than women, 
even if the significance of the direction or accuracy of difference was not 
tested.  At least two studies recorded a significant difference in the right 
direction between men and women, and none found no effect.  It is probably 
generally well known that women live longer than men; the evidence exists in 
the increasing ratio of women to men with age in the population of any 
developed country.  It appears that men know this to the extent that on 
average they have longevity expectations lower than women.  This can be 
consistent with the suggestion from some studies that men tend to have 
longevity expectations that are higher than current reality for male longevity.  
It suggests men are more optimistic than women relative to a lower male 
longevity expectation. 
 
It is also the case that higher socio-economic position and educational 
level improves longevity, but this is perhaps less widely known.  The evidence 
here suggests a directional link between longevity expectations and 
educational level, but a mixed picture as regards measures of socio-economic 
position more broadly.  This would be expected insofar as different measures 
are used.  Two British studies found a link to occupational social class (one 
only to manual occupations), but one found no link.  Income was significant in 
one British study, not in another and not in a US study.  The latter found a link 
to past economic hardship, but one of the British studies found no link to 
father's occupational social class in childhood. The sum of evidence therefore 
suggests that longevity expectations tend not to reflect socio-economic factors 
with the exception of education. 
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Self-reported health status was found to be directionally linked with 
longevity expectations in four studies from both countries, although having a 
medical condition or physical impairment was not found to be associated in 
one US study.  Studies using HRS have found that respondents with relatively 
low SPS correctly predict their greater risk of mortality over short periods, 
from two to 10 years (Hurd and McGarry 2002; Khwaja et al. 2007; Smith et al. 
2001).  Although the evidence is not conclusive, an association of perceptions 
of health and mortality seems likely, at least in the short term. 
 
Some evidence suggested that people with health risk factors 
underestimate the impact of actual risk involved.  This analysis requires 
comparing the SPS or SLS from the survey with life tables that reflect the 
mortality experience not only of the usual population attributes of age and 
gender but also the variable in question.  The production of such life tables is 
rare, and their accuracy is necessarily less robust than national population life 
tables.  Schoenbaum (1997), Ross and Mirowsky (2002) and O'Brien et al 
(2005), despite working from different samples, all suggested that the true 
excess mortality risk of smokers was generally greater than respondents who 
smoked, or who used to, expected.  Several studies found the direction of 
longevity expectations was associated with smoking.  However, being a heavy 
current smoker appeared to make more of an impression on longevity 
expectations than being a light or ex-smoker, even though in both of the latter 
situations mortality risk would be elevated from population averages.   
 
Further, Falba and Busch (2005) found that being overweight or obese 
only significantly affected the perceived survival probability for female non-
smokers.  Smoking appears a more influential risk factor than obesity.  Falba 
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and Busch suggested that obese respondents substantially underestimated the 
excess mortality risk of obesity.  However, the sample dates from the 1992 HRS 
survey of Americans then mostly aged in their fifties.  People of different ages 
and elsewhere may have different knowledge, and knowledge may generally 
have increased as the health risks of obesity have had significant media 
attention.  An association of longevity expectations with obesity is therefore 
not proven. 
 
In summary, these studies, despite being based on few datasets, 
consistently suggest that individuals can vary their subjective longevity 
expectations in the direction that risk varies.  The more widely used risk 
factors appear to be gender, educational level, self-reported health status and 
smoking.  Other factors may have an effect, but the evidence is limited.  None 
of the studies asked how respondents actually derived their choice of answer 
to the question on longevity expectations.  When a risk factor correlates in the 
correct direction with SLS or SPS, then authors tend to imply that people are 
taking the risk factor into account.  However, the analyses investigate 
correlation only, and the mechanism by which people actually think about 
their longevity expectations is hypothesised. 
 
How do individuals think about their longevity expectations? 
While Mirowsky (1999) suggested that all adults held the same reference 
group for SLS, O'Brien et al suggested adults saw themselves in a reference 
group of like people, and adjusted their SLS according to the broadly correct 
demographic profile of that group.  Under this 'normalising' model, male 
smokers would have an idea of the current average life expectancy of a male 
smoker, and reflect that it should be lower than a female non-smoker.   




This is at odds with the psychologists' model of SLS, which from very 
early in the analysis of the subject has been considered "a critical indicator of a 
highly complex attitude toward an emotionally charged topic" (Tokor and 
Murphy 1967 p. 21).  Under this 'planning for death' model, people adjust their 
population average estimate of SLS based on personal anxiety about death or 
experiences of death among family.  This theme has been explored in small 
and selective studies not considered in detail here, such as Hamermesh (1985) 
and Brouwer and van Exel (2005).  These studies illustrate a hypothesis on the 
basis of significant associations between SLS and age at death of grandparents 
and parents that there is "huge reliance on forebears' longevity" (Hamermesh 
1985 p. 400) when people set their own longevity expectations.  An example of 
anxiety about death being to the forefront when prompted by events is given 
by Smith (2008) who found an exaggerated lowering of SPS by people in the 
areas affected by Hurricane Andrew in 1992.   
 
A third model assumes that people thinking about SLS are not thinking 
about death, but about remaining life, often specifically about planning for 
retirement.  This model, called here 'life planning', underlies further studies 
based on HRS, which suggest that US adults aged mainly in their fifties and 
older with low SPS tend to retire earlier and consume in preference to save 
(Hurd et al. 2003; Salm 2006).  Further, van Solinge and Henkens (2009) found 
later retirement age intentions for those in a select sample of Dutch employees 
with good pension plans who expected a longer life, based on higher than 
average scores on a variable combining subjective probabilities of survival to 
age 75 and beyond age 90. 
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All these models assume that people have some idea of their likely 
lifespan.  Research on subjective longevity expectations has tended to ignore 
the survey respondents who did not answer the question on SLS or SPS or 
answered "don't know".  Only 2 per cent non-response was reported in the first 
wave of HRS (Hurd and McGarry 1995).  However, Mirowsky (1999) reported 
a non-response rate of 21 per cent and O'Brien et al (2005) that 10 per cent of 
the sample responded "don't know" to the SLS question.  The "don't knows" 
can therefore form a sizeable group.  Of the surveys covered in this review, 
only Mirowsky (1999) made explicit allowance for those responding "don't 
know", imputing a response to them.  No other analysis has been found which 
profiles the "don't knows" compared to those who responded, or those who 
appeared to misunderstand the question.  Such an analysis could shed light on 
the characteristics of those more or less likely to have thought about their own 
longevity, and the information that could help people form more accurate 
longevity expectations.  
 
7.3 Structuring the research questions 
The international studies provide useful learning for survey and analysis 
design, and give confidence that asking for SLS or SPS yields usable responses.  
The remainder of this chapter describes how the design of these international 
surveys informed the design of the survey undertaken in New Zealand, thus 
allowing the comparison of the first New Zealand data on longevity 
expectations to be compared with the international dataset.  Table 7.4 
summarises the way the survey and analysis were structured, and references 
the sections in following chapters which contain the analysis of each research 
question.  
 



























What do New Zealanders 




How do these expectations 









How much have New 
Zealanders thought about 
their own longevity? 
 
How do New Zealanders 
choose a response when 
asked what they think 













What predicts high or low 
longevity expectations? 
 
What is the profile of those 









to retirement plans 
 
Do New Zealanders 
consider longevity when 
making retirement plans? 
 
What is the distribution of 
intended retirement age 
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The first research gap to be addressed was how New Zealanders view 
their expected longevity and whether, collectively, the population 
underestimates.  The subjective longevity expectations, gathered by survey, 
are compared to benchmark population measures to see whether the aggregate 
shape of longevity expectations in New Zealand is similar to the international 
picture.   
 
Second, the mechanisms by which people use understanding of their own 
risk factors or other considerations when setting longevity expectations are 
unknown.  This research explores how New Zealanders' longevity 
expectations are formed.  Important questions are how people think about 
their likely longevity; whether they think about it at all, and in what context.  
Do people of different characteristics think about their longevity differently, 
and if so, which factors are different groups most likely to take into account?  
Are there any groups who are more likely to answer "don't know" when asked 
for their longevity expectation?  Do any of the three models postulated for 
how people think about longevity - normalising, planning for death or life 
planning - fit the New Zealand population? 
 
Third, this research aims to describe the extent of longevity 
underestimation in New Zealand.  The characteristics of New Zealanders most 
likely to expect high or low longevity will be identified, as will the profile of 
those most likely to under- or overestimate longevity.     
 
Fourth, the research gap on how people think about their likely longevity 
seems important when considering how to formulate effective communication 
of information on longevity.  A government might be interested in this either 
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to help individuals with retirement planning or to communicate the rationale 
for superannuation policy changes.  The few studies to link longevity 
expectations with retirement planning suggest that longevity underestimation 
is important, because it may lead people to retire without providing for the 
potential length of retirement.  Hence this research asks how New Zealanders' 
longevity expectations relate to their retirement plans.   
 
7.4 Survey sampling frame 
The ANZ-Retirement Commission Financial Knowledge Survey was first 
carried out in 2006 and repeated in 2009.  The Retirement Commission, now 
known as the Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income, and 
abbreviated here as CFLRI, is responsible for financial education in New 
Zealand.  It organises the survey with ANZ Bank as the major sponsor.  The 
objective of the survey to measure levels of financial knowledge in the New 
Zealand adult population so that knowledge levels can be tracked over time 
and areas of low financial literacy can be identified and addressed.  
 
The survey was carried out by Colmar Brunton, a market research 
company, under the oversight of a steering group including representatives of 
the CFLRI, ANZ Bank, and academic and financial experts.  I attended most 
steering group meetings for the 2009 survey as an advisor on financial literacy.  
In addition, I designed the additional survey questions on longevity 
expectations to be explained in the next subsection.  Colmar Brunton was 
responsible for sampling and interviewing, using a questionnaire developed 
by the steering group and described in the next subsection.  Details are 
available in Colmar Brunton (2009), the company's report to its client, then 
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called the Retirement Commission, which is the source for all information 
about the survey in this section unless otherwise stated.   
 
A stratified sample of Statistics New Zealand area units was used, with 
unit areas selected with probability in proportion to size.  Eight face to face 
interviews were carried out in randomly chosen households in each area unit.  
A single respondent was chosen at random within each household from those 
eligible - adult aged 18 and over - by asking for the adult with the last 
birthday.  The ethical procedures for sample selection and interviews followed 
were those of Colmar Brunton's established practice.  The interviews took 
place during March and April 2009 and were on average 60 minutes long.  
Each participant was given $20.   
 
A sample size of 850 interviews was achieved.  The response rate was 62 
per cent, considered high by Colmar Brunton relative to other general public 
surveys which are usually carried out by telephone (personal communication, 
June 2010).  National surveys carried out in New Zealand for statistical 
purposes, such as the Household Economic Survey (Income), the Survey of 
Family, Income and Employment and the Household Labour Force Survey 
have higher response rates in the order of 75-88 per cent.  However, these are 
very large samples (n=4,700, 15,100 and 15,000 households respectively) and 
supported by Crown budgets.  Data to enable analysis of the source of non-
response in the Financial Knowledge Survey were not collected.  However, the 
potential for non-response bias was mitigated to some degree as the data were 
proportionally weighted, but not rescaled, to achieve population 
characteristics as at Census 2006 by household size, age and gender.  The 
analysis in this thesis uses the weights determined by Colmar Brunton.   




7.5 Survey questionnaire  
The full questionnaire for the 2009 survey consisted of 98 questions, some of 
which had many parts.  The majority of the questions for the 2009 survey were 
the same or slightly changed from those in the 2006 survey, because of the 
requirement to track knowledge level results over time.   
 
The first 59 questions in the questionnaire were mainly set by the previous 
survey; a mixture of specific tests for financial knowledge such as: 
Q32) If Nicky has $100 in a savings account and the interest rate 
was 2% per year, after 5 years how much would Nicky have in her 
account if she left the money to grow?  Would it be more than $102, 
exactly $102 or less than $102? 
Q 36) At what age are people entitled to NZ Super? 
 
<and questions on the financial behaviour of the respondent, for 
example: 
Q13) Do you have a budget? 
Q34) To what extent have you thought about your financial 
planning for your retirement? 
 
These questions covered the following subjects, in this order: money 
management, budgeting, goal setting and financial planning, debt 
management, mortgages, managing risk, saving, retirement planning, 
investing, consumer rights and responsibilities, attitudes and behaviours to 
saving and spending, and locus of control in life.  There then followed the 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 7 
 
224 
questions inserted to the 2009 survey to ask about longevity expectations: Q60 
to Q63 inclusive.   
 
Following these questions were four questions on KiwiSaver, also not 
asked in 2006, and then the final 28 questions which collected demographic 
information about the respondent and information on aspects of their personal 
finances.   
 
7.6 Survey questions on longevity expectations 
The questions on longevity expectations were inserted into the 2009 survey 
specifically for this thesis.  I designed these questions, using the context as 
described in Table 7.4, and learning from the international studies on longevity 
expectations already covered.  This subsection explains the design of these 
questions, which then are set out in Table 7.5. 
 
All the international studies described in Table 7.1 situated questions on 
longevity expectations into long questionnaires which were primarily 
designed around a purpose other than longevity; either health, ageing or 
consumer interests.  It is possible the preceding health related questions in 
HRS and other international studies tended to concentrate the respondents' 
thoughts on their perceived good or poor health, which also affected their 
longevity expectations.  It is also possible that the questions preceding those 
on longevity expectations in the New Zealand survey influenced the 
respondents differently, towards appropriate financial planning attitudes.  
However, the format of the New Zealand survey, with longevity expectations 
questions situated within a questionnaire asking about financial knowledge 
and behaviour is comparable in form with international studies.   




The international studies gave confidence that asking for longevity 
expectations - either subjective lifespan (SLS) or subjective probability of 
survival (SPS) - yields usable responses.  However, there were three main 
decisions to take in question design, for which the international surveys took 
varied approaches: whether to ask for SLS or SPS; whether to allow responses 
in single years of age or in age bands; and, how exactly to phrase the 
questions.   
 
SLS or SPS? 
Both SLS and SPS data can be used to compare expectations with reality and to 
examine how that differential varies with demographic and other 
characteristics.  In an influential paper on expectations measures in attitudinal 
surveys for the purpose of econometric modelling, Manski (2004) called for 
expectations to be measured using subjective probabilities, asserting that is 
consistent with modern economic theory.  He favoured SPS over SLS as SPS 
reflects that people hold ‚a set of subjective distributions for an unknown 
event‛ (page 1369) rather than expect one deterministic outcome.   
 
However, SLS questions elicit more data that can be analysed in more 
depth than SPS questions.  With SPS, responses yield data only in relation to 
the ages chosen as benchmarks: usually 75 or 85.  A survival distribution by 
age has to be modelled using these one or two data points, which demands a 
lot from analysis of little data (for example as in Khwaja et al. 2007; Perozek 
2008).  Both SLS and SPS studies suffer from bunching at focal values.  O'Brien 
et al (2005) reported bunching of SLS at quinquennial ages, especially age 80.  
In the HRS first wave, bunching at probabilities of 0, 0.5 and 1 was reported 
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(Hurd and McGarry 1995).  Additional inconsistency is reported in SPS 
studies.  In the first wave of HRS, only 70 per cent of respondents chose a 
lower probability of survival to age 85 than to age 75.  There is no explanation 
for the "cognition error or misunderstanding <revealed by the other 30 
percent of respondents" (Hurd and McGarry 1995 p. S277).  Technically, SLS 
appears the preferable variable. 
 
Further, the SLS of respondents form a distribution of expected lifespans; 
the basic unit examined for this study which takes an individual life course 
perspective.  For example, SLS can be compared directly to expected age at 
retirement.  Therefore, SLS was chosen as more relevant for this study.   
 
Age band or single year of age? 
Further consideration was given to how to collect responses from the SLS 
question (Q61): to ask an open question and collect single age responses or 
band responses into age brackets; or to prompt a response by showing a card 
with quinquennial ages or age bands.  Using a showcard was preferred in 
order to be consistent with the way in which showcards were used to collect 
responses from other questions in the survey.  Initially, 5-year age bands (for 
example 60-64, 65-69,<) was chosen in an attempt to avoid bunching at round 
numbers.  However, pre-survey qualitative cognitive testing of the 
questionnaire showed that the use of single years of age in the showcard was 
preferred by respondents, who perhaps found age bands confusing when 
asked for SLS as a year of age.  It was decided to use put quinquennial single 
years of age on the showcard (under 60, 65, 70 and so on.).  While this 
introduced bunching, the evidence of the international surveys suggested that 
bunching was bound to occur anyway.   




The same method was used for the question on expected retirement age 
(Q63), with a similar but younger range of ages offered.  This was to give the 
respondent consistency of question style and to allow the calculation of the 
gap between SLS and retirement age for each respondent. 
 
Phrasing of longevity questions 
The questions on subjective longevity, as originally developed to meet the 
research objectives, were tested in a pre-survey qualitative cognitive pilot, and 
amended slightly to flow with the remainder of the questionnaire.  The final 
wording of the entire section of the questionnaire on longevity expectations is 
set out in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5: Questions on longevity expectations in New Zealand survey  
 
The next section is a short one about retirement and ageing. 
 
IF RESPONDENT HAS REPORTED A MAJOR HEALTH PROBLEM 
AT Q55 (pg 30), THEN READ: When I read the questions, if you don't 
feel comfortable answering them, please just let me know and we will 
skip them. 
 
Q60) Thinking now about what age you might live to, which of the 
following best describes how much you have thought about it? 
SHOWCARD.   
CODE ONE ONLY. 
I've thought about it a lot 
I've given it some thought 
I've not really thought about it 




Q61) What age do you think you will live to?  
SHOWCARD.   
CODE ONE ONLY. 
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Table 7.5: Questions on longevity expectations in New Zealand survey, 
continued 
Q62) For what reasons do you say that? OFFER NO PROMPTS. 
CODE FIRST MENTIONED IN FIRST COLUMN; 
CODE ALL OTHER MENTIONS IN SECOND COLUMN 
That's about average/normal [for someone like me] 
Genetics 
Thinking about my parents 
Thinking about my grandparents 
Thinking about people my age/that's about normal for people my age 
I smoke 
I don't smoke 
I'm fit/I exercise 
I'm not fit/I don't exercise 
I have a good diet 
I have a bad diet 
I'm healthy (generally) 
I'm not healthy (generally)/I'm ill 
I have had health scare(s) 
Medical Science/new technologies 





Q63) At what age, if any, do you think you are most likely to retire? By 
'retire' I mean to stop full-time paid work with no intention of working 
full-time again, although you might still do a little part-time work or 
some voluntary work. 
SHOWCARD.   
CODE ONE ONLY. 





Never: I'll carry on working 
I've already retired or I don't work 
Don't know 
Refused 




The CFLRI requested that the questions on longevity not be asked if a 
respondent had reported earlier in the survey having had a major health 
problem in the last 12 months.  This was in case a very ill respondent would be 
upset by being asked the age to which he or she might live.  In the event, these 
questions were asked to all survey participants. 
 
Question Q60 on how much the respondent had thought about the age he 
or she might live to was asked with a showcard with a 4-point Likert scale, 
and clearly had to be asked before the question asking for an SLS.  Question 
Q62 aimed to elicit why the respondent had chosen the SLS in Q61.  An open 
question with no showcard was chosen because no evidence was found from 
prior studies even for how many reasons people might have.  The first reason 
reported was isolated and other reasons given collected in another variable. 
 
In addition to the questions in Table 7.5, questions used in the 2006 
Financial Knowledge survey were repeated and are included in the analysis 
here as they enable investigation into the links between SLS and retirement 
planning.  
Q34) To what extent have you thought about your financial 
planning for your retirement?  
(SHOWCARD: A lot, a fair amount, A little, Not at all) 
Q35) What are all the things that a person needs to consider 
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7.7 Choice of independent variables for analysis 
The Financial Knowledge survey gathered data on a large number of variables.  
A subset of variables was selected in order to focus the analysis to what is 
most relevant for the research questions in this thesis.  This subset formed the 
independent variables tested for association with the responses to the 
longevity expectations questions.   
 
Previous studies explored the association of longevity expectations with 
demographic characteristics and health risk factors (Table 7.3), both of which 
are relevant for this research.  Because of the focus of the Financial Knowledge 
survey, a third category of variables on planning and financial knowledge was 
also available.  Some of the variables used were transformed by grouping 
answers in order to have significant numbers in cells for analysis.  Generally, 
information on don't knows were kept, and merged with refused.  There were 
very few refused.  The grouping followed that used in previous reports on the 
survey, where possible.  The data gathered in the survey but excluded from 
this research were those designed for tracking financial knowledge levels and 








For this study, age, gender and education level and ethnicity were available.  
Two additional available variables were included to explore other angles of 
ethnicity: whether born in New Zealand and comfort with English.  Indicators 
used for socio-economic status were education level, personal income and net 
wealth.  The latter variable was constructed by Colmar Brunton from response 
to questions on assets, housing equity and debts.   
 
Table 7.7 sets out the characteristics of the weighted sample on the 
demographic variables selected and grouped, and compares with the New 
Zealand adult population as close in time as possible to that of the survey.  The 
weighted sample provides a close representation of the adult population of 
New Zealand by gender, age, ethnicity and personal income.  Differences are 
within sample error (see Table 7.6) except for a slight over-representation of 
adults educated at tertiary level.  
 
Table 7.6: Estimated sample errors, full sample,  




Margin of error 
 
10% or 90% 
20% or 80% 
30% or 70% 
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NZ population aged 
18 and over 
































Ethnicity (multiple response) 





















Place of birth 
Born in New Zealand 










Comfort with English 
Very 
Somewhat 








Primary or basic secondary 
Secondary school 













Ages 15+ Personal income 
Up to and including $30,000 pa  
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Ethnicity is measured in Table 7.7 as in the usual population measures.  
Both the survey and the New Zealand Census 2006 allowed multiple 
responses, as people can belong to one or more ethnicity.  Responses are 
counted for each ethnicity, so that the data points for ethnicity add up to more 
than the number of people in the population and the percentages for ethnicity 
in Table 7.7 add up to more than 100 per cent.  For analysis, the ethnicity 
variable was grouped differently, so that each respondent is counted once.  
Respondents who gave a single ethnicity in one of the largest four groups - 
New Zealand European, Māori, Pacific or Asian - form separate groups, as do 
those who gave both New Zealand European and Māori ethnicities.  Those 
with other multiple ethnicities are included in "All other", along with those 
who give a single ethnicity that is not in one of the largest groups.  The 
frequency table on this basis is shown as Table 7.8.  The sample size for all 
ethnic groups other than New Zealand European is still smaller than ideal for 
a full analysis of results by ethnicity.   
 







nequiv Per cent 
 
Sole New Zealand European 
Sole Māori 
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Health risk variables 
Data was not collected directly on health status or risk factors except where the 
respondent gave in response to Q62, the reason for choosing an SLS a risk 
factor such as "I smoke" or "I have a good diet".  As the survey was about 
financial knowledge rather than health, it would not have been appropriate to 
gather the health-related data available to international surveys such as the 
HRS or ELSA.  Therefore, the analysis of self-reported health risk factors in this 
study is limited to where they are top of mind for respondents.  This was 
designed to be the case in order to identify specifically which, if any, health 
risk factors were in mind when respondents gave their longevity expectations.  
This effect has only been inferred in previous studies.  The use of this variable 
is described further in section 8.2.2. 
 
Planning and knowledge variables 
Variables that measured respondents' engagement with retirement planning 
and planning for later life were selected.  These were whether the respondent 
was currently contributing to KiwiSaver; whether he or she had made a will 
and how much he or she had thought about financial planning for retirement.  
In addition, in order to check associations with the general attitude towards 
planning rather than leaving things to 'fate', three variables on locus of control 
were selected.  These asked the respondent to agree or disagree on a 5-point 
Likert scale to "My life is determined by my own actions"; "<is determined by 
things beyond my control"; and, "<is controlled by the actions of other 
people".  Responses were grouped to three categories representing agree; 
neither agree or disagree; and disagree. 
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Finally, variables that conveniently measured overall financial knowledge 
were selected.  The major summary measure of the Financial Knowledge 
survey was membership of the High, Medium or Low knowledge group.  This 
measure had been calculated by scoring for correct answers on the basic 
financial knowledge questions in the survey, across a variety of financial 
topics, then using those scores as the basis of splitting into the three groups.  
The scores from the 2006 Financial Knowledge survey were used then to 
divide the sample into three evenly sized groups, named 'tritiles'.  In 2009 the 
same boundary scores for each group were maintained, in order to track the 
desired increasing number in the High knowledge group and decreasing 
number in the Low knowledge group.   
 
Being in the High knowledge group is more likely for those aged 35-64 
rather than older or younger, New Zealand European, tertiary educated, home 
owners, skilled executives or professionals, with an annual household income 
of more than $50,000.  Being in the Low knowledge group is more likely for 
those aged 18-24 or 65 and over, of Māori or Pacific ethnicity, primary or basic 
secondary educated only, tenants, not in paid employment or in semi-skilled-
or unskilled work, and on a low income (ANZ-Retirement Commission 2009 p. 
9).  Further, financial product ownership is highest among the High 
knowledge group and lowest among the Low knowledge group (Colmar 
Brunton 2009 p. 15).  Further tests (not shown) confirm that membership of 
financial knowledge group is strongly associated with contributing to 
KiwiSaver, having made a will and having thought about planning for 
retirement (all p < .001).  Thus, membership of a knowledge group is 
associated with both socio-economic status and with activity in personal 
finance management.   




Further, two knowledge groups had been defined by the steering group at 
'extreme' scores.  The Lowest knowledge group were the 10 per cent of 
respondents with the lowest scores on the basic financial questions, and can be 
seen as a marker for those excluded from personal finance management.  
Conversely, the Advanced knowledge group scored highly on knowledge 
questions about advanced financial topics, mostly investing.  Around 20 per 
cent of respondents were in the Advanced knowledge group.  Table 7.9 shows 
the distribution of the sample on these planning and financial knowledge 
variables.  Note that the proportion in the High knowledge group had 
increased from 2006 to 2009 as desired, with less than a third of the sample in 
the Low and Medium knowledge groups. 
 
The sample proportions reporting contributing to KiwiSaver were slightly 
lower than would be expected.  The number contributing to KiwiSaver at the 
time of the survey was approximately 29 per cent of the New Zealand 
population (aged 18 and over; calculated from IRD statistics).  KiwiSaver had 
started less than two years before the survey took place, and numbers were 
growing rapidly.  Some respondents may not have reported their membership 
correctly, especially if they had been auto-enrolled. 
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Table 7.9: Planning and financial knowledge characteristics of sample 
 
 




Contributing to KiwiSaver 





Made a will 





How much thought about financial 
planning for retirement? 
A little or not at all 







My life is determined by my own 
actions 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 






My life is determined by things 
beyond my control 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 






My life is controlled by the actions 
of other people 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 
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7.8 Methods of analysis 
All statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS version 18.  As variables 
were categorical, exploratory analysis searched for associations between 
responses and selected variables using Pearson's chi-squared tests.  Significant 
standardised residuals within the contingency table were identified.  For some 
tests of association, binary or multinomial logistic regression was then used 
with regression equation: 
 
            
 
                    
 
 
The Xi input into the model were the potentially salient predictor variables 
identified in exploratory analysis, re-coded where 1 indicated the category as 
shown, and 0 all other responses.  Both backward and forward stepwise 
methods were tested.  Although inclusion would have been preferred as a 
possible error over exclusion, the fit of the model was generally better with the 
forward method. 
 
SLS responses were compared to population indicators of expected 
lifespan from life tables.  First, aggregate measures of survey responses to SLS 
were compared to benchmark aggregate population lifespan indicators.  This 
checked whether the SLS were centralised around one norm, ignoring the 
distribution by age.  This analysis is in section 8.1.1.   
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Next, the gap between SLS and life table lifespan was calculated for each 
respondent to form a distribution for each life table used.  This gap is a 
measure of respondents' underestimation of lifespan relative to that calculated 
from life expectancy e from the life table T for the respondent's age x and 
gender g: 
 
                                       
 
Calculating the gap for each age and gender improves on some previous 
studies as it allows for the characteristic of lifespan prospects improving as age 
increases and creates a distribution amenable to analysis.  Four Statistics New 
Zealand life tables were used as the source for comparator population 
lifespans (T): 
 Statistics New Zealand's latest period life table as at the time of the 
survey (2005-7); 
 The cohort life table relevant to the time of the survey, that is, for all 
ages in calendar year 2009.  This table was calculated and made 
available for this purpose by Statistics New Zealand on each of the three 
main scenarios for future mortality in the 2009-base population 
projections. The use of these cohort tables introduces benchmarks 
incorporating assumptions for future mortality improvement. 
 
The importance of using population life tables as the benchmark - apart 
from the precedent of following previous studies - is that the tables are the 
official source of such information, and are used in domains which may 
provide indicators for individual expectation-setting, for example by policy 
makers.  Thus the extent of underestimation is set in the policy context.  The 
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question is therefore not whether each individual lifespan expectation is 
accurate - that would be impossible to determine until each of the survey 
respondents had died - but rather the extent of the collective tendency for 
expectations to follow population benchmarks, taking into account the age and 
gender characteristics within the population.  The summary measures of the 
distribution of the gap from each life table provide an overview of collective 
over- or underestimation of lifespan.  Regression analyses profile the 
characteristics of those most likely to over- or underestimate.  These analyses 
are in section 8.3.  
 
SLS was collected at quinquennial ages, with the first group "60 or under" 
and the last "Over 100".  These groups were assigned an SLS of 60 and 105 
respectively where numerical calculations were necessary.  Comparator 
lifespans from life tables were also rounded to multiples of 5 years to be 
consistent.  Thus probabilities of survival between quinquennial SLS were not 
analysed, but this additional detail is not necessary to understand the extent of 
underestimation.  The pattern of comparison between quinquennial SLS and 
quinquennial life table lifespans proved sufficiently clear for robust 
interpretation of results. 
 
Age was not uniquely defined for either age of respondent or SLS.  Age of 
respondent had been collected in 5 year age bands except for groups aged 18-
19, aged 65-74 and aged 75 and over.  The variable of interest x+ex varies little 
across 5 year age bands, and as lifespans were rounded were rarely different 
for lower and upper ages of a band except for the oldest age group.  The gap 
was taken to be zero, or SLS deemed "congruent" to the table value, if the SLS 
was within the range of life table lifespans from the lower and upper age of the 
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age band; positive if SLS fell below the lifespan of the lower age and negative 
if SLS were above the lifespan of the upper age.  This is a strong test for non-
congruence, especially for those aged 75 and over. 
 
7.9 Limitations of this analysis 
This analysis necessarily had to use what was available from the Financial 
Knowledge survey.  This was not a problem insofar as the wordings of the 
questions inserted on subjective life expectancy were as requested.  However, 
the survey collected responses to other questions as decided by the steering 
group outside of considerations of this specific research.  The data collected 
which formed the independent variables for this analysis were therefore not 
designed around the question of subjective lifespans.  No obvious variable was 
missing for this analysis which focuses on subjective lifespan and retirement.  
If the intention had been to carry out an analysis of subjective lifespans in 
association with health factors then this survey would not have been the 
starting point.  
 
Possible limitations of this analysis arise not from the availability of data 
in aggregate, but rather in the detail of three specific variables.  The first, 
ethnicity has already been discussed.  The sample size for ethnicities other 
than solely New Zealand European is smaller than ideal, as is the case for 
many surveys in New Zealand which are not supplemented by booster 
samples.  Ethnic booster samples were available for the Financial Knowledge 
survey 2006, but budget constraints precluded their use for the 2009 survey 
used here.   
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The second possible limitation is the grouping of SLS and retirement age 
responses to quinquennial years.  While this was done to help the respondents 
answer more easily, it does risk losing potential responses between the 
multiples of five years.  However, previous studies on subjective lifespans 
showed that bunching at quinquennial ages was likely to occur anyway which 
itself would have reduced the power of using single age data.  Further, the 
analysis using SLS treated the quinquennial rounding appropriately, for 
example by comparing to rounded lifespans from life tables, and still sufficient 
data on the degree of over- and underestimation of lifespan was obtained.  
Therefore, the use of rounded SLS is not considered a significant limitation, 
although an unconstrained range of responses would be required to test 
whether that holds true. 
 
However, it may be more of a limitation for responses to the question on 
likely retirement age.  There is a smaller range of likely retirement ages given 
than SLS, and intuitively, it is perhaps more likely that an individual can 
imagine retiring at, say, 67 rather than 65 or 70, compared to picking 87 as SLS 
instead of 85 or 90.  The analysis using retirement ages was therefore chosen to 
minimise distortion from the use of quinquennial ages for response.  For 
example, the implied length of retirement was calculated as rounded SLS less 
rounded retirement age and then grouped into three categories, rather than 
analysing the variable of implied length of retirement as if it were linear. 
 
The third limitation from the design of the survey is that age of 
respondent was collected in age bands.   In particular the oldest age bands of 
65-74 and 75+ were wider than the five year bands used at younger ages.  This 
is a common complaint of any research on later life issues using survey 
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evidence as it limits the information available just as heterogeneity of many 
variables associated with ageing increases.  For example, 75-year-olds would 
be expected to have a very different average SLS than 95-year-olds.  The effect 
on the SLS analysis of using age bands rather than single years for age of 
respondents is mitigated somewhat by the use of lifespans (x + ex) rather than 
life expectancy (ex) as the dependent variable of interest.  Lifespans vary little 
across most age bands.  For example, in the 2005-7 male period life table, 
lifespan rounded to the nearest multiple of five is 85 years for all ages from 63 
to 78.  It is then 90 years until age 88, reaching 100 years at age 95.  The most 
critical impact on this analysis of not having age of respondent by single age is 
therefore in the age band 75+.  In the absence of any data on the actual age of 
the oldest survey respondent, age 89 was used as the end point of this last age 
band.  Sensitivity testing on this assumption is discussed in the text where 
relevant.  The interpretation of these results is not affected.  Potential 
exploration of how SLS features in the financial planning of over 75 year olds, 
for example for annuity purchase, is limited, but this study is concerned with 
longevity risk in the pre-retirement period. 
 
Finally, this is a survey at one point in time of New Zealanders' SLS, and 
subsequent changes in SLS may have occurred.  After this survey was carried 
out in 2009, the earthquakes in Christchurch of 2010 and 2011 may have 
heightened Cantabrians' sense of mortality.  The subsequent media coverage 
of the risks from natural hazards in other parts of New Zealand may also have 
affected New Zealanders' perceptions of mortality.  This is despite the number 
of earthquake deaths being fewer than one per cent of the total annual deaths 
in New Zealand.  Smith (2008) suggests that those affected by a natural hazard 
may reduce their lifespan expectations.  If so, the extent of underestimation of 
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lifespans in New Zealand may be greater than shown by this 2009 survey, but 
the effect may be temporary. 
 
The limitations are judged not to undermine the results of this analysis, 
but suggest points of difference for future surveys on longevity expectations.  
 
7.10 Conclusions 
Subjective longevity expectations are an important element of policy and 
individuals' own retirement planning, but there has been until recently no data 
on longevity expectations in New Zealand, and few large sample surveys on 
the subject internationally.   
 
The international studies provide somewhat inconclusive evidence, but 
some common themes emerge together with some unanswered research 
questions.  Summary findings reporting subjective lifespans congruent to 
population life tables usually hide both over- and underestimation of 
longevity, but the general tendency appears more to be underestimation.  
People may have a broad view of average longevity, or they may take some 
individual mortality risk factors into account which can introduce additional 
underestimation.  A shared theme is that men reflect that they have lower 
actual longevity than women, but are more optimistic, so that women are more 
likely to underestimate their actual longevity.  However, there is almost no 
data on how people think about longevity, if they think about it at all, and why 
they choose a particular estimate of their own likely longevity when asked.   
 
A reasonable hypothesis consistent with the limited evidence is that 
people are aware of current information on longevity, both the average for the 
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population and some factors causing it to vary for individuals with higher or 
lower than average mortality risk.  The underestimation of individual 
longevity may occur if available public information on longevity is itself 
outdated, or does not help individuals to understand the potential for and 
implications of mortality improvement and the impact of individual risk 
factors. 
 
The New Zealand study here has been designed to test this hypothesis 
and fill research gaps on the extent of any collective underestimation of 
lifespan in the population, by whom and why.  The new survey extends the 
approach used in the international studies in three important ways.  First, 
additional variables for analysis include retirement planning and financial 
knowledge to explore longevity risk in the context of retirement planning.  
Second, new questions and risk factors probe the rationale for choice of 
subjective lifespan.  Third, the analysis enables the gaps to potential lifespan to 
be estimated allowing for age and gender, and tested against population life 









Chapter 8: New Zealanders' lifespan expectations 
The findings of the survey on New Zealanders' lifespan expectations are 
structured in sections of this chapter based on three out of the four research 
gaps identified from international studies: what lifespan New Zealanders 
expect; how those lifespan expectations are formed; and, what they imply for 
the profile of lifespan underestimation in New Zealand.  A final section 
discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from this survey evidence.  The 
fourth research gap, on how subjective lifespan expectations are related to 
retirement planning, is considered in the next chapter.   
 
8.1 New Zealanders' subjective lifespan expectations (SLS) 
The survey asked "What age do you think you will live to?" to obtain a 
subjective lifespan (SLS).  This section first describes the distribution of SLS 
responses and then investigates the profile of respondents and non-
respondents. 
 
8.1.1 Distribution of SLS 
The shape of the distributions of SLS given by men and women were very 
different (Figure 8.1).  The distribution of female SLS had a clear mode at age 
85.  The distribution of the male SLS was weighted more to the left, with a flat 
peak from age 75 to 85.  There were higher proportions of men than women in 
both the lowest and highest SLS groups. 
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Figure 8.1: What age do you think you will live to? Subjective lifespan, 















Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=365 male, 361 female who gave an SLS 
 
To explore whether the population takes cues from contemporary age-
independent indicators of population lifespan, Table 8.1 sets out measures of 
average SLS alongside such benchmarks.  Life expectancy at birth is the most 
obvious candidate for a mean age-independent published indicator to test. The 
latest two Statistics New Zealand period life tables are used as comparators.  
Further age-independent indicators used are derived from the lifespans that 
people would see around them.  Statistics New Zealand provides ages at death 
in New Zealand, from which the mean, median and mode have been 
extracted.   
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Table 8.1: Summary of sample SLS compared to age-independent 
population lifespan indicators 
 SLS, actual or life table 
measure, in years 
Total Men Women 



























Mean life expectancy at birth 
Complete period life table, 2005-7 











Actual age of deaths in New 

























Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses and Statistics 
New Zealand data. 
 
The mean age at death from the life expectancy at birth measure is close to 
the mean SLS for women, but not for men.  Mean actual ages at death are 
lower than period table life expectancy at birth as the latter is the mean age at 
death for a hypothetical population affected less by deaths at young ages. 
However, for the total population, the median SLS of 80 years and the mode of 
85 years are close to those measures for actual deaths in New Zealand.  
Moreover, there is indeed a close similarity between the shape of the 
distribution of actual deaths within the age range of SLS survey responses and 
the distribution of SLS (Figure 8.2).  The peaks and the asymmetry of the SLS 
distributions of both men and women align with those of the distributions of 
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actual deaths, although the peak in male SLS at 75 and female at 85 are more 
pronounced than in actual deaths.  A further inconsistency is the higher 
proportion of men compared to women with an SLS of 100 or more when 
reality is reversed.  However, the general pattern suggests that, collectively, 
the population takes cues for SLS from the contemporary pattern of deaths in 
the population.   
 
Figure 8.2: Distribution of SLS responses compared to actual deaths in New 
















Source: SLS data from Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=365 male, 361 female who gave an SLS. Actual deaths 2009, 100 per cent = 
deaths over age 57.  Actual deaths at ages 100 and over grouped in data source 
from Statistics New Zealand. 
 
When aggregate measures of SLS are compared to population benchmarks 
which do not vary by age, an important actuarial property is ignored; that life 
expectancy ex decreases with each additional year of age (x) by less than one 
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year because those that survive the extra year are on average less frail than the 
group would have been with the addition of those that have died.  Life 
expectancy at birth would therefore be lower than mean likely lifespans for an 
adult population sample.  This is also true for central measures of the 
distribution of actual deaths in a past year.  As mortality is improving, the 
central measures of age at death for an ageing population would be expected 
to increase every year.  If survey respondents were anticipating these effects 
then the sample SLS would be expected to exceed these time-dependent 
indicators.  This is why a more insightful analysis is provided by examining 
the distribution of the gap between SLS for each respondent and gender-, age- 
and time-dependent population lifespan measures.  Section 8.3 shows the 
results of this analysis. 
 
8.1.2 Profile of SLS respondents 
Most survey respondents, around 85 per cent, gave a subjective lifespan when 
asked what age they thought they would live to.  Fewer than 10 respondents 
refused to give an answer; 116 said they didn't know (13.7 per cent of sample, 
weighted estimate, sample error +/- 2.3 per cent).  This is within the range of 
previous international SLS surveys, but the "don't knows" form a sizeable 
group worth profiling.  For an exploratory profiling of responses to the SLS 
question, the sample was split into three groups: those choosing an SLS up to 
and including the median of 80 years; those choosing an SLS of 85 years and 
above (responses were collected at quinquennial ages) and those saying don't 
know or refused.  Results are in Table 8.2. 
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Gender and age are significantly associated with not giving an SLS.  
Women are significantly more likely than men to say they don't know when 
asked for their SLS.  Women form two-thirds of the "don't knows".  Further, 
those under 30 are not more or less likely to say "don't know" to the SLS 
question, but after age 30, the likelihood of saying "don't know" increases with 
age.  It would be speculative to say whether uncertainty comes with age, or 
whether today's older cohort is less confident at giving SLS than the younger 
cohort.   
 
Those saying "don't know" are more likely to have basic or secondary 
education only; be in the Low financial knowledge group; and, disagree that 
life can be determined by own actions.  Financial planning for retirement is not 
associated, but contributing to KiwiSaver is, with KiwiSaver contributors less 
likely to say "don't know" when asked for SLS.  Ethnicity and comfort with 
English are significantly associated, with Pacific Peoples being more likely to 
say "don't know".  In summary, respondents to the SLS question are more 
likely to be male, middle aged rather than under 30 or over 60, well educated 
(which may mean financially better off), knowledgeable about financial issues, 
and confident about influencing their life themselves.   
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Ethnicity (single count) ** 
New Zealand European 
Māori 

























Place of birth 
Born in New Zealand 










Comfort with English ** 
Very 
Somewhat 














Primary or basic secondary 
Secondary school 













Personal income *** 
Up to and including $30,000 pa  
Over $30,000 pa 
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Table 8.2: What age do you think you will live to?, continued 














Contributing to KiwiSaver ** 











Made a will  











How much thought about financial 
planning for retirement? * 
A little or not at all 













My life is determined by my own 
actions *** 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 
















My life is determined by things 
beyond my control 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 
















My life is controlled by the actions 
of other people  
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 
















































Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
Note: A Pearson's chi-squared test was carried out between the variable denoted in the 
table columns and each variable in a subsection of the table.  An asterisk next to the 
variable name denotes significant association between the two variables.  An asterisk 
within a cell denotes a high standardised residual value for that category under the 
assumption of no association between the two variables.  * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. 




These findings are consistent with international evidence.  The only 
previous study to study the "don't knows" found that the likelihood of saying 
"don't know" to the SLS question increased with age, particularly for women, 
and decreased with education and a sense of control over one's own life 
(Mirowsky 1999 p. 974-5).  Further, international studies have consistently 
found that men are more likely to overestimate likely longevity than women 
(Hurd and McGarry 1995, 2002; Mirowsky 1999; O'Brien et al. 2005).  This 
analysis gives a possible explanation, which also fits with the higher 
proportion of men than women with SLS of 100 or more: those men who give a 
response to the SLS question are more likely to be guessing than the female 
respondents, and they tend to guess with some bravado towards the higher 
SLS.   
 
8.2 How lifespan expectations are formed 
This section reports on the results of the New Zealand survey questions that 
aimed to shed more light on how responses to questions of lifespan 
expectations are formed. 
 
8.2.1 How much New Zealanders have thought about lifespan 
Potential lifespan seems to have been considered by a majority of the 
population.  An estimated 70 per cent of adult New Zealanders (69.5 per cent 
of sample, weighted estimate, sample error +/-3.1 per cent) claim to have given 
the age they might live to some or a lot of thought (Figure 8.3).  The 30 per cent 
who say they have not or never thought about SLS are significantly more 
likely to say they don't know their SLS (p < .001).  Yet only 15 per cent say they 
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do not know what their SLS is.  This means that over 20 per cent (15/70) of SLS 
responses to the survey could be a guess from people thinking about it for the 
first time.   
 
Figure 8.3: How much thought given to age might live to, estimated 



















Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=850. 
 
Having thought about SLS was strongly associated with age.  Specifically, 
those aged under 30 were significantly more likely to say they had never or 
not really thought about the age they might live to (p < .001) than those aged 
30 or over.  Figure 8.4 shows that those aged 18-29 were roughly equally likely 
to say they had or hadn't given the age they might live to some thought; 
whereas around three-quarters of those aged 30 and over said they had given 
it some thought.  The odds of a New Zealander aged 30 and over having given 
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the age they might live to some or a lot of thought were 2.5 times higher than 
the under 30s.   
 
Figure 8.4: What thought given to age might live to, estimated percentage of 





18-29 30-44 45-59 60+
None, not 
really any or 
don't know
Some or a lot 
of thought
 
Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=850. 
 
The two subsamples of respondents aged 18-29 and aged 30 and over 
were investigated for associations with degree of having thought about SLS. 
Within those aged under 30, no significant associations for having thought 
about age might live to were identified (analysis not shown).  Table 8.3 shows 
the results of this analysis for the 30 and over age group.  The responses 
"never" or "not really thought" or don't know were grouped, as were "some" or 
"a lot of thought".   
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Table 8.3: Have you thought about the age you might live to?  




Percentage within category 
No, not really 
or don't know 
Some or a lot 
of thought 






















Ethnicity (single count) *** 
New Zealand European 
Māori 


















Place of birth 
Born in New Zealand 







Comfort with English *** 
Very 
Somewhat 










Primary or basic secondary 
Secondary school 









Personal income *** 
Up to and including $30,000 pa  
Over $30,000 pa 



























Table continues, with notes, on following page. 
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Table 8.3: Have you thought about the age you might live to?, continued 




Percentage within category 
No, not really 
or don't know 
Some or a lot of 
thought 
Contributing to KiwiSaver 








Made a will ** 








How much thought about financial 
planning for retirement? *** 
A little or not at all 









My life is determined by my own 
actions 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 











My life is determined by things 
beyond my control 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 











My life is controlled by the actions 
of other people *** 
Strongly or somewhat agree 
Neither agree or disagree 



































Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
Note: A Pearson's chi-squared test was carried out between the variable denoted in the table 
columns and each variable in a subsection of the table.  An asterisk next to the variable name 
denotes significant association between the two variables.  An asterisk within a cell denotes a 
high standardised residual value for that category under the assumption of no association 
between the two variables.  * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Among those aged 30 and over, there is a significant association with 
being more likely to say that they have not thought about the age they will live 
to for: Māori, those less than very comfortable with English, those who have 
not thought about financial planning for retirement, those at the lowest levels 
of education and financial knowledge and those who agree that their life is 
controlled by other people.  Those with higher incomes are significantly less 
likely to say they have not thought about the age they might live to, whereas 
those who did not know their income or refused to say are more likely to say 
they have not thought about it. 
 
The general picture of the New Zealand population, then, is that having 
thought about personal longevity by age 30 is equally likely as not.  Thereafter, 
more thought is likely to be given to SLS especially by those with better 
incomes or good financial knowledge, perhaps in tandem with financial 
planning for retirement.  However, around a quarter of New Zealanders aged 
30 and over still has not really thought about their likely lifespan. 
 
The strong association with age uncovered here confirms that the 
international studies with older age samples, such as HRS and ELSA, or with 
younger age samples, such as the studies in psychology often carried out with 
small groups of students, cannot be used without question as guides to the 
profile of SLS and correlates for a population of all adult ages.  This is 
particularly concerning because of the number of interpretive studies based on 
HRS.  Further, as Māori are less likely to have thought about SLS, generalising 
the study of any international population study on SLS to New Zealand is 
questionable.  
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8.2.2 How New Zealanders choose their SLS 
Asking why survey participants chose their SLS was considered to be an 
integral part of this study.  There was no theory from international studies to 
direct enquiry, and yet it was hypothesised that how New Zealanders think 
about their lifespan may influence not only whether SLS was high or low, but 
also how messages about population average lifespans or lifespan 
improvement may be received.   
 
After giving an SLS, survey respondents were asked "For what reasons do 
you say that", and the unprompted answers coded and recorded, separately 
for first reason and subsequent responses.  There were 35 codes used to collect 
reasons, so some grouping into manageable categories was necessary.  The 
responses ranged from none to 8 reasons given (Figure 8.5).  For 30 per cent of 
the sample (weighted) only one reason was given.  The modal number of 
reasons was just one; the median two reasons and the mean 2.1.  In over one-
third of cases where two reasons were given, both reasons were the same 
according to the grouping developed, and explained below.  Thus, the first 
reason given is likely to be a good indicator of why people gave the SLS they 
did.  Analysis here concentrates on this 'main' reason only, grouped into five 
categories, described in the following.   
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Figure 8.5: Number of reasons for why chose age will live to, estimated 









None 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=850. 
 
Distribution of main reason 
The first reasons given for choice of SLS were grouped into five categories as 
follows: 
 Genes: Respondents who gave the reasons coded as "genetics", 
"thinking about my parents/grandparents" or "family history" formed 
the largest group, comprising an estimated 34 per cent of the 
population.  Within the groups, nearly half mentioned their parents, a 
third "genetics", and under one-fifth their grandparents. 
 Other or don’t know: The long tail of other reasons coded was grouped 
with those who said "don't know" as some of those reasons were 
tantamount to saying don't know, for example, "just a number in my 
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head", "it's out of my hands" or a wish such as "I want to be around for 
my grandchildren", or "that's a reasonable age".  This group comprised 
an estimated 30 per cent of the population. 
 Average/normal: Responses were coded as "That about average/normal 
(for someone like me)" or "thinking about people my age/that's about 
normal for people my age."  This group comprised an estimated 10 per 
cent of the population. 
 Good risk factors: A variety of lifestyle, but not genetic, reasons were 
coded as factors which indicated good health behaviour or favourable 
mortality risk, such as "I'm healthy" (9.9 per cent of first reasons), "I'm 
fit" (2.3 per cent) or "I don't smoke" (2.2 per cent).  In total, this group 
comprised an estimated 17 per cent of the population. 
 Bad risk factors: Similarly, lifestyle, but not genetic, reasons indicative 
of poor health or mortality risk were coded such as "I smoke" (3.5 per 
cent of first reasons) or "I've had health scares" (2.0 per cent).  This 
group was just over half the size of the good risk factor group, at an 
estimated 9 per cent of the population. 
 
SLS is external to personal behaviour or manageable risk for respondents 
in the first three groups.  Their rationale is based on family history or a genetic 
explanation; they do not have an explanation or evade one by saying 
something like "it's out of my hands"; or, can only reason on the basis of their 
SLS being 'average' or 'normal'.  These groups together make up around three 
quarters of adult New Zealanders.  The remaining quarter of the New Zealand 
adult population gives personal risk factors - either positive or negative - as 
their first reason for choosing their SLS.  
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Profiling who gives each main reason 
Predictive variables for being in each of the five groups were identified by 
multinomial regression, following exploratory analysis with Pearson's chi-
squared tests and binary regression for each main reason (not shown).  Results 
are in Table 8.4. 
 
Those in the Low financial knowledge group have significantly greater 
odds of saying "other or don't know" or not having a reason for choosing a 
particular SLS relative to all other reasons.  There is also a suggestion of a 
weaker association with having negative net wealth and saying "other or don't 
know".  Giving as main reason "average/normal" has greater odds for those 
aged 30-44, with no other significant associations found. 
 
Compared with saying "other or don't know" or not having a reason for 
choosing a particular SLS, the odds of giving genes as the main reason are 
greater for those in the High financial knowledge group as opposed to in the 
Low or Medium groups, those who gave New Zealand European as sole 
ethnicity as opposed to all other ethnicities, and those who have given their 
life expectancy some or a lot of thought rather than not really given it any or 
no thought.   
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Table 8.4: Predictors of main reason for choice of SLS: multinomial logistic 
regression 
 
Each reason relative to 
reference category "Other 






















Have thought about SLS 
Low financial knowledge 
Female 
NZ Euro sole ethnicity 
High financial knowledge 
Negative net wealth 


























































Bad risk factors 
Constant 
Age 30-44 
Have thought about SLS 
Low financial knowledge 
Female 
NZ Euro sole ethnicity 
High financial knowledge 
Negative net wealth 


























































Good risk factors 
Constant 
Age 30-44 
Have thought about SLS 
Low financial knowledge 
Female 
NZ Euro sole ethnicity 
High financial knowledge 
Negative net wealth 
























































Table continues, with notes, on following page. 
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Table 8.4: Predictors of main reason for choice of SLS: multinomial logistic 
regression, continued 
 
Each reason relative to 
reference category "Other 



















Average or normal 
Constant 
Age 30-44 
Have thought about SLS 
Low financial knowledge 
Female 
NZ Euro sole ethnicity 
High financial knowledge 
Negative net wealth 


























































Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
 
Notes: R2 = .21 (Cox and Snell), .22 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (32) = 194.86*** 
Significance level: * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Predictor variables all have two categories: stated category and all other.  
Sole ethnicity categories compare with other sole ethnicities separately 
identified (NZ European, Māori, Asian, Pacific) and all mixed ethnicities. 
 
^^ Strongly or somewhat agree with "My life is determined by my own 
actions". 
 
Forward stepwise method used with variables identified by significant 
associations in Pearson's chi-squared and binary logistic regression tests.  
 
Those who have given their life expectancy some or a lot of thought also 
have greater odds for personal good risk factors being the main reason for 
choosing SLS.  A further predictor for having greater odds for good risk factors 
relative to "other or don't know" is agreeing that life is determined by one's 
own actions.  Those with greater odds of bad risk factors being the main 
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reason for choice of SLS are New Zealand Europeans, but no other significant 
associations were found.   
 
Few significant associations were found to predict each category of main 
reason for choosing SLS.  There are likely to be other predictors unavailable in 
these data.  However, a pattern emerges that the main reason given for SLS is 
based primarily on thoughtfulness about lifespan, view on locus of control and 
level of financial knowledge.  Demographic and socio-economic factors are 
conspicuously absent, except that those of New Zealand European sole 
ethnicity are more likely to give bad risk factors or genes as main reason than 
say "other or don't know".  This could be because of a cultural tendency to give 
a definite answer rather than genes or bad risk factors being more prevalent 
for this group.  Finally, given that people are more likely to start to consider 
lifespan after the age of 30 - as shown in Figure 8.4 - it is perhaps not 
surprising that those aged just above 30 do not have a clear reason for their 
choice of SLS and so have greater odds of giving the response "average or 
normal". 
 
Summary: importance of the reason for choosing SLS 
The five main reasons for choice of SLS in the New Zealand adult population 
are illustrated in Figure 8.6.  These reasons are significant as they start to get 
behind the reason why people choose the SLS they do.  Because five different 
main reasons summarise a larger number of different reasons; and because 
there are different profiles of those most likely to give each reason, efforts by 
previous writers to model population choice of SLS as if it were homogenous 
appear flawed.   
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Figure 8.6:  Main reason for choosing SLS, grouped, and predictors of being 














Have thought about SLS
Locus of control with self
NZ European
SLS set by 
externals




Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
Height represents estimated percentage of population in each category, 100 
per cent=850. 
 
International literature has used three models for how people think about 
and choose their SLS, as defined and discussed in section 7.2.  In the 
'normalising' model, adults choose their SLS according what they think is 
normal in a reference group of like people.  In the 'planning for death' model, 
people choose their SLS based on personal anxiety about death or experiences 
of death among family.  In the 'life planning' model, SLS is used as an 
assumption in order to plan for retirement.   
 
The results of this survey suggest that all three models may apply within 
groups of the New Zealand population, but the models do not seem a 
complete explanation for why people choose the SLS they do, or how they 
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think about lifespan.  The importance of financial knowledge level as a 
predictor for main reason for SLS choice seems to indicate that thinking about 
SLS is linked to financial planning, probably linked to retirement.  Further 
evidence of this is considered in the next chapter.  The planning for death 
model seems more relevant to the large group giving genes or family history 
as the main reason for SLS.  The normalising model clearly applies to those 
giving "average/normal" as the main reason, but it could also apply to the 
"other or don't know" group, and to those taking personal risk factors into 
account, with a different norm.  The number and variety of reasons given in 
this survey suggest a diversity of ways of thinking about lifespan within the 
population that summary models cannot describe adequately. 
 
For any one individual, the relative importance of genes or risk factors for 
actual longevity is impossible to estimate unless facts are known on, for 
example, a smoking-related illness or a hereditary disease.  However, bio-
demographers have proposed that one-quarter of the variation in adult 
lifespans could be explained by genetic factors, one quarter by early life 
conditions and half by conditions in later life (Vaupel et al. 1998).  'Later life 
conditions' includes the health issues and behavioural factors that would be 
part here of good or bad risk factors.  One-third of the sample gave genes as 
the main reason for SLS choice, and one-quarter personal risk factors.  
Compared to the Vaupel hypothesis, New Zealanders appear to weight 
genetic factors more and risk factors less.   
 
Further, almost three-quarters of the population state a first explanation 
for their choice of SLS that is external to them, either genetics, being average or 
normal, some other explanation, or none.  This suggests that health promotion 
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messages - insofar as the connection from healthier personal behaviour to 
improving lifespan is concerned - may fall on unreceptive ears much of the 
time.   
 
Just over one fifth of the New Zealand adult population (aged 15+ years) 
smokes on a regular basis (Ministry of Health Tobacco Use Survey 2008).  
Smoking is thought to be a well-understood health risk factor.  Yet fewer than 
10 per cent (9.1 per cent, weighted estimate, sample error +/- 0.6 per cent) 
admit that their bad risk factors may affect SLS, and of the whole sample only 
3.5 per cent specifically said they smoked.  Previous surveys have linked 
smoking behaviour with SLS, and asserted that smokers generally 
underestimate the risk to their longevity.  This survey suggests that most 
smokers do not first think of their smoking when they choose their SLS.  
Further, if behavioural risk factors are not being considered by the majority of 
the population in setting their SLS, it is not surprising that international 
studies have not found conclusive or consistent evidence for the 'accuracy' of 
individuals' SLS compared to the effect of such factors. 
 
Finally, in terms of public messages around improving longevity for 
superannuation and retirement planning, as so many people believe in an 
external or given reason for lifespan, it may be that they are receptive to 
evidence that it is improving.  The counter to that may be that as a sizeable 
group have taken evidence from their family history or their own personal risk 
factors, the power of individual anecdote or belief in personal risk may 
override the general message.  It could be that only the tenth of the adult 
population who say that they chose their SLS because it is 'average or normal' 
are receptive to public information on average population lifespans. 
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8.3 Lifespan underestimation 
The pattern of diverse reasons given for choosing SLS suggests that choice is 
not evidence-based for many New Zealanders.  This section explores how the 
SLS chosen fit the lifespan evidence available.  Whether the SLS show over- or 
underestimation of lifespan can only be seen by comparing the SLS responses 
against each other - which tests whether those at relative risk of low lifespan 
have relatively lower SLS - or by comparing with relevant measures of likely 
lifespan for the population from which the sample is drawn.  In what follows, 
first, factors predicting high or low SLS are investigated and responses 
examined for directional accuracy.  Next, the gaps between SLS and life table 
lifespans are calculated and the profile of those most likely to over- or 
underestimate SLS described. 
 
8.3.1 Predicting high or low SLS 
The profile of those choosing relatively high or low SLS should give some 
insight into whether the choice is directionally 'accurate' relative to the 
actuarial risk inherent in the profile, or related to subjective rather than known 
risk factors, or simply random.  In particular, those likely to choose extreme 
high or low SLS are likely to be over- or underestimating respectively 
compared to life tables, so are a potential source of the greatest inaccuracy.   
 
Binary logistic regression was used to identify predictive characteristics of 
those more or less likely to choose high or low SLS and to choose extreme 
values.  The "don't knows" were eliminated from the sample to construct three 
dichotomous dependent variables for those who gave an SLS response:  
 Very low SLS of 65 or below compared to SLS 70 or above (n=65/661). 
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 Above median SLS of 85 or above compared to SLS 80 or below 
(n=355/372). 
 Very high SLS of 100 or above compared to SLS 95 or below (n=61/665). 
This grouping of the sample in these groups is illustrated in Figure 8.7, 
and the results of the regression are in Table 8.5. 
 
Figure 8.7:  SLS, above and below median and extreme groups, estimated 
percentage of population  
SLS 70 to 80
42.1%
SLS 85 to 95
40.3%
SLS 100 or 
more
8.5%




Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=726 who gave an SLS. 
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See notes on following page. 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 8 
 
274 
Source for Table 8.5:  
Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
 
Notes: 
SLS at 65/70: 
R2 = .14 (Cox and Snell), .31 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (8) = 109.54*** 
SLS at 80/85: 
R2 =.13 (Cox and Snell), .18 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (8) = 102.42*** 
SLS at 95/100: 
R2 =.10 (Cox and Snell), .22 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (7) = 73.77*** 
 
Significance level: * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Predictor variables all have two categories: stated category and all other.  
Sole ethnicity categories compare with other sole ethnicities separately 
identified (NZ European, Māori, Asian, Pacific) and all mixed ethnicities. 
^ Strongly or somewhat agree with "My life is controlled by the actions of 
other people". 
^^ Strongly or somewhat agree with "My life is determined by my own 
actions". 
 
All variables were tested for each of the three models.   
Variables excluded by stepwise regression from all models: 
New Zealand European sole ethnicity 
Age 30-44 
Age 45-59 
Tertiary or postgraduate education 
High personal income; over $30,000 pa 
High net wealth; over $301,000 
Have thought about financial planning for retirement 
Strongly or somewhat agree with "My life is determined by things beyond 
my control". 
In Medium financial knowledge group 
In High financial knowledge group 
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The regression models do not explain all of the variance that exists, as the 
R2 indicators are low.  However, the picture that emerges suggests that the 
reason for SLS choice is as important as the few actuarial factors that seem to 
be relevant.  Further, both extremes of the SLS distribution are also associated 
with having a low level of financial knowledge. 
 
Very low SLS: Pessimism and lack of knowledge 
Not surprisingly, those aged 60 and over are significantly less likely to choose 
an SLS of 65 or below than those aged under 60, but there appears to be no 
significant difference within ages under 60 in propensity to choose a very low 
SLS.  People with negative net wealth are more likely to choose a very low SLS 
than those with positive net wealth.  These significant predictor variables are 
the only ones linked to actuarial risk factors.  It therefore appears that 
something other than an appraisal of population mortality risk influences the 
choice of a very low SLS. 
 
The high significance of bad risk factors as the first reason for choosing 
SLS, with odds ratio of 17, suggests that people reasoning on the basis of their 
individual mortality risk factors from behaviour such as smoking, poor diet or 
lack of exercise or a health problem, are likely to choose a very low SLS.  
However, as discussed earlier, the proportion of people reasoning SLS on the 
basis of bad risk factors appears low compared to the prevalence of such 
factors in the population.  Those taking such risks into account when choosing 
their SLS are not necessarily doing so correctly, but are more pessimistic about 
their health or mortality chances than those with the same bad risks but who 
do not reason their choice of SLS on the same basis. 
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This suggests that those choosing a very low SLS are influenced, perhaps 
unduly, by pessimism about life chances.  This is confirmed as those who 
agree that their life is controlled by the actions of other people are twice as 
likely to choose a very low SLS compared to others.  The pessimism also seems 
linked to lack of knowledge about lifespans and planning.  Specifically, those 
who say "don't know" or similar when asked why they chose their SLS are 
more likely to choose a very low SLS than others.  Those who offer the reason 
that they are "average" or "normal" are also more likely to do so.  And low 
financial knowledge is almost as salient a predictor with an odds ratio of 
nearly three.   
 
Above median SLS: Optimism strengthened by age and gender  
The odds of those aged 60 and over choosing an SLS or 85 or more are nearly 
twice those of younger respondents.  The odds for females are 1.4 times higher 
than that of males.  Those giving Māori as sole ethnicity are less likely to 
choose an above median SLS.  These properties are in the correct direction 
compared to mortality risk (although not necessarily of the correct size, which 
is not tested here).  However, the remaining predictor variable associated with 
actuarial risk appears to be in an incorrect direction: those giving Asian as sole 
ethnicity are less likely to choose an above median SLS than others, but 
population risk would predict longer lifespans on average for those of Asian 
ethnicity.  However, given the small subsample of Asian ethnicity this result 
should be considered with caution. 
 
The other variables cannot be explained actuarially as they are related to 
how people think about SLS and life in general.  Those making genes the first 
reason for their SLS are more likely to choose an above median SLS than other 
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respondents.  Those reasoning on the basis of good risk factors are more likely 
to give an above median SLS, whereas those reasoning on the basis of their 
bad risk factors are significantly less likely to do so.  Those who agree that life 
is determined by their own actions are also less likely to choose a high SLS.  
Taken together, these results imply a degree of optimism that either 
externalities or individual good health behaviour will influence longevity 
positively. 
 
Very high SLS: Optimism with doubtful rationale 
The lack of any variable of actuarial significance in the regression model 
derived for the highest SLS of 100 or more is striking.  Instead, optimism 
appears to be the strongest influence.  Those who have given the age they 
might live to some thought are more likely to choose a very high SLS or more 
compared to others.  However, having thought about SLS is not guarantee of 
choosing an accurate SLS, or being able to use that SLS in planning effectively.  
Those in the low financial knowledge group are also more likely to choose a 
very high SLS than respondents with greater financial knowledge scores. 
 
Again, the reasoning behind choice of SLS was highly significant for 
predicting a very high SLS, with an odds ratio of 24 for those reasoning on the 
basis of good risk factors and an odds ratio of seven for those reasoning on the 
basis of genes.  However, those who said "don't know" when asked why they 
chose the SLS they did also were more likely to choose a very high SLS.  This is 
consistent with a general theme of optimism without good rationale for those 
hoping for a lifespan of 100 or more, notwithstanding that some respondents 
will have some grounds for a longer than average lifespan on the basis of 
family history or very healthy lifestyle. 




Those who have negative net wealth are less likely to choose a very high 
SLS, the converse of being more likely to choose a very low SLS.  Those who 
have made a will are also less likely to choose the highest SLS.  Perhaps for this 
latter group the necessity to confront mortality in a practical way has led to a 
more conservative assessment than those who claim to have thought about 
how long they will live, but have thought about it in the abstract.   
 
Summary: Reasoning behind SLS is a key predictor 
Taken together, the results from these three models suggest that the usual 
actuarial predictors of age and gender are not the only things people think of 
when choosing an SLS.  Indeed, for those who give the highest or lowest value 
of SLS, actuarial parameters are hardly important at all.  Further, other factors 
that are known to make a different to actual mortality risk such as ethnicity 
and other socio-economic indicators seem to be relatively absent in New 
Zealanders' consideration of SLS.  The exceptions are that Māori sole ethnicity 
seems to be an indicator for below rather than above median SLS and that 
negative net wealth is associated with the lowest SLS. 
 
The stronger predictor of high or low SLS appears to be the reasoning 
behind choosing SLS.  Individual good or bad risk factors are highly 
significant predictors of above or below median SLS and especially for very 
high or very low SLS.  However, the associations found with general locus of 
control, with low financial knowledge and with having no particular 
reasoning for choice of SLS suggest that for many, SLS is not an informed or 
thoughtful prediction.   
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No previous study of subjective longevity expectations explored the 
reasons why people gave the SLS or subjective probability of survival (SPS) 
they did, although some small studies found an association of family longevity 
history with SLS (Brouwer and van Exel 2005; Hamermesh 1985).  The new 
finding here is that family longevity history may be an important explanation 
for many people, and individual risk factors may be for others, but people 
reason differently - if they do so at all - and this reasoning has significant 
influence on choice of SLS.  Further, rational understanding of mortality risk 
seems to play little part in setting SLS.  This finding casts doubt on previous 
interpretations of surveys that imputed accuracy in given SLS or SPS to 
respondents' understanding of their own risk factors as if all respondents were 
thinking in that way.   
 
8.3.2 Over- and underestimation of SLS 
In the earlier part of this chapter, it was shown that the aggregate SLS of New 
Zealanders did not obviously underestimate relative to age-independent 
population lifespan indicators which ignored future mortality improvement.  
However, the distribution of SLS showed a wide range of SLS responses, and 
variation by gender.  Here, the distributions of the gaps between SLS and age-, 
gender- and time-dependent life table measures are evaluated to explore what 
factors contribute to congruence with life tables or over- or underestimation of 
lifespan. 
 
Four life tables for the New Zealand population are used, as provided by 
Statistics New Zealand: the latest complete period life table as at the time of 
the survey and the cohort life table for all ages in calendar year 2009.  The 
period table takes no account of potential future change in age-specific 
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mortality risk. The cohort table does, and has three versions, one for each of 
the main scenarios for future mortality in the 2009-base population projections.  
The gap between SLS and rounded life table measures was calculated for each 
respondent by age and gender.  A positive gap represents underestimation of 
lifespan relative to the comparator life table; a negative gap overestimation. 
Table 8.6 summarises key measures of the four distributions of the gaps 
between SLS and each of the life tables.   
 
The period life table itself is an underestimation of likely lifespan, as it 
does not take future mortality improvement into account.  The cohort life table 
does so.  This explains the pattern of increasing underestimation moving down 
through the different life tables of Table 8.6.  Relative to the period life table, 
male SLS appear to be congruent on average, although the gap ranges from 
overestimating by 25 years to underestimating by 20 years.  Women 
underestimate on average by 2.8 years to the period life table, with a 
maximum underestimation of 25 years.  For each life table comparator, the SLS 
for women are a greater underestimate than the SLS for men.  
 
Figure 8.8 shows how the prevalence of underestimation of SLS increases 
through the progression of life tables as the greater force of assumed future 
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Table 8.6: Summary of gap between life table estimated lifespan  
(by age and gender) and SLS for men and women, in years 

























































































Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
Note: A positive gap represents underestimation of lifespan relative to the 
comparator life table; a negative number overestimation.  If the oldest respondent 
were aged 99 instead of 89 as assumed then the mean gap to the period life table 
would increase by 0.2 years for women.  The cohort table provided stops at age 90, so 
a similar sensitivity test could not be performed.  The cohort table of life expectancy 
by age in calendar year 2009 consistent with 2009-base projections was provided by 
Statistics New Zealand (April 2010).   
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Figure 8.8: Estimated percentage of the population with SLS higher 














Cohort table, by mortality projection
 
Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=726 who gave an SLS.  Congruence implies the SLS is within the range of 
relevant life table values for the age group within which the individual lies. 
 
Figure 8.9 illustrates the distribution of the gap relative to the period table 
by gender.  Figure 8.10 shows the distribution of the gap relative to the Low 
Mortality cohort table, illustrating how the prevalence of underestimation 
increases as the assumption for future mortality improvement becomes 
stronger.   
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Figure 8.9: Gap between SLS and period life table, estimated percentage of 
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Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=365 male, 361 female who gave an SLS.   
 
Chapter 5 suggested that the most plausible mortality outcome for New 
Zealand could be the Low Mortality cohort table.  Compared to this 
benchmark, the best estimate of underestimation of SLS on average is 5.5 years 
for men and 7.3 years for women.  O'Brien et al (2005) found underestimation 
relative to a British cohort table with mortality assumptions in a range similar 
to the medium to low mortality assumptions of the New Zealand table of 4.6 
years for males and 6.0 years for females.  Thus this set of results is highly 
consistent with those of the only comparable international survey of adult 
population SLS.   
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Figure 8.10: Gap between SLS and Low Mortality cohort life table, estimated 
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Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=365 male, 361 female who gave an SLS.   
 
In order to identify the characteristics of those most at risk of 
underestimating lifespans, profiling of the gap distributions were carried out 
for the gap relative to the period table and the Low Mortality cohort table.  
Categorical tests of association were carried out with the distribution of SLS to 
the period gap split into three groups: congruent to the life table (that is, the 
gap was around zero); overestimates (the left hand side of the gap 
distribution); and, underestimates (the right hand side of the gap distribution).  
Predictive variables for being in the over- and underestimating group instead 
of the congruent group were identified by multinomial regression, following 
exploratory analysis with Pearson's chi-squared tests (not shown).  Results are 
in Table 8.7. 




Table 8.7: Predictors of over- and underestimation of SLS compared to 
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Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
Notes:  
R2 = .22 (Cox and Snell), .24 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (18) = 176.32*** 
Significance level: * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001 
^ Strongly or somewhat agree with "My life is controlled by the actions of 
other people". 
^^ Strongly or somewhat agree with "My life is determined by my own 
actions". 
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Relative to the low mortality cohort table, an estimated 14.9 per cent of the 
population gave an SLS that overestimated.  Therefore only two groups were 
formed to compare underestimates (65.2 per cent of sample) with congruent or 
overestimated SLS (34.8 per cent).  The results of binary logistic regression are 
in Table 8.8. 
 
Table 8.8: Predictors of underestimation of SLS compared to Low Mortality 

























Asian sole ethnicity 
First reason 'average' 
Good risk factors 
Bad risk factors 
Male 
Age 60 and above 






























































Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
Notes:  
R2 = .12 (Cox and Snell), .17 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (7) = 92.43*** 
 
Significance level: * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Relative to period life table 
Relative to giving an SLS congruent to the period life table, the odds of 
overestimating SLS are significantly greater for males, those who give good 
risk factors as their main reason for choosing SLS, those who give genes as 
their main reason, or those with net wealth $300,000 or below.  The odds of 
underestimating SLS to the period table are greater relative to giving a 
congruent SLS for those who give bad risk factors as their main reason, those 
who give ethnicity as something other than solely New Zealand European or 
those who agree that the life is determined by their own actions.  Those aged 
60 and over, or who disagree that life is controlled by the actions of others 
have greater odds for choosing an SLS congruent to the period table, relative 
to either underestimating or overestimating. 
 
The strength of prediction from personal good or bad mortality risk 
information is not surprising.  This additional information is lost in a 
population average represented by the life table, although if it were an 
accurate representation of actual medical risk then would be taken into 
account by individual underwriting for a life insurance or annuity policy.  
Whether or not people reasoning their SLS by individual risk factors turn out 
to be accurate, their SLS is presumably in the right direction relative to the 
current population table.  The greater likelihood of those reasoning on the 
basis of genes to overestimate suggests a greater tendency to use family 
history only when it is good, as if longer-living ancestors are more memorable 
than shorter-living ones when thinking about one's own longevity.  Again, 
people reasoning on the basis of genes may turn out to be accurate in their 
choice of SLS or not.   
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This analysis confirms that, although men choose below median SLS more 
than women (Table 8.5), men are also more likely to overestimate SLS than 
women.  This is consistent with the aggregate picture of Table 8.6, which 
showed men on average choosing an SLS congruent to the male period table 
lifespan and women underestimating relative to the female period table.  
Assuming that men and women are equally accurate in their prediction of 
their own longevity, it could be that the male life table underestimates future 
likely longevity more than the female life table does.  Alternatively, if the 
period tables were an accurate estimation of future longevity for both genders 
then this picture could be explained by men being relatively less cautious, and 
more prone to exaggerate SLS than women.  This is consistent with the 
previously made observation that men were less likely to say "don't know" and 
therefore perhaps more likely to guess than women.  A similar explanation 
could be advanced for why people of lower net worth are more likely to 
overestimate than choose a congruent SLS.   
 
While it is logical that those who reason on the basis of bad risk factors 
would have greater odds of underestimating SLS relative to congruence with 
the period life table, it is less clear why those not of New Zealand European 
sole ethnicity or who agree that life is controlled by one's own actions would.  
A possible explanation is that people in these groups tend to think they would 
have shorter lifespans than what they see as the average, which is represented 
in some way by the period life table.  This is explicable to some extent on the 
basis of ethnicity, although Asian sole ethnicity would be a counter-example.  
The locus of control predictor makes sense under this explanation only if 
people who think that own actions matter believe that their own actions are a 
mortality risk relative to average.  This is not inconsistent with the greater 
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odds for people who disagree that the actions of others control their life 
choosing a congruent SLS, which further suggests that congruence is 
associated with a norm which is out of individual or others' control. 
 
However, the results are not conclusively consistent with the suggestion 
that the population models SLS on a norm represented by the period life table.  
Individual risk factors influence some, but also the greater odds for males to 
overestimate suggest a fundamental division by gender.  Further, people aged 
60 and over have greater odds for a congruent SLS to the table relative to 
either over- or underestimating compared to all ages below 60.  This suggests a 
further division by age.  Therefore, it appears that the population is generally 
not choosing SLS congruent with the period table across either of the table's 
two defining characteristics: age or gender. 
 
Relative to Low Mortality cohort life table 
The profile of those more likely to underestimate SLS relative to the Low 
Mortality cohort table, as shown in Table 8.8, is a more realistic assessment of 
those actually likely to underestimate their SLS than that relative to the period 
life table.  Underestimating lifespan is more likely for those aged below 30 
than older people, although less likely for those aged 60 and over.  It is more 
likely for women than men, all other things equal.  It is also more likely for 
those of Asian sole ethnicity than people of any other ethnicity.  Reasoning 
behind choice of SLS is again important, with those choosing good or bad risks 
being less or more likely to underestimate respectively and those saying they 
chose their SLS on the basis of it representing a normal or average lifespan 
being more likely to, comparing in each case to those giving all other reasons. 
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Possible explanations for each of these predictor relationships can be 
advanced.  The youngest ages are more likely to underestimate than other 
groups because for them the strong mortality improvement assumptions in the 
low mortality cohort table have longest to take effect.  If people are taking a 
view based on current lifespans they see around them without taking future 
mortality improvement into account, then all other things being equal, the 
youngest people will offer the most inaccurate SLS.  People in the oldest age 
group are in the opposite position as regards future mortality improvement, 
and they may also make their decision based on more information gathered 
over a lifetime of observation and their own personal risk factors. 
 
Information on personal risk factors, where it influences choice of SLS, 
obviously leads to being more or less likely to underestimate compared to the 
life table.  Whether or not this is accurate cannot be determined by from this 
analysis, but it applies only to those influenced by those risk factors.  This 
model predicts that those who do not use any personal information, but rely 
on what they think of as a normal or average lifespan for their SLS are more 
likely to underestimate than all others.  Thus, lifespans from the Low Mortality 
cohort life table can be seen as overestimating compared to the population's 
view of normal; or rather, that 'normal' is not perceived to include the 
possibility of mortality improvement to the extent in the table.  
 
That those of Asian sole ethnicity appear more likely to underestimate 
than other ethnicities is a puzzle.  As discussed earlier, the subsample of Asian 
ethnicity is very small, and the result may be spurious. 
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The finding that men are less likely to underestimate relative to the Low 
Mortality cohort table fits with the summary statistics of the gap between SLS 
and each life table in Table 8.6 and with the analysis of predictor variables for 
the gap with the period life table in Table 8.7.  Women have greater odds of 
choosing a congruent SLS relative to overestimating to the period table 
compared to men.  Whether explicitly done or not, the pattern of women's SLS 
is consistent with ignoring future mortality improvement from the period life 
table, while men are more likely to choose SLS consistent with better mortality 
than the period life table.  The cohort mortality tables introduce mortality 
improvement which is assumed to be at a higher rate for women than men 
(see Table 5.1).  This has the effect of widening the gender difference in the SLS 
gap, while resetting the benchmark higher for women.  Thus women are more 
likely to choose an SLS that underestimates relative to the low mortality cohort 
table than men. 
 
Summary: underestimation a significant risk 
If the key longevity risk is underestimating relative to the low mortality cohort 
table, then there are some clear predictors of who is most likely to suffer that 
risk in the New Zealand population: females, those under age 30 and those 
who think their SLS is 'average' or 'normal'.  Thus, a large part of the 
population is at risk.  The odds are twice as high for females compared to 
males, nearly as much for the under 30s compared to older people (odds ratio 
1.9) and slightly lower for those who reason their SLS on the basis of being 
average compared to other reasons (odds ratio 1.7).  Further, those who reason 
on the basis of bad risk factors are nearly 8 times more likely to choose an SLS 
which underestimates on this definition.  Whether or not the SLS responses are 
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real underestimation, or reflect accurate assessment of true individual 
mortality risk cannot be ascertained. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, ethnicity and socio-economic factors are not 
conclusive predictors of underestimation relative to tables that do not take 
these factors into account.  This suggests that the known factors lowering 
mortality on average and shortening average lifespans are generally not taken 
into account by individuals.   
 
8.4 Conclusions 
This survey has identified subjective lifespan expectations of adult New 
Zealanders which form similar patterns to those found in earlier American and 
British surveys.  As in these previous surveys, New Zealanders appear to take 
cues for their SLS from the contemporary pattern of deaths in the population 
without taking likely future mortality improvement into account.  Further, this 
study has shown that aggregate measures conceal substantial variation in SLS 
with potential underestimation of lifespan in the New Zealand adult 
population even before allowing for future mortality improvement.   
 
New insights have emerged on how longevity expectations are formed.  
Simplistic models for how the population thinks about SLS are not 
appropriate, as there is great diversity in reasoning.  Three quarters of the New 
Zealand adult population reason their SLS on the basis of external, given 
factors or none; only one quarter reason on the basis of personal risk factors 
which they could influence.  This appears to underplay the impact on 
mortality risk of lifestyle and behaviour.  Within the larger group, few believe 
their SLS is 'normal', with most either putting faith in their genes or in a 
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variation of lifespan being 'out of their hands'.  Therefore, information on 
likely future population average SLS may simply not be immediately believed 
by many.  Moreover, reasoning for SLS appears to be less evidence-based than 
the implicit assumption in previous studies that individuals choose SLS with 
an appreciation of the mortality risk of their demographic characteristics.  This 
research suggests reasoning, if done at all, is on a more emotional level, with 
levels of financial knowledge and locus of control being associated predictors. 
 
When asked for their likely age at death, more adult New Zealanders give 
answers that underestimate what is considered likely in population age- and 
gender-specific population projections of future lifespans than give higher 
answers or answers close to the projections.  This holds for both the official 
Medium Mortality cohort projections, and those considered more likely by the 
analysis in this thesis, the Low Mortality projections.  The pattern is consistent 
with a general lack of appreciation that mortality is improving.  Compared to 
the period life table which assumes no future mortality improvement, female 
New Zealanders underestimate lifespans on average by over two years, while 
males are more likely to choose SLS congruent to the table.  Taking future 
mortality improvement into account increases the prevalence of likely 
underestimation in lifespan substantially.  Using the medium estimate cohort 
table shows an underestimation of around four years for men and women.  
Using the cohort table with projected Low Mortality, New Zealand men 
underestimate their SLS on average by over five years and women by over 
seven years.   
 
There are higher proportions of men compared to women at both 
extremes of low and high SLS, suggesting subgroups of men both over-
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pessimistic and over-optimistic; both subgroups are associated with low 
financial knowledge.  Those under age 30 are more likely to underestimate 
than older people, because the effect of unanticipated mortality improvement 
is greater.  No other demographic mortality risk factors appear salient 
predictors of underestimation.   
 
Reason for choice of SLS is a predictor for high or low SLS; the risk of 
underestimation is strongly associated with the reason behind choosing SLS.  
Those who do not have a reason, or who give a reason on the basis of their SLS 
being 'average or normal' or who cite their personal bad mortality risk factors 
are more likely to give a low or very low SLS, and so are at risk of 
underestimating their lifespan.  Those who cite good risk factors or genes or 
family history of lifespan are more likely to choose an SLS at the higher end, so 
are less likely to underestimate SLS compared to population life tables. 
 
However, underestimation of lifespan may still exist even where people 
choose a higher SLS.  The benefit of 'good' risk factors in extending longevity 
may not be fully appreciated, or those taking their parents' or grandparents' 
lifespan may not allow sufficiently for mortality improvement over time.  
Those choosing the lowest SLS may turn out to have actual lifespan in the 
lower range, but still have longevity risk from living longer than they expect, 
and from not having money saved for retirement because of low financial 
knowledge or low net worth.  The optimists who choose the highest SLS are 
also more likely to have low financial knowledge, suggesting that they may be 
a group of confident optimists rather than accurate predictors or planners.  
Whether or not they turn out to live as long as they expect, their longevity risk 
may arise from poor financial planning for retirement.   




Chapter 9: Longevity risk in New Zealand 
Longevity risk - the risk that people live longer than expected - can exist in 
retirement plans or in government policy through underestimation of 
longevity.  The previous chapter showed that there is substantial 
underestimation of longevity by adult New Zealanders.  This chapter 
discusses the sources of potential longevity risk in New Zealand, first in 
individuals' retirement planning, and second within superannuation policy.  
The third section attempts to quantify longevity risk in both domains.  
 
9.1 Potential for individual longevity risk 
"Longevity risk" for the individual is defined as the risk of living longer than 
expected in retirement planning, so that retirement is of longer duration than 
expected and personal finances in retirement become compromised.  The 
previous chapter showed that underestimation of potential lifespans appears 
to exist in New Zealand but that translates into longevity risk for individuals' 
retirement only if potentially low lifespans are taken into account when 
planning for retirement.  Assuming a too early retirement age can also lead to 
the risk of a longer than expected duration of retirement.   Using further 
analysis from the survey described in Chapter 7 this section explores these two 
risks for adult New Zealanders.  It describes how New Zealanders consider 
lifespan, retirement age and duration of retirement in their retirement plans. 
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9.1.1 How New Zealanders consider lifespan in retirement plans 
Fewer New Zealanders claim to have thought about financial planning for 
retirement than have thought about the age they might live to.  Whereas an 
estimated nearly 70 per cent of the population said they had given the age they 
might live to some or a lot of thought, under 60 per cent said they had thought 
about financial planning for retirement a lot or a fair amount (55.6 per cent, 
weighted estimate, sample error +/-3.3 per cent; the questions were phrased 
slightly differently, see Table 7.5, but responses for both were collected on a 4-
point Likert scale).  This suggests that retirement plans, including intended 
retirement ages, are less well considered than life plans more generally, 
including subjective lifespan (SLS). 
 
Further, SLS does not seem strongly attached to retirement planning.  This 
is despite having thought about SLS and having thought about financial 
planning for retirement being highly correlated (χ2 (1) = 41.864, p < .001).  
Those who have at best not really thought about SLS are significantly more 
likely to have given financial planning for retirement a little or no thought 
than those who have thought about SLS.  However, when asked what things 
need to be considered by people saving for retirement, fewer than one quarter 
offered unprompted a response coded as "How long they will live for in their 
retirement" or "Their life expectancy" (24.1 per cent, weighted estimate, sample 
error +/- 2.9 per cent).  This compares with an estimated 75 per cent offering 
responses to do with required spending in retirement, 58 per cent offering 
responses on current financial situation and 44 per cent offering responses on 
income available in retirement (Colmar Brunton 2009 p. 97).  Even if a slight 
majority of the population have thought about financial planning for 
retirement, only a minority have considered SLS in that context. 




Knowing that lifespan should be considered for retirement saving was not 
significantly associated with having thought about SLS, or with having 
thought about financial planning for retirement.  Indeed, the only variable 
significantly associated at p < .001 was financial knowledge group (χ2 (2) = 
51.216).  Those offering longevity as a consideration when saving for 
retirement were more likely to be in the High knowledge group and less likely 
to be in the Low knowledge group (both at p < .001).  Level of financial 
knowledge appears to be the best predictor of whether people know possible 
lifespan should be considered when planning saving for retirement. 
 
9.1.2 Intended retirement age 
Despite some lack of knowledge about planning for retirement, when asked 
for their likely retirement age, only around 5 per cent said they didn't know 
(5.3 per cent, sample error +/- 1.5 per cent).  Almost three times as many gave 
no response when asked for their SLS.  However, an estimated 15.8 per cent of 
the population gave "I've already retired or I don't work" as a response to the 
question on likely retirement age.  The analogous group of course does not 
exist when asking for SLS. 
 
Excluding the latter group of non-workers, the distribution of responses to 
the question "At what age, if any, do you think you are most likely to retire?" 
was different from that for SLS (Figure 9.1).  Likely retirement ages were less 
variable and bunched at the left of the distribution.  The mode and median 
likely retirement age were both 65 years, the mean was 65.4 years and the 
standard deviation was 5.9 years, compared to a standard deviation for SLS of 
10.5 years.  This partly reflects that the age options on the showcards for both 
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questions started at 60 and under, but the SLS question continued until "Over 
100", whereas the retirement age question swept up all ages over 75 into 
"Never, I'll carry on working". 
 


















Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=850.  *"Never, I'll carry on working".  **I've already retired or I don't work". 
 
Given that many people have not given financial planning for retirement 
much thought, this clustering of likely retirement age around age 65 may not 
always be a signal of intention, but rather of supposition that they will follow 
what they think of as the normal retirement age.  The concentration of 
responses around age 65 underlies how entrenched that age is as a marker of 
that perceived norm of retirement.  This is despite there being no legal barrier 
to retirement at any age and the rising participation of New Zealanders aged 
65 or over in the labour force: at 17 per cent at Census 2006, the age 65 and 
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over participation rate had tripled from the low in 1991 (Statistics New 
Zealand 2009b).  The age of eligibility of the public pension is also likely to act 
as a marker for retirement.  Since public pension began in New Zealand in 
1898, and prior to the inception of the New Zealand Superannuation (then 
called National Superannuation) in 1977, the eligibility age was age 65, with a 
period in the mid 20th century when a reduced benefit was also available at 
age 60.  Eligibility age was raised to age 61 effective 1992 and reached the 
current age of 65 in 2001 (Preston 2008).  Both of the two intended retirement 
ages chosen by the majority of adult New Zealanders have been the ages of 
eligibility for the public pension within memory. 
 
To investigate the characteristics associated with high or low likely 
retirement ages, the responses of those working and not already retired were 
split into two groups: those choosing a likely retirement age of 65 and under 
(n=491) and those choosing one of 70 years and over (responses were collected 
at quinquennial ages) including in the latter group (n=180) those who said 
"Never, I'll carry on working".  Associations found in exploratory analysis (not 
shown) suggested that early or late likely future retirement age may be 
determined by age, ethnicity and socio-economic factors.  These were tested 
more fully by logistic regression, the results of which are shown in Table 9.1.   
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Table 9.1: Predictors of likely retirement age of 70 or more (including never), 


















Variables included in 
model 
    
Constant 
Age 60 and over 
Age 45-59 
SLS 85 and over (those that 
gave an answer) 
Net wealth over $300,000 
Male 
NZ European sole ethnicity 
[Have will] 
[Asian sole ethnicity] 








0.488*   (0.203) 
-0.560*   (0.226) 
-0.480*   (0.242) 
-0.650    (0.367) 






































     
Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
 
Variables excluded from model: 
Each first reason for giving SLS; Māori sole ethnicity; Have tertiary education 
High personal income; Negative net wealth; Age under 30 and 30-44 
 
Note: 
Each variable is defined as stated category compared to all other categories 
combined.  
Backwards stepwise method used.  Forward method excludes variables in square 
brackets. 
R2 = .11 (Cox and Snell), .16 (Nagelkerke).  Model χ2 (9) = 67.44*** 
Significance level: * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
This analysis reveals that later retirement is predicted most strongly by 
older age, higher SLS, lower net wealth and to a lesser extent by gender.  The 
model does not explain all of the variance in retirement age, as shown by the 
low R2 statistics.  It is possible that an exogenous factor, such as the perception 
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of age 65 as perceived normal retirement age at eligibility age for the public 
pension, exerts more influence on individuals' intentions than any of the 
variables shown here.   
 
Nevertheless, this model suggests that intended retirement aged 70 and 
over (among those workers who gave an expected retirement age) is more 
likely for those over age 45 as compared with younger workers, and especially 
for those over age 60 and over.  It is significantly less likely for those with net 
wealth over $300,000.  This pattern suggests that people become more likely to 
consider later retirement as they age, unless they have the wealth to consider 
retiring earlier.  New Zealanders who give European as their sole ethnicity 
may be more likely to be in this financial position; it may also be the case that 
the norm of retiring at 65 may be more entrenched for this group.  The pattern 
of changing intentions with increasing age and wealth implies increasing 
realism as retirement becomes a nearer event and wealth is more known.  
Declarations of intended early retirement from young people may well be turn 
out to be unrealistic and premature.  The inverse relationship between wealth 
and retirement age intentions may be more of a concern from a social policy 
perspective.  Those in higher socio-economic groups have an actuarially 
greater chance of a longer life than those in lower socio-economic groups.  The 
evidenced disparity in length of intended retirement by socio-economic 
differential magnifies the disparity in lifespan alone.   
 
A higher retirement age was also associated with a higher SLS, although 
this analysis cannot show whether high SLS leads to a higher intended 
retirement age, or the reverse, or whether this is a consequence of another 
variable.  The association is logical in the sense that a longer expected lifespan 
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should allow a later retirement age.  It also confirms findings from 
international studies, notably van Solinge and Henken (2009) and Hurd et al 
(2003), that later retirement intentions were associated with longer expected 
life.   
 
9.1.3 Implied length of retirement 
To explore the length of retirement implied by the responses to the questions 
on intended retirement age and expected length of life, the gap between the 
two was calculated for each respondent who gave an answer to both (n=603).  
This is most likely not the length of retirement most people are explicitly 
expecting; as previous analysis has indicated how few people plan their 
retirement, let alone those who do so with life expectancy as a consideration.  
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the distribution of implicit 
assumptions being made.  This variable is therefore called "implied length of 
retirement ". 
 
Both SLS and likely retirement age were collected at quinquennial ages, so 
for most responses implied length of retirement was found by simple 
subtraction, and is itself a multiple of 5 years.  At the extreme ends of the 
scales, an SLS of 60 or under was taken as 60, and an SLS of over 100 was taken 
as 105.  A likely retirement age of 60 or under was taken as 59, and one of over 
75 was taken as 77, with the choice of cut off points made at smaller gaps than 
5 years because of the narrowness of the retirement age choices.  "Never" was 
taken as 77 or SLS if lower.  Four cases were removed where SLS was lower 
than the given likely retirement age. 
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The resulting implied lengths of retirement ranged from zero to 46 years.  
The median was 16 years, mean 16.7 years and mode 20 years.  Inevitably, 
given the bunching at quinquennial ages and rather arbitrary choice of end 
values, the distribution was lumpy.  However, the data fell naturally into three 
equally sized groups, and these tritiles, as shown in Figure 9.2 were used for 
further analysis.  
 
Figure 9.2: Implied length of retirement in years, estimated percentage of the 
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Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.   
n=603 workers who gave an SLS. 
 
Table 9.2 shows how each significantly associated variable is distributed 
by tritile of implied length of retirement.  Other variables were tested but do 
not show significant associations.  
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Source: Analysis of Financial Knowledge 2009 survey responses.  
See notes on following page. 
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Notes for Table 9.2: A Pearson's chi-squared test was carried out between the 
variable denoted in the table columns and each variable in a subsection of the 
table.  An asterisk next to the variable name denotes significant association 
between the two variables.  An asterisk within a cell denotes a high 
standardised residual value for that category under the assumption of no 
association between the two variables.  * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Socio-economic status appears linked with implied length of retirement as 
it did with both SLS and retirement age, but is most apparent in the profile of 
the Short tritile.  Those with negative net wealth are significantly more likely 
to be expecting a short retirement, as are those in the low financial knowledge 
group.   
 
The pattern of association with reasons for SLS suggests that predictors of 
high or low SLS follow through to an implied consistent retirement age: a first 
reason of genes is a predictor of a high SLS and less likely to be associated with 
a short implied retirements; a first reason of bad risk factors is a predictor of 
low SLS and a short implied retirement.  Other associations are less 
compelling.  There is no obvious association with age, except that people aged 
under 30 are less likely to expect a mid-range length of retirement, but may 
expect either a short or long one.  The converse is apparent with those who 
have made a will; this group are significantly more likely to be in the middle 
tritile for implied length of retirement. This pattern seems to suggest 
knowledge and the likelihood of reasonable intentions increasing with age and 
with making practical decisions related to lifespan. 
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Longevity risk can occur whether implied length of retirement is short, 
medium or long.  The financial impact of the risk appears greatest for people 
who expected a low SLS, but a relatively high retirement age, so are in the 
tritile of shortest implied length of retirement.  In theory, living a number of 
years longer than assumed would lead to a proportionately larger savings 
shortfall if a short retirement were expected compared to a long retirement.  
Short expected lifespans may turn out to be accurate if assessments of poor 
mortality risk factors were correct.  However, the probability of living longer 
than expected still exists, and, as being in this tritile is associated with having 
low financial knowledge and negative net worth, people in this position may 
not have money saved for retirement.  Further, if they have health problems or 
cannot find suitable work (and many in this tritile expect to work until age 70 
or later), then their retirement finances may be further compromised from 
their implicit or explicit expectations.  
 
9.2 Potential for longevity risk in public pension policy  
Longevity risk in public pension policy exists if too low lifespans are assumed 
in the evidence used by policy makers when estimating the future cost of 
public pensions and in deciding on policy reform.  This section considers 
whether this is the case, first briefly for the comparator countries used in 
previous mortality analysis to give some international context for the situation 
in New Zealand, and then focusing in more detail on the latter.   
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9.2.1 How lifespan is considered in pension policy  
Many countries have reformed pension policy over the last decade or two with 
increasing longevity cited as one of the main reasons for change.  Raising the 
age of eligibility for the public pension has been the most common reform in 
developed economies.  Further increases are planned, and applauded (OECD 
2007, 2011a, b).  The OECD explicitly links policy for increasing eligibility age 
(which it calls pensionable age) to increasing lifespans: 
 
"By 2050, the average pensionable age in OECD countries will 
reach nearly 65 for both sexes: an increase of nearly 2.5 years for 
men and 4 years for women on 2010.  However, life expectancy is 
projected to grow faster than these increases in pension age.  Life 
expectancy at pensionable age is forecast to increase by about 3 
years for men and 2.5 years for women between 2010 and 2050." 
OECD 2011b p. 21 
 
The OECD analysis underlying this conclusion uses the projected change 
in period life expectancies at pensionable age from the United Nations 
population division, 2008 revision (OECD 2011b p. 27).  Thus, it uses a 
measure that is likely to underestimate average age at death.  If this were a 
basis for a policy recommendation, it would therefore contain longevity risk.  
The OECD does not make a specific argument for why eligibility age should 
keep pace with increasing life expectancy.  For example, a valid policy could 
be to retain eligibility age in order to offer people the ability to fund greater 
leisure time after that age.  However, the implicit rationale appears to be that 
increasing length in retirement (or, more precisely, time spent receiving a 
public pension - in many countries receipt of the pension is not contingent on 
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having retired) will increase the cost of providing the public pension.  The 
OECD does not suggest a specific cost goal, but it appears to be implicit that 
length of retirement should be constant rather than increasing.  The absolute 
level of total costs could increase even if length of retirement were constant if 
the number of people over the eligibility age increases, and costs as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could increase if GDP failed to 
grow at the same pace as the number of pension recipients.  Within any 
country, the precise cost goal and the importance of cost in relation to other 
factors shaping the structure of the public pension and economy would be a 
matter of public policy subject to political debate within that country.  
Therefore, although longevity risk is likely to exist in eligibility age policy at 
the level of the OECD analysis, the extent of longevity risk and the importance 
of increasing longevity will vary by country.   
 
Table 9.3 compares the policy position on raising age of eligibility for the 
public pension in the countries used as comparators for the mortality analysis 
in previous chapters.  This shows that only New Zealand and Canada have not 
yet acted to increase eligibility age beyond age 65.  Thus, countries with both 
worse (UK, USA) and better (Australia) average lifespans than New Zealand 
plan to increase eligibility age to age 67 or age 68, on differing timetables.  For 
the same countries, Table 9.4 summarises the longevity evidence published as 
rationale for increasing the age of eligibility from policy makers where 
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Table 9.3: Policy position on raising age of eligibility for the public pension 
in selected countries  
 Age of eligibility for public pension and policy 
position as at late 2011 
Australia Legislation was enacted in 2009 to increase Age 
Pension age of eligibility from age 65 to 67 at a rate of 
six months every two years, starting 1 July 2017 and 
finishing 1 July 2023.   
Affects people born 1 July 1952 and later. 
(Australian Government 2009). 
Canada No legislative plans, but proposals are in debate.   
For example, the Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation 
published costed proposals for increasing the normal 
age of eligibility for the Canada Pension Plan and 
Quebec Pension Plan from age 65 to 67 at a rate of 
two months every year starting 2012 and finishing  
2023.   
Would affect people born in 1952 and later. 
(Hering and Klassen 2011). 
New Zealand Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement 
Income (CFLRI), then called the Retirement 
Commission, proposed an increase in New Zealand 
Superannuation from age 65 to age 67 at a rate of two 
months every year starting 2020 and finishing 2033.  
Would affect those born in 1955 and later (Retirement 
Commissioner 2010 Table 6.2).   
 
No action taken by Government.   
"Prime Minister John Key said there would be 
no change on his watch. < He disagreed with 
the assertion the current age had to rise. 
"For a variety of reasons but in my view, New 




In November 2011 the opposition Labour party 
adopted the CFLRI proposal as policy. 
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Table 9.3: Policy position on raising age of eligibility for the public pension 
in selected countries, continued 
 Age of eligibility for public pension and policy 






Up to 5 April 2010 the State Pension age (SPa) was 60 
for women and 65 for men.  Legislation was enacted 
in 1995 for women’s SPa to increase gradually from 
April 2010 to reach 65 in 2020.   
 
Legislation was enacted in 2007 to increase SPa for 
both men and women to 66 between April 2024 and 
April 2026, to 67 between April 2034 and April 2036 
and to 68 from April 2044 to April 2046. 
Affects people born 6 April 1959 onwards. 
 
The Pensions Act 2011 accelerated the increase in SPa 
to 65 for women and to 66 for both men and women.  
Women's SPa will increase to 65 between April 2016 
and November 2018.  The SPa for both men and 
women will start to increase in December 2018 and 
reach 66 in October 2020.  The first cohort to have SPa 
over 65 years exactly will have been born in 
December 1953. 




Legislation was enacted in 1983 to increase the age of 
eligibility for unreduced Social Security retirement 
benefits ("full or normal retirement age") from age 65 
to 67 over the period 2003 to 2027, with an 11-year 
pause during which the age will remain at 66. 
Affects people born in 1938 and later.   
Social Security Online (2011) and related documents 
 
Note: "Age of eligibility" is used as a general term here for the age at which full 
benefits are available from the main public pension.  Reduced benefits may be 
able to be taken at earlier ages, and other benefits, sometimes with other 
eligibility ages, also exist in each country. 
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Table 9.4: Longevity rationale invoked for proposed or actual increase in 
public pension eligibility age in selected countries  
 
Longevity rationale, as published 
Australia "<people are living longer and spending more 
retirement years in good health.  Despite this the 
Age Pension age has not been increased above 65 
years since its inception in 1909.  When the Age 
Pension was introduced, a male retiring at age 65 
would have expected to spend 11 years in 
retirement.  At that time, around half of the male 
population reached retirement age.  Today over 85 
per cent of the male population reaches retirement 
age and can expect to spend over 19 years in 
retirement. 
To respond to the long-term cost of demographic 
change, and to reflect improvements in life 
expectancy, the Government will progressively 
increase the qualifying age for the Age Pension." 
(Australian Government 2009). 
The source is not given but the figures are 
consistent with period life expectancy measures.   
Canada "Canadians now live considerably longer than 
policy makers expected when they reformed the 
CPP and QPP in the late 1990s.  Official estimates 
show that by 2050, men and women who retire at 
age 65 will live, on average, until age 87 and 89, 
respectively.  The latest projections of life 
expectancy at age 65 in 2050 are thus 3.0 years and 
0.7 years higher for men and women respectively 
than those made during the last round of CPP 
reforms in the 1990s.  Moreover the latest official 
projections very likely underestimate future 
improvements in life expectancy<" 
(Hering and Klassen 2011 p. 6). 
 
The source is not given but the figures are 
consistent with the cohort life expectancy medium 
scenario as used in Chapter 5. 
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Table 9.4: Longevity rationale invoked for proposed or actual increase in 
public pension eligibility age in selected countries, continued 
 Longevity rationale, as published 
New Zealand "Average life expectancy has been steadily rising 
for many years. Age cohorts born later are 
expected to live a greater number of years beyond 
a given age than cohorts born earlier." 
 
"It is too early to calculate reliable life expectancies 
for cohorts born later [than cohorts born in 1915, 
1925 and 1935 as shown], but the trends suggest 
that the cohort of women born in 1945, who qualify 
for NZS this year, are likely to receive it for at least 
22 years, and that men, whose life expectancy has 
been rising faster than women’s, might also receive 
NZS for 22 years on average. 
Twenty years from now, given the rising trend in 
life expectancy, we might expect the baby boom 
generation to receive NZS for 24 or more years. 
Although this can be only a rough forecast, it does 
suggest that under the proposed increase in NZS 
eligibility age there might well be no reduction in 
the number of years of pension coverage for baby 
boomers compared with today’s retirees." 
 
(Retirement Commissioner 2010 pp 123-124). 
 
The source for life expectancy figures is given as 
Statistics New Zealand: Cohort life tables, 
September 2010.   
 
"Labour will also gradually increase the age of 
eligibility for NZ Super from 65 to 67 years. 
By 2050, the number of people aged 65 and over 
will double to 1.35 million. Our bill for 
superannuation will also double so it’s vital we 
plan for our rapidly ageing population now." 
(New Zealand Labour Party 2011). 
 
 






"When the first contributory pension was 
introduced, many people did not live long enough 
to receive it.  But more of us are living to State 
Pension age, and receiving the State Pension for 
longer, than at any time in our history<." 
"The state pensions system needs to be both fair 
and sustainable in the face of societal and 
demographic change<. rising life expectancy 
comes at a financial cost, which falls mainly on our 
working-age population." 
(DWP 2010 p.9). 
 
Detailed data shown using ONS projected cohort 
life expectancy data, including: 
"In 1980, a woman of 65 would have been expected 
to live to 83, on average. Her daughter, reaching 65 
this year, can expect to live to 89, on average. And 
her granddaughter, when she reaches 65 in 2040, 
should expect to live to 92, on average. In three 
generations, the expected average length of life 
after age 65 has risen by nine years<In 1980, a 
man received a State Pension for 24 per cent of his 
adult life, on average<.Today, a man will receive 
it for 32 per cent of his adult life, on average. For 
women, the proportion of adult life spent in receipt 
of a State Pension has increased from 36 per cent in 
1980 to 42 per cent today, on average." 




"Congress cited improvements in the health of 
older people and increases in average life 
expectancy as primary reasons for increasing the 
normal retirement age < Since the program first 
began paying monthly Social Security benefits in 
1940 the average life expectancy for men reaching 
age 65 has increased nearly 4 years to age 81; for 
women reaching age 65, their average life 
expectancy has increased nearly 6 years to age 84." 
(Social Security Online 2011). 
The source is not given but the figures are 
consistent with period life expectancy measures. 
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In public documents, the rationale for reform is often summarised and less 
than explicit, but a shared theme of response to increasing cost from increasing 
longevity is apparent.  Of the countries where increases in eligibility age are 
planned by government, only the UK uses detailed future cohort life 
expectancies for all current ages as evidence of expected increases in average 
lifespans in future, but only a single scenario - the medium estimate as labelled 
in Chapter 5 - is used.  Australia and the USA invoked only evidence of past 
increases in period life expectancy as argument for increasing eligibility age.  
For the two countries where independent bodies have made proposals for 
reform - New Zealand and Canada - projected cohort life expectancies are 
mentioned even if not referenced as such.  In Canada projections further into 
the future are used to cover more of the current population and the possibility 
that these are underestimates of likely future lifespans is referred to.  The New 
Zealand political debate, though limited, is in terms of the increasing cost from 
the number of people reaching the age of eligibility.  This is an aggregate cost 
view, ignoring the impact, including cost, on individual lifespans. 
 
Even if an explicit cost goal of legislation to increase eligibility age is not 
stated, the cost implication of plans is published and cost is referred to in 
general as one driver for change.  If the cost of the public pension started to 
increase unexpectedly as a result of average lifespan underestimate, it may be 
possible to change eligibility age or other parameters within the policy 
structure at short notice to compensate.  Therefore, it is not necessarily the case 
that longevity risk of this type will always lead to higher cost of the public 
pension than planned for.  However, it would mean that eligibility age is not 
being raised fast enough to meet whatever the implicit cost or other goals were 
at the time of reform, which is usually some years before the increase in 
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eligibility age begins.  This risk was made explicit in the case of the UK when a 
new government used the rationale for longevity increasing faster than 
expected to propose an acceleration of the timetable for the increase to age 66 
only three years after the timetable had been set:  
 
"The Pensions Act 2007 legislated for increases in State Pension 
age. Under the Act, the State Pension age was planned to rise for 
men and women to 66 by 2026, 67 by 2036, and 68 by 2046. < Even 
since this timetable was set, official projections for average life 
expectancy at 65 in 2026 have gone up an extra 1.5 years for men, 
and 1.6 years for women< 
... tomorrow’s pensioners will spend an even greater part of 
their adult life in receipt of a State Pension than was thought in 
2007.  No responsible government can afford to ignore the 
challenges of increasing longevity.  It is crucial for both financial 
sustainability and fairness to each generation that the state pensions 
system reflects how much longer we are living.  To ensure this, the 
Government has reviewed the timing of the increase in State 
Pension age to 66." 
DWP (2010) p. 9 and p. 15. 
 
Public discourse about eligibility age policy reform may be the only way 
in which individuals are exposed to data about expected average lifespans.  If 
that data is then used in individuals' retirement planning then it has a direct 
consequence for individual longevity risk.  Of these countries, governments in 
Australia and the US did not use the opportunity of eligibility age reform to 
give information about future likely average lifespans.  The UK government 
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has used the best available source of future projected cohort life expectancies 
extensively.  However, each time it uses only the medium estimate without 
referencing the potential for longer (or shorter) average lifespans than the 
medium scenario provides.  For example a database published by the 
government department responsible for pension policy of cohort life 
expectancies at age 65 for cohorts reaching that age from 1951 to 2058, from 
projections dating from 1983 to 2008, shows only the principal projection 
results from the statistical or actuarial agency (DWP 2011), yet the same source 
details the consistent underestimation of the projections over time.  The policy 
debates in both Canada and New Zealand have been narrow by comparison, 
far from a full public debate led by government.  It is therefore unlikely that 
individuals have been able to discern good estimates of likely future lifespans, 
or the uncertainty involved, from the available public discourse.   
 
Table 9.4 shows that the longevity rationale for each country's eligibility 
age reform or proposal has been made with a variety of parameters to describe 
potential average lifespans.  Very few parameters are likely to be absorbed by 
the public and hopefully used in their own retirement planning.  The most 
useful parameters for this purpose would intuitively be likely average 
duration of retirement or likely average total lifespans.  Because more people 
think about lifespan than retirement age, it is likely that a single figure of a 
likely future average lifespan would be the most likely to be remembered.  A 
range of plausible estimates for this figure could be useful to show that there is 
uncertainty and therefore demonstrate the need for caution in planning.  None 
of the debates in the countries shown reach an ideal of communicating this 
parameter simply and memorably, quite apart from whether the best future 
estimate of the parameter is used.  




9.2.2 Longevity in New Zealand's superannuation policy 
The previous section identified three potential contributions to longevity risk 
in New Zealand from policy for the public pension, New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS).  First, New Zealand is unusual among the comparator 
countries for not planning to increase eligibility age even though average 
lifespans in New Zealand are at higher levels and are increasing faster than 
countries that are increasing eligibility age beyond the current age of eligibility 
age for NZS of 65.  Despite the fast improvement in mortality in New Zealand, 
relative to the other countries considered, even the CFLRI proposal for reform 
of eligibility age suggests a later increase than planned or proposed elsewhere.  
In declining to raise eligibility age, a political judgement is being made that the 
future cost of NZS is affordable and the savings to be made from increasing 
eligibility age could not be better used elsewhere.  This policy decision means 
that the cost of New Zealand Superannuation is likely to increase faster than 
the cost of other public pensions where eligibility age is increasing because of 
increasing longevity.   
 
Second, where an increase to the eligibility age has been proposed, the 
evidence invoked has been past or near-term cohort life expectancies, even 
though estimates of cohort life expectancies projected further into the future 
are available on request to Statistics New Zealand.  Therefore, it would be 
possible to use future estimates of lifespan, on the Low and Medium Mortality 
scenarios.  Although there is uncertainty in these future estimates - "It is too 
early to calculate reliable life expectancies for cohorts born later" as the 
Retirement Commissioner put it (2010 p. 124)  - a discussion of that very 
uncertainty itself carries an important message for retirement or policy 
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planning: that using a single conservative estimate carries a risk of future 
financial loss.   
 
Estimates of future mortality rates consistent with future cohort life 
expectancies are already used within models of the future fiscal cost of New 
Zealand Superannuation, whether to explore the consequences of policy 
change such as increasing eligibility age or for the regular use of the Long 
Term Fiscal Model for cost estimates on current policy (Rodway 2010; Rodway 
and Wilson 2006; The Treasury 2006, 2009).  Generally, however, only the 
medium scenario for mortality is used.  Even if other scenarios are used they 
are not reported on prominently but rather as sensitivity tests on the main 
case.  Therefore the future cost of NZS as most prominently reported from the 
results of the model will be underestimated compared to the results from 
using the low mortality variant.  Thus longevity risk is introduced into policy 
planning from the use of a single, conservative, scenario for longevity.   
Further, the reporting of the results of these models is not an effective forum 
for giving public information on likely future lifespans because their purpose 
is to estimate the fiscal cost of NZS, which depends on many other assumed 
parameters.  
 
Third, there are consequences from public policy on New Zealand 
Superannuation for longevity risk in individual retirement planning.  
Opportunities to give individual New Zealanders' information about their 
potential lifespans are limited because the public debate about eligibility age is 
narrow and late.  In other countries, such a debate has provided a public 
forum for data on increasing lifespans and the implications therein to be 
revealed, explained and discussed.  A single helpful measure of future average 
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lifespans is not obvious in New Zealand's public discourse.  The political party 
with a policy to increase age of eligibility uses the same rationale highlighted 
in the media release on the original proposal from the 2010 Retirement 
Commissioner's Review of Retirement Income Policy: the increasing number 
of superannuitants from the "baby boomer" generation (CFLRI 2010).  The 
message of increasing lifespans was subsumed into the detail of the report in 
which there was only a tentative reference to the possibility the baby boomer 
generation might receive NZS for 24 or more years.  This number is critically 
important for individual retirement planning, but not emphasised as such. 
 
Further risks to individual retirement planning accrue from retaining New 
Zealand Superannuation eligibility age at 65.  A low estimate of individual 
lifespan is associated in New Zealanders' minds with a low retirement age, 
with eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation appearing as a critical 
factor influencing retirement age intentions (Figure 9.1).  Retaining eligibility 
age at 65 is therefore likely to retain age 65 as the modal intended retirement 
age of New Zealanders.  Additionally, eligibility age for New Zealand 
Superannuation is also the age at which KiwiSaver funds become available.  
Therefore, as long as an eligibility age of 65 is retained, so the basis for most 
New Zealanders for financial retirement planning is likely to be retirement at 
age 65.  The public policy position of no change to eligibility at age 65 fails to 
give the public the message that longevity is increasing.  It does not trigger any 
reason for individuals to increase their explicit or implicit assumptions about 
retirement age or age at death.  
 
Policy debate need not be the only source of information about potential 
average lifespan or appropriate or normal retirement age.  However, in New 
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Zealand it is the main contender.  KiwiSaver is the main retirement savings 
vehicle for the adult population; around half of those eligible for KiwiSaver 
aged 18 and over are members (computed from IRD KiwiSaver membership 
statistics as at end April 2011 and Statistics New Zealand population estimates 
March 2011 quarter).  Other retirement plans outside of KiwiSaver tend to 
make the same assumption for eligibility age, that is, they follow New Zealand 
Superannuation eligibility age.  Illustrations of future retirement benefits from 
an adviser will also use an assumption of likely lifespans.  The most prominent 
widely available calculator promoted so that New Zealanders can estimate the 
savings needed for their own retirement exists on the Sorted website 
(www.sorted.org.nz), from the Commission for Financial Literacy and 
Retirement Income (CFLRI).  An individual using this calculator has the 
opportunity to input his or her own assumptions for both retirement age and 
age at death, but defaults are provided.  Behavioural economic theory suggests 
these defaults would be most often used (for example, Madrian 2009).  The 
default retirement age is age 65.  The definition or source of the default ages at 
death are not stated, but they are age- and gender-specific and slightly lower 
than period life expectancies at retirement age (see later in Table 9.5).  Not all 
New Zealanders will have used CFLRI's retirement savings calculator.  
Around a third of New Zealanders are estimated to have ever used Sorted 
material, including booklets and seminars as well as the website, which 
contains many other calculators (CFLRI 2011 p. 4).  Individuals may have 
alternatively used similar calculators with a financial advisor or policy 
salesman, and these may in fact rely on the Sorted calculator.  Whether by 
setting official estimates for use in calculators such as these, or by implanting 
key assumptions through the use of headline numbers on retirement age and 
potential lifespans, the parameters used in policy and discussed in policy 
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debate, and data supplied by Statistics New Zealand which in turn is used in 
policy debates, can all extend a strong influence on the assumptions made in 
individuals' retirement planning. 
 
9.3 Quantifying longevity risk in New Zealand 
Do the contributions to potential longevity risk described in previous sections 
actually constitute significant longevity risk in New Zealand's policy planning 
or significant longevity risk in New Zealanders' retirement planning?  This 
section addresses this question by quantifying the effect of longevity risk in 
these two domains. 
 
9.3.1 Longevity risk in policy  
Failure to increase the age of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation 
(NZS) in itself invites greater exposure to longevity risk.  An unchanged 
eligibility age means a greater change to NZS eligibility age or other parameter 
would be required to mitigate the increase in future cost of NZS due to future 
increases in longevity than if a schedule of future increases in eligibility age 
were planned.  Further, the political judgement which currently accepts the 
future fiscal cost of NZS may make a different policy decision if future costs 
were estimated to be higher as a result of using assumptions on mortality 
improving faster than Statistics New Zealand's medium scenario.  Treasury 
does not publish full up to date cost scenarios for NZS using anything other 
than the medium scenario.  Therefore it is difficult to gauge the extent of 
longevity risk as a result of conservatism in the choice of mortality 
assumptions.  However, a recent illustration is available from Treasury work 
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to estimate the cost savings from raising eligibility age (Rodway 2010).  This is 
the source for what follows in this section. 
 
The base case for the gross of tax fiscal cost of New Zealand 
Superannuation was estimated to be 4.4 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 2010, rising to 6.9 per cent in 2035 and 7.9 per cent in 2060.  Among 
the many demographic and economic assumptions this calculation requires, 
the medium scenario for mortality from Statistics New Zealand was used.  The 
cost in 2035 was estimated to increase by 0.3 percentage points, to 7.1 per cent 
of GDP, and by 0.7 percentage points, to 8.6 per cent of GDP in 2060, if 
mortality instead followed Statistics New Zealand's Low Mortality scenario 
(Rodway 2010 p. 23).  Thus, if mortality did decrease on what this thesis 
anticipates is plausible, and no other changes to policy were made, then the 
fiscal cost of NZS would be higher by less than one tenth over the next five 
decades.  While this may not be deemed highly significant, further 
improvements in mortality would of course make more of a fiscal impact.  The 
Very High Life Expectancy scenario (where period life expectancy at birth is 
set arbitrarily to 95 years in 2060) was estimated to increase the gross cost of 
NZS in 2060 to 9.7 per cent of GDP.  Given that cohort life expectancy at birth 
is already within five years of that figure for females, it is not outside the 
bounds of possibility that such improvement could occur over that timeframe. 
 
Although the actual cost of mortality proving to be on the Low Mortality 
scenario does not look in isolation to be highly significant, some context can be 
provided for what policy change would be required to mitigate the cost.  The 
reduction in cost under the medium scenario if eligibility age were increased 
from age 65 to age 67 on the CFLRI's proposed timetable detailed in Table 9.3 
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is estimated to be 0.8 percentage points of GDP, and larger savings would be 
made earlier than the additional cost would be on the lighter mortality 
assumption (Rodway 2010 p. 10).  Therefore, to mitigate the longevity risk 
resulting from a conservative choice of mortality assumptions in cost 
modelling requires a policy that provides as much cost saving as the CFLRI's 
proposed increase in eligibility age.  This policy appears to be currently (late 
2011) politically impossible to achieve.  From this point of view the longevity 
risk in current New Zealand Superannuation policy is significant.  The risk 
will only grow as lifespans continue to increase, and if lifespans start to 
lengthen by even more than the Low Mortality scenario suggests, while plans 
to increase eligibility age continue to be avoided.   
 
9.3.2 Longevity risk in individual retirement plans 
In addition to the longevity risk from failure to address increasing longevity 
within New Zealand Superannuation policy, the lack of signalling on rationale 
for increasing eligibility age is likely to lead to increased longevity risk for 
individual New Zealanders.  As discussed above, eligibility age is a signal for 
retirement age and is the default age for planning when KiwiSaver funds 
become available.  An increasing eligibility age is therefore likely to indicate an 
expectation of increasing intended retirement age, which has a beneficial effect 
on mitigating financial risk in individual retirement planning.  Further, the 
public discourse around the longevity rationale for policy reform to increase 
eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation would offer the opportunity 
to inform the public of plausible future lifespans using cohort life expectancy 
measures, which should mitigate longevity risk from using poor assumptions 
of likely age at death.   
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This section explores the size of longevity risk in individual plans from 
two public policy messages: the effect on intended retirement age from the age 
of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation, and the effect on subjective 
lifespan (SLS) from using lifespan data in public messages that underestimates 
the actual likely future lifespans.  This analysis summarises previous work by 
drawing on Chapter 3 for the theoretical rationale for using cohort life 
expectancy rather than the more commonly used period measure, on Chapters 
4 to 6 for the conclusion that the Low Mortality variant of the Statistics New 
Zealand projections is more plausible than the more commonly used medium 
estimate, on Chapters 7 to 8 for data on adult New Zealanders' SLS and on this 
Chapter 9 for the associations between SLS, age of eligibility for New Zealand 
Superannuation and intended retirement age.   
 
Having less money than expected in retirement can arise from a number 
of reasons other than underestimating lifespan.  Under the lifecycle savings 
hypothesis, individuals rationally work out how much income they will need 
in retirement on top of the public pension they will receive, and then save 
regularly to provide that excess income making assumptions for the rate of 
return net of costs they will achieve on their savings and the rate at which they 
will be able to draw down or annuitise their savings in retirement.  In this 
rational model, there is scope for lower retirement income than expected 
through contributions to savings not being made as planned, public pension 
being less than expected through policy change, lower than expected returns 
on savings or worse than expected annuitisation rates.  Further, retirement 
income may be lower than implicit expectations by those individuals who did 
not make retirement plans because their expectations were irrational or 
unrealistic. 




The impact of longevity risk on retirement income turning out lower than 
expected can be illustrated in the rational case by computing the financial 
effect of changing lifespan assumption in the lifecycle savings model.  By also 
making retirement age intention a variable parameter, the effect of the links 
between the two parameters that determine length of retirement can be 
explored.  These computations were carried out using a simple publicly 
available calculator based on the lifecycle savings model from the Sorted 
website.  Results are in Table 9.6.  The analysis is illustrated using one example 
individual born in 1960, so in 2009 was aged 49 which is a reasonable estimate 
for the typical age of retirement planning.  This analysis computes the monthly 
savings required to reach a defined retirement income objective given a set of 
assumptions including retirement age intention and age at death.  For this 
analysis, the latter two assumptions vary and other assumptions, including 
retirement income objective, are held constant at the CFLRI default, or omitted 
where unnecessary. 
 
The assumptions for typical age at death likely to be used in a financial 
planning exercise were selected from the distribution of New Zealanders' 
subjective lifespans (SLS) revealed in the previous chapter, from potential 
signals from public commentary and from the (age-specific) recommendations 
from the Sorted website. The potential actual ages at death were taken from 
age-specific actual or projected mortality data as detailed.  Table 9.5 
summarises the age at death assumptions used and their sources.   
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Table 9.5 shows that the contribution to underestimation of lifespans from 
using a flawed measure - period as opposed to cohort - is greater than the 
contribution from using a more plausible assumption for future mortality than 
the almost universally used medium estimate.  Assuming survival to the age 
of retirement intention (that is using period life expectancy at retirement age) 
improves on assuming the flawed period life expectancy at birth measure by 
adding four years for females and five for males.  Further improvement of the 
same amount is added by using the year of birth-specific cohort measure on 
the plausible scenario, but all but one of these years comes from the change 
from period to cohort measure, rather than from the choice of scenario of 
future mortality improvement.   
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Lifespan in years 
 
Female  Male 
Assumptions 






Median SLS 85 80 




used in public 
commentary 
(see Table 3.1) 





using age at 
retirement 
Period life expectancy at 
age 60/65/67 
85/86/86 82/83/83 
Modal age at 
death 






Cohort (born 1960), life 
expectancy at age 65 










Cohort life expectancy at 
age 65 (born 1960), Low 






90th percentile of age of 
actual deaths, 2009 
92 89 
See notes on following page. 
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Notes for Table 9.5: 
1.  For modal and median SLS see Table 8.1.  These are the mode and median 
for the New Zealand adult population as surveyed, not specific to this 
illustrative individual. 
 
2. 'CFLRI' ages at death are the retirement age-specific default assumptions in 
the calculator.  They are described as "Your expected lifetime is the age at 
which an average person could be expected to live to if you reach your 
retirement age", but source is not given. Female default is the same for 
retirement age 60 and 65; male varies as shown.  Note that these figures are 
lower than the approximate 24 years after age 65 the Retirement 
Commissioner's 2010 Review of Retirement Income Policy used for the 
possible lifespan of the baby boomer generation, as part-rationale for 
proposing an increase in age of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation 
(see section 9.2.2). 
 
3.  Period data from Statistics New Zealand published 2005-7 complete life 
table (the most recent complete life table as at 2009).   
 
4.  Cohort mortality table ages at deaths are expected lifespan from age 65, M65 
= 65 + e65 for cohorts born in 1960, consistent with latest available 2009-base 
projections (data provided by Statistics New Zealand November 2009). Further 
improvement to the model should be made by using cohort life expectancy 
from the actual retirement age if different from 65.  However, this data is not 
available.  It should not affect the results significantly as lifespan estimates do 
not change by a significant amount within a low number of years, as shown by 
the period life table equivalents in this table.  The effect of changing eligibility 
age of retirement from age 65 to 60 or 67 using this age at death assumption is 
illustrated in Table 9.6. 
 
5.  90th percentile age at death from distribution of actual deaths in 2009, from 
Statistics New Zealand data 
 
6.  All life expectancy measures rounded to nearest integer.   
 
Underestimating lifespans? Why longevity risk exists  Chapter 9 
 
329 
Modal age at death from the latest period table adds further improvement 
to the period life expectancy measure, getting close to cohort life expectancy.  
It is therefore a useful proxy for cohort lifespan at this age, and could be used 
if full cohort tables were not available. To introduce greater conservatism, or a 
margin for the possibility of further mortality improvement, higher age at 
death assumptions could be used.  For example, the 90th percentile of the 
current distribution of ages at death would increase the assumption a further 
one or two years.  Advice on age at death assumption is important as the SLS 
of the adult New Zealand population underestimates likely actual age at 
death.  The advice available from the CFLRI also underestimates.  Because the 
definition of the measure is so important for getting close to a likely age at 
death measure, it is important that public information on likely ages at death 
does use theoretically accurate measures. 
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Table 9.6: Sizing the effect of longevity risk on retirement plans 
 Monthly savings required, in dollars, to meet 
retirement income objective of 70 per cent of pre-
retirement income using assumption for age at 
death and other assumptions as in notes 
 
Female Male 

















1,496 415 178 1,248 244 24 
Median SLS 
 
1,496 415 178 1,383 337 108 








1,496 429 190 1,431 385 151 
Modal age at 
death 




at age 65 
1,573 468 226 1,536 442 203 
Low mortality 
cohort lifespan 
at age 65 
1,591 480 237 1,555 455 214 
90th percentile 
of age of actual 
deaths, 2009 
1,624 503 258 1,573 468 226 
See notes on following page. 
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Notes to Table 9.6: 
1. Calculations from Comprehensive Retirement calculator on Sorted website 
www.sorted.org.nz performed May 2011.   
 
2. Illustrative case is a single person, born January 1960 with an annual income 
of $40,000 (approximately median wages and salaries, New Zealand Income 
Survey: June 2009, Table 12, Statistics New Zealand).  Changing age of 
individual changes the amount needed to be saved but not the proportional 
change in saving needed for changes in age at death. 
 
3. The calculator default assumptions are used as at time of carrying out 
calculation: total retirement income objective is 70 per cent of pre-retirement 
pre-tax income after tax, New Zealand Superannuation of $17,676 per annum 
will be available from age 65 and net real rate of return from savings is 3.6 per 
cent (for a 17.5 per cent tax payer in a Portfolio Investment Entity).  Results are 
in current dollars.  Other assumptions made within the calculator not stated.  
No additional investment lump sums, housing assets or mortgages were 
included in the calculation in order to focus only on the change in savings 
required when assumed age at death changes.  
 
4. Monthly savings computed are in dollars from age 50 to the assumed age of 
retirement.  For retirement at age 67, NZS payments from age 65 are assumed 
to be accumulated and used to contribute towards retirement income. 
 
5.  See also notes to Table 9.5. 
 
Looking first at the example woman intending to retire at age 65, the 
CFLRI's recommendation for expected age at death is the same as the model 
and median SLS found in the New Zealand adult population.  If retirement did 
take place at age 65, but age at death turned out to be that predicted by the 
average from the Medium Mortality cohort table, then monthly savings 
towards retirement should have been $468 rather than $415.  For an 
unexpected increase in age at death of four years, savings would fall short by 
11 per cent.  If age at death turned out to be one year later at the average from 
the low mortality cohort table, or a further year later at the 90th percentile of 
New Zealand ages at death, then the shortfall would be 14 per cent or 17 per 
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cent respectively.  For the example man, the CFLRI's recommendation for 
expected age at death is higher than the modal and median SLS found for the 
New Zealand adult population.  To take the extreme case shown in the table, a 
man expecting to die at the modal SLS of 75, but who actually turned out to 
live to the 90th percentile of actual deaths at age 89, would have a shortfall in 
retirement savings of 21 per cent if he intended to and did retire at age 60 or a 
shortfall of 48 per cent with retirement at age 65.  Table 9.6 confirms that a 
greater contribution to longevity risk comes from using a period indicator for 
lifespan instead of a cohort indicator than by changing mortality improvement 
scenario in the cohort indicator.  This result holds for individuals born ten 
years earlier or later than the example shown here (calculations not shown). 
 
Retiring later makes a large difference to retirement finances.  Most New 
Zealanders choose when asked a retirement age assumption of either 65 rather 
than 60 (Figure 9.1).  This choice has a greater impact in required savings than 
any change in assumption in age at death illustrated in Table 9.6 for a given 
intended retirement age.  Retiring later increases the number of years when 
savings could be made and reduces the number of years that retirement funds 
have to cover income needs.  An increase in retirement age to age 67 from age 
65 cuts the amount of savings required on any of the age at death assumptions 
by at least half.  For some New Zealanders, a retirement age of 67 may turn out 
to be realistic than an increase in regular saving to meet the same retirement 
income goal.    
 
The association between SLS and intended retirement age (Table 9.1) 
means that an expectation of a lower than likely actual lifespan may have a 
double negative effect on retirement finances: by not saving enough for likely 
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length of retirement and by starting retirement too early.  However the 
sensitivity to age at death assumption, and therefore the effect of longevity 
risk, increases with higher retirement age.  The quantum of risk for New 
Zealanders in financial planning for retirement from a low intended retirement 
age is greater than longevity risk from underestimating likely age at death, but 
the remedy of a higher retirement age intention brings with it a greater 
significance of longevity risk.   
 
New Zealand Superannuation is available as the first tier of income, so a 
shortfall of retirement savings should not mean absolute poverty for most.  
Further, for any individual facing a shortfall in savings, the option may exist of 
retiring later than expected.  Thus, longevity risk is present in New 
Zealanders' individual retirement plans, but may not be financially significant 
for all.  There is an additional, linked, and likely more significant risk from 
intending to retire too early.  The financial impact may be able to be mitigated 
by saving more or working longer than intended.  However, in some cases, the 
financial impact could be severely negative, and mitigating actions may not be 
available when they are needed.  Therefore, even if longevity risk is not always 
significant for individuals, addressing the risks of longer than intended 
retirement would be of benefit to New Zealanders.  The natural forum for 
theoretically correct and plausible measures of likely future lifespans that 
policy debate around eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation would 
provide would help to address such risks.  
  




New Zealanders think less about financial planning for retirement than about 
how long they are going to live.  Expectations for retirement age are 
concentrated around age 65, whereas expectations for age at death cover a 
wider range.  Few people appear to have thought about length of retirement 
even if they have a financial plan for retirement.  The lengths of retirement 
people implicitly expect vary widely.  Individual New Zealanders suffer 
longevity risk in their own retirement planning when they assume implausibly 
low age at death; and the financial risk is often exacerbated by low intended 
retirement ages. 
 
Because socio-economic position is positively associated with subjective 
lifespan but inversely related to retirement intentions, socio-economic 
disparities in implied length of retirement are magnified.  People in higher 
socio-economic groups are more likely to expect to retire at 65 or earlier, and, 
probably relying on genes or family history, expect a longer than median 
lifespan and, implicitly, a retirement that is at least ten years or more.  People 
in lower socio-economic groups are more likely to expect to work until 70 or 
beyond, and perhaps through lack of knowledge, assume a low SLS, so that 
implied length of retirement is likely to be short; less than ten years.  
Longevity risk exists whatever the implied length of retirement, but seems 
greatest for people who expect both a short retirement and a short lifespan.  
The risk of having lower than expected retirement income will be 
compounded for people in this group who find they are not able to correct 
their early retirement intention when they need to by continuing to work in 
later life.   
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Longevity risk within New Zealand's public pension policy is greater than 
that in those of the British settler countries used as comparators for this thesis 
which have started to raise eligibility age for the main public pension (USA) or 
have plans to do so (Australia, UK).  This is because there are no plans to 
increase eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation.  This policy is the 
most direct form of addressing the increasing fiscal cost of superannuation 
caused by increasing longevity.  While it can be argued that there is no 
requirement to raise the age of eligibility provided the increasing cost can be 
borne, not doing so leaves the future cost of NZS more exposed to future 
unexpected increases in longevity than if a schedule of future increases in 
eligibility age were planned.   
 
Estimates of future fiscal cost of NZS made by Treasury's Long-term Fiscal 
Model apparently yield politically acceptable results.  However, the risk is that 
future mortality is better than assumed in the single scenario used: costs will in 
fact be greater than expected.  A planned rise in eligibility age would be some 
insurance against this outcome which is likely according to the examination in 
this thesis of the plausibility of suggested future mortality trends.  In fact, the 
increased cost from the likely outcome would be covered by an increase in 
eligibility age to 67, even on a slower timetable than other countries.  Thus 
longevity risk in New Zealand is also present as a result of failing to use a 
plausible range of mortality projections.   
 
That New Zealand's public debate on eligibility age is relatively late and 
limited in nature is a further contributor to longevity risk.  Where individual 
New Zealanders make unrealistically low assumptions for retirement age or 
lifespan, policy makers can help by providing signposts for both parameters.  
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Eligibility age for NZS is a strong signal for intended retirement age, and the 
greater risk for New Zealanders in financial planning for retirement is from a 
low intended retirement age rather than longevity risk from underestimating 
likely age at death.   
 
A wider debate about raising eligibility age would offer the opportunity 
for introducing the best available evidence on likely future lifespans into 
public discourse, improving from the flawed and underestimated data points 
most commonly referenced.  This means referencing modal age at death, from 
period or cohort tables, or projected cohort life expectancies at the relevant age 
at least on the Medium Mortality basis, instead of the more common period 
measures.  The potential for further lifespan improvement can be 
communicated by additionally referencing indicators from the Low Mortality 
scenario.  However, the definition of the measure is more important for getting 
close to a likely age at death measure than the choice of mortality scenario.   
 
This research was not directed at answering the question of whether New 
Zealand should have a higher eligibility age for its public pension.  Other 
issues would also have to be addressed, such as preferences and equity 
considerations for spending on providing additional leisure years for older 
people compared to other potential demands.  However, these findings 
provide evidence for a longevity rationale for raising eligibility age; suggest a 
potentially more compelling presentation of the policy than so far used in New 
Zealand, based on the individual perspective; and demonstrate the additional 
benefit of the policy from the mitigation of longevity risk.  




Chapter 10: Conclusions and implications 
Longevity risk - the risk that future lifespans turn out to have been 
underestimated - is known as a potential threat to individual retirement 
planning and policy making.  Demographers and actuaries have analysed past 
mortality trends and theorised about future mortality patterns, understanding 
the inherent uncertainty in forecasting future mortality and the recent history 
of underestimating population average lifespan.  This thesis has probed some 
unanswered questions about why longevity risk should exist when a great 
deal of intellectual activity is taken up with projecting future mortality, and, 
using New Zealand as an example population, specifically examined the 
extent to which underestimation of likely future lifespans occurs and the 
consequences for longevity risk. 
 
The starting hypothesis was that there are structural reasons in the way 
lifespans are measured and communicated that lead to longevity risk in both 
individual retirement planning and policy making settings.  This chapter 
describes the findings of this thesis that confirm this hypothesis and illustrate 
the New Zealand case.  It shows that, first, longevity risk is inherent and likely 
widespread when mortality is improving; second, that the relatively positive 
mortality outlook for New Zealand means future lifespans are likely to turn 
out better than the main official estimate; third, that New Zealanders 
underestimate likely lifespans; and fourth, that lifespan indicators used in 
public discourse may hold the key to reducing longevity risk in both 
individual planning and policy domains.  A final section summarises the 
contribution to theory this thesis has made. 




10.1 Longevity risk inherent and widespread  
Longevity risk is known to be a threat in public pension policy, even after 
reforms to tackle ageing such as raising the age of eligibility of public 
pensions, and in individual retirement planning.  In neither domain has the 
extent, causes and consequences of longevity risk been well investigated.  
Limited empirical evidence from survey data in the United Kingdom and 
United States of America suggests lifespans are more often underestimated 
that otherwise. 
 
Longevity risk is more likely to exist now than in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Then, mortality rates were fairly stable in most developed countries or even 
slightly worsening.  Now, mortality rates are improving and average lifespans 
are lengthening.  Moreover, it is well known amongst demographers and 
actuaries that the pattern of mortality trends is changing: there has been 
unexpected rapid improvement in mortality rates at older ages in developed 
countries since the 1980s.  The consequences of these patterns for future trends 
are a source of active debate, but the consensus among demographers and 
actuaries is for further gains in average lifespan.  All mortality forecasting is 
essentially extrapolation of past trends.  When mortality is improving, over-
reliance on extrapolation without due consideration of potential changes in 
trend is likely to lead to underestimation of future lifespans; and has done so 
in developed countries since the 1980s.   
 
It is known in demographic and actuarial theory and practice that period 
life expectancy, at any age but especially at birth, is a flawed measure of actual 
lifespans, being better suited as a summary indicator of population average 
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mortality experience at a point in time.  Cohort life expectancy allows for 
changing mortality rates during the lifecourse of a defined birth cohort and is 
therefore closer to the intuitive meaning of what lifespan an individual should 
expect.  Despite this, cohort measures are rarely used, whereas period life 
expectancy at birth is used in many settings, including in official mortality 
projections.  Existing literature does not explore the consequences of the 
almost universal use of period measures in public discourse.  However, one 
consequence is demonstrated here: the misuse of period life expectancy, 
especially life expectancy at birth, to set individual lifespan expectations in 
informal and formal settings in New Zealand and elsewhere.  Period measures 
will be lower than the more appropriate cohort measures of lifespan when 
mortality is improving, and will increase more slowly.  Therefore, such misuse 
contributes to a structural reason for lifespans to be underestimated.  The 
reason for such misuse is conjectured here to stem from the original naming of 
'expectation of life' in a setting which no longer applies.  The more appropriate 
cohort measures are available in New Zealand, the UK and other countries 
with an actuarial input to forecasting but are widely referenced for policy 
making and in public discourse only in the UK.   
 
Furthermore, period life expectancy is increasingly problematic as a 
measure of likely lifespans in countries where its value is high, over 80 years, 
and mortality is shifting and compressing.  As the shape of the distribution of 
ages at death changes, life expectancy at birth, the average of the distribution, 
becomes less useful as a single indicator of change.  In these circumstances, 
modal age at death is sensitive to changes in mortality at the oldest ages, and 
will be higher than period life expectancy at birth, even within the same period 
life table.  In countries including New Zealand which are advanced on the 
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path to mortality compression with mortality change taking place at the oldest 
ages, the mode is an increasingly useful measure of the central tendency of 
population age at death.    
 
Because available data suggests a tendency to underestimate future 
lifespans by both individuals (in subjective longevity expectations) and policy 
makers (in the mortality projections provided to them by official agencies), 
there is likely to be widespread longevity risk in individual retirement 
planning and policy making settings.  Furthermore, there appears to be a 
culprit in the almost ubiquitous measure of lifespan proven as flawed and of 
diminishing usefulness.  However, to confirm or otherwise the hypothesis that 
this contributes to a structural reason for longevity risk, further exploration 
was made into the lifespan assumptions prevalent in policy making and 
retirement planning, taking New Zealand as a case example. 
 
10.2 Future mortality outlook in New Zealand positive 
Longevity risk is exacerbated if public information on future mortality or 
lifespan is conservative, that is, underestimates lifespans.  Public information 
on future lifespans is sourced in most countries from official statistical 
agencies.  These agencies use similar mathematical techniques to extrapolate 
assumed future trends in mortality rates from past trends.   
 
However, new doubts about relying purely on extrapolation are beginning 
to be expressed.  The fast pace of mortality improvement at older ages and the 
changing shape of the distribution of ages at death produces a situation never 
seen before which may presage a break from the hitherto smooth 
improvement in average population lifespan.  Moreover, demographic theory 
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attempting to explain the variance of lifespan within populations is only now 
emerging.  This theory also sows doubt on whether simple extrapolation of 
average mortality measures from past to future can still be a valid basis for 
mortality projections in high life expectancy countries like New Zealand.   
 
Uncertainty about future lifespans is therefore increasing.  The uncertainty 
is about the pace of future mortality improvement; the question is how to 
estimate it.  Understanding past mortality trends has long been considered a 
necessary activity before attempting to forecast future population mortality, 
although the extent to which such analysis influences official projections of 
future mortality is hard to appreciate from published reports.  There is no one 
formula to which one can refer to predict future age at death for an individual 
or for the average of a population.  There are too many possible contributory 
factors - environmental, genetic, behavioural and medical - with an overlay of 
randomness.  It is not possible to quantify the potential future population 
mortality risk from single causes.  Only smoking with its single main cause of 
death has a reliable past evidence base of causation.  Therefore, instead of 
accumulating evidence on past causes of death as a source of insight to 
supplement pure extrapolation, international comparisons of past average 
population mortality trends are recommended.  However, such analysis is 
rarely carried out, and any reported on in support of official mortality 
projections appears cursory.   
 
This thesis has carried out detailed analysis of New Zealand's mortality 
compared to that of its British settler country peers.  Mortality in New Zealand 
ranks in the middle of the groups of British settler countries selected for this 
analysis, the others being Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
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United States of America (US).  This is the case looking at both the level of 
mortality rates and period life expectancy at birth used here in its appropriate 
form as a summary measure of all-ages population mortality at points in time.  
There is slightly better mortality in Canada and still better mortality in 
Australia.  There is slightly worse mortality in the UK and still worse in the 
US.  In all these countries mortality rates are lower and life expectancy is 
higher for females than males.  Relative to the other countries, New Zealand's 
mortality appears comparatively better for females than males. 
 
Although the 1960s were a decade of slow or no improvement in 
mortality, there has since been constant improvement in all countries.  The 
improvement in all-age mortality rates over the 45 years, standardised to the 
New Zealand population age profile by gender was 1.3 per cent for both males 
and females in the US; 1.6 per cent in the UK; and 1.7 per cent for New 
Zealand.  The rates for Canada were 1.8 per cent for females and 2.0 per cent 
for males; from Australia 2.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively.  New 
Zealand's mortality improved over the evaluation period against Canada, the 
UK and US at ages over 40, but worsened at younger ages especially for males.  
The improvement in New Zealand's mortality accelerated for females in 1980s 
and males in 1990s.  In the last decade the rate of improvement in mortality 
rates in New Zealand was the highest of all countries for female and second 
only to the outperformance of Australia for males.  Thus the very fast 
improvement in mortality levels in Australia has been striking over the forty-
five year period, and New Zealand's recent experience has come very close.   
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Mortality analysis in actuarial literature has focused recently on the 
existence of a 'golden cohort' of people born in the UK before and during the 
Second World War who have had higher annual rates of improvement in 
mortality rates than preceding or following cohorts at each age through their 
lifetime.  The analysis in this thesis revealed that all the countries selected here 
have such a golden cohort with birth years covering the period 1922-1941.  The 
UK is unusual in that its golden cohort is most clearly defined by the extent of 
the difference to mortality improvement levels in other cohorts, but also 
because it does not have a putative younger golden cohort visible in all the 
other countries centred on birth years 1952-1976.  Relatively, New Zealand has 
had poor mortality levels at ages 1 to 20 although high rates of improvement at 
ages 15-25 in the last decade. Over the longer term of this analysis New 
Zealand has had particularly strong mortality improvement at ages over 40 
and unusually high rates of mortality improvement at ages over 75.  This bias 
towards good mortality at older ages is further indicated by New Zealand 
having had the highest increase in modal age at death among these countries 
with the most recent data showing New Zealand with the highest modal age at 
death for females.   
 
The official projections of New Zealand's future life expectancy are similar 
to those in the other countries selected for this analysis in that they are based 
on an extrapolation of past trends and therefore result in projected continued 
lengthening of average population lifespan.  The difference between 
projections of different countries is the assumed trajectory of future mortality 
improvement.  The analysis of the projections made for this thesis revealed 
generally simple and somewhat arbitrary assumptions for this trajectory.  All 
the projections are 'what-if' scenarios essentially assuming a simplified 
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continuation of the historic average mortality trend, but with different implicit 
or explicit choices made about the shape of the trajectory.  A comparison of the 
outcomes of the central projections, as measured by future life expectancy 
measures, shows that Australia retains the top ranking and the US the lowest.  
There would be no reason to suggest otherwise, given the relative positions 
each country's mortality sustained over the forty-five years of historic analysis.  
However, the mortality of Canada is projected to worsen relative to its peers, 
the UK's to improve significantly, and New Zealand's and the UK's to diverge 
even though current and past life expectancy measures have been close.  
Existing mortality analyses have provided no explanation for why this should 
be so. 
 
Instead, analysis here of the assumptions underlying New Zealand's 
mortality projections compared to those of its most relevant mortality role 
models have confirmed that New Zealand's appear relatively pessimistic.  
Underlying Australia's projections are more optimistic assumptions for future 
mortality than those made in New Zealand's because recent mortality 
improvement is given more weight than earlier, slower change.  Following this 
approach for New Zealand would increase the rate of mortality improvement 
assumed.  The UK's projections appear relatively optimistic because they allow 
for high mortality improvements in the short-term future - a path which based 
on recent experience New Zealand may be more likely to follow.  By seeking 
consistency between the assumptions and outcomes of these relevant 
comparator projections, the Low Mortality variant of Statistics New Zealand's 
projections has a plausible narrative.   
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Further analysis of aspects of New Zealand's mortality provides no 
evidence to alter this conclusion.  In particular, demographic opinion tends to 
the view that obesity will not cause average mortality levels to increase in 
future.  Increasing average body mass index in New Zealand and all 
comparator populations has coexisted with improving average mortality levels 
over recent decades.  Medical treatments and prevention appear able to reduce 
mortality risk from obesity, and improvements in non-obesity related 
mortality continue.  The rise in obesity prevalence appears to be levelling off.  
Against the potential for a surprising worsening mortality trend must be set 
the evidence for New Zealand's better fundamentals for long life than most 
countries can offer: cleaner air, lower population density and more benign 
climate.  The evidence-based reasoning presented here, based on more 
detailed analysis of past and future projected mortality than has been 
presented elsewhere, points to future mortality in New Zealand being better 
than the main official projection and plausibly like the Low Mortality variant 
of Statistics New Zealand's projections.  
 
Further testing of the robustness of this conclusion was carried out by 
applying demographic theories to draw conclusions from a comparison of 
mortality rates, life expectancy and mortality variance between 
subpopulations of the New Zealand total population over the forty-five year 
period.  Specifically, the characteristics in those parameters for the Māori 
subpopulation as compared to non-Māori and those of males compared to 
females appear as expected following these theories.  Further, the changing 
mix of migrants to New Zealand is not likely to have a large unanticipated 
impact on average mortality trends.  Thus, no evidence is available to suggest 
that mortality changes occurring within the New Zealand population are 
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likely to disturb the extrapolation of total population mortality trends.  
However, data definition inconsistencies and fluidity in the ethnic concept for 
population and death registrations make it difficult to interpret trends and 
absolute values of mortality by ethnicity in New Zealand.  Importantly, the 
reliance on period life tables and lack of reliable cohort life expectancies by 
ethnicity means that the available period life expectancies for Māori and non-
Māori understate actual lifespans and will likely overstate the gap between 
realistic average lifespans of these ethnic groups.   
 
Consideration of demographic theories of mortality or age at death 
variance confirmed that variation will remain: it is an inherent characteristic of 
mortality.  Although epidemiologic studies have focused on the socio-
economic drivers of mortality variation, these do not provide a complete 
explanation of cause or consequence.  On one measure of age at death variance 
which standardises for level of life expectancy, New Zealand appears to have 
somewhat low variance for men but high for women, within the groups of 
comparator British settler countries.  A reduction in mortality at young ages 
would reduce the level of variance in age at death in New Zealand although it 
would not improve average all-age measures such as period life expectancy by 
any significant amount.  Given New Zealand's poor relative levels of mortality 
rates at ages 1-20, policy actions to reduce deaths at these ages, such as 
tackling road traffic and other accidents are justified.  However, demographic 
theory suggests that age at death variance may increase in future in countries 
well advanced on the path to mortality compression because of increasing 
heterogeneity of frailty as more people survive to the oldest ages.  This would 
be true in the case of New Zealand, especially given its relatively good 
mortality at older ages.   




Thus at this current phase of emerging theory and limited empirical data, 
and assuming efforts are made to tackle mortality differences where causes 
can be isolated, the picture of mortality variance appears to lend support for 
relative and absolute optimism about future population mortality in New 
Zealand, and the Low Mortality variant projection to be more likely than the 
Medium Mortality estimate.  The latter is more commonly used, and where it 
is referenced, future lifespans are likely to be underestimated and longevity 
risk therefore exists. 
 
10.3 New Zealanders underestimate likely lifespans 
Subjective longevity expectations, that is, how long people think they are likely 
to live, should be an important element of individuals' own retirement 
planning.  Further, the subjective view of policy makers on the outlook for 
longevity may colour their interpretation of demographic data and policy 
decisions made using it.  However, there has been no data on longevity 
expectations in New Zealand, and few large sample surveys on the subject 
internationally.  The mechanisms by which people set their expectations are 
not understood.  Differences in expectations, the accuracy of expectations, or 
what factors cause people to have those expectations have not been well 
explored.  This thesis addressed these research gaps with a review of existing 
literature to extract findings relevant to a national population and a detailed 
survey of the lifespan expectations of adult new Zealanders.    
 
Studies based on surveys asking for individuals' expectations for their 
own longevity are found in the literature of actuarial science, anthropology, 
demographics, economics, health studies, policy, psychology and statistics.  Of 
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the reports of findings based on surveys of "subjective life expectancy" or 
"subjectivity probability of survival" only six were from original large datasets 
of longevity expectations using national adult population samples. These 
either originated in the UK or US.  Only one survey, from Great Britain, 
covered all adult ages, had no other limitation of scope and quantified the gap 
between given subjective lifespan and life expectancy as measured by a 
population life table for each respondent by age and gender.  This single study 
(O'Brien et al. 2005) was not in a peer-reviewed journal, but found that on 
average subjective lifespan as given was slightly below contemporary period 
life tables, but more significantly below the population cohort measures which 
allowed for the then best estimate of future improvement in mortality, at 
around four years on average for males and six years for females.  The authors 
concluded that people had a sense of a prevailing wisdom based on current 
period measures of life expectancy but did not appreciate that the future was 
likely to bring improving mortality.  The accumulated evidence from the other 
studies pointed to people holding subjective longevity expectations congruent 
to contemporary period tables and so exhibiting a prevailing tendency to 
underestimate potential longevity more than overestimate.  Longevity risk 
therefore existed in all these samples.   
 
The survey of subjective lifespan expectations carried out in New Zealand 
confirmed the hypothesis that a similar pattern of underestimation of lifespans 
exists.  Subjective lifespan (SLS) was captured by asking "'What age do you 
think you will live to?" to a sample representative of the New Zealand adult 
population (n=850).  Average underestimation of lifespans was around four 
years compared to Statistics New Zealand's Medium Mortality cohort table 
and over five years for males and over seven years for females compared to 
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the cohort measures from the Low Mortality projection which this thesis 
proposes as the most plausible variant.  The proportions of adult New 
Zealanders underestimating their SLS based on the period table contemporary 
to the survey was 45 per cent, with 25 per cent giving SLS congruent to the 
table and 30 per cent overestimating.  Using the Medium Mortality projection 
for future mortality improvement, those figures are respectively, 56, 24 and 20 
per cent.  Compared to the preferred Low Mortality projection, 65 per cent of 
adult New Zealanders underestimated their lifespan, 20 per cent gave 
congruent SLS and 15 per cent overestimated.  Thus, when asked for their 
likely age at death, more adult New Zealanders give answers that 
underestimate what is considered likely in population age- and gender-
specific population projections of future lifespans than give higher answers or 
answers close to the projections.  The maximum underestimation of SLS was 
30 years on the Low Mortality cohort table.  Underestimation of lifespans in 
New Zealand is therefore widespread and can be significant.    
 
As appeared to be the case in previous surveys, it is likely that New 
Zealanders take cues for their likely lifespan from the contemporary pattern of 
deaths in the population.  The female distribution of SLS had a single, strong 
peak at age 85.  The male distribution was flat from 75 to 85.  Both features are 
similar in the distribution of age of deaths contemporary to the survey, 
although the male SLS tended towards age 75 more than the actual 
distribution.  Within six months before this survey, life expectancy at birth 
from the most recent complete period life table (2005-7) had been publicised in 
New Zealand, erroneously, as what should be expected as a lifespan for those 
recently born: 82 years for females and 78 years for males.  The evidence from 
this New Zealand survey is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals 
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form lifespan expectations without appreciating likely future mortality 
improvement; and that indicators in the public domain exert some influence. 
 
Subgroups of male New Zealanders appeared both over-pessimistic and 
over-optimistic about SLS: higher proportions of men than women gave SLS at 
both low and high extremes.  Both subgroups were associated with low 
financial knowledge.  Individuals aged under age 30 were more likely to 
underestimate than older people; the effect of unanticipated mortality 
improvement accumulates for longer for younger people.  Other than age and 
gender, no other demographic mortality risk factors appear salient predictors 
of underestimation. 
 
By asking why respondents chose their SLS, new insights emerged on how 
longevity expectations are formed.  Great diversity in reasoning was apparent, 
so no one model for how the population thinks about SLS is appropriate.  
Three quarters of the New Zealand adult population reason their SLS on the 
basis of external, given factors or none; only one quarter reason on the basis of 
personal risk factors which they could influence.  This appears to underplay 
the actual likely impact on mortality risk of lifestyle and behaviour.  Within 
the larger group, few believe their SLS is 'normal', with most either putting 
faith in their genes or in a variation of lifespan being 'out of their hands'.  
Therefore, information on likely future population average SLS may simply 
not be believed by many without some other narrative or rationale.   
 
The risk of underestimating lifespan appeared to be strongly associated 
with the reason behind choosing SLS.  Those who do not have a reason, or 
who give a reason on the basis of their SLS being normal or who cite their own 
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bad mortality risk factors are more likely to give a low or very low SLS.  All 
could be at risk of underestimating lifespan; the latter group are still are at risk 
if their perception of bad mortality risk is incorrect.  Those who cite good risk 
factors or genes or family history of lifespan are more likely to choose a high 
SLS but may still underestimate.  The extent to which perceived 'good' risk 
factors will extend longevity may not be fully appreciated.  Those basing their 
SLS on parents' or grandparents' lifespan may not allow sufficiently for 
mortality improvement over time.  Those choosing the lowest SLS may turn 
out to have actual lifespan in the lower range, but still have longevity risk from 
living longer than they expect, and may not have money saved for retirement 
because this group is also associated with having low financial knowledge or 
low net worth.  Those who choose the highest SLS are also more likely to have 
low financial knowledge, suggesting that they may be a group of confident 
optimists rather than accurate predictors or planners.  Whether or not they 
turn out to live as long as they expect, their longevity risk may arise from poor 
financial planning for retirement.   
 
The survey revealed how infrequently New Zealanders incorporate 
lifespan expectations into retirement planning.  Financial planning for 
retirement is given some thought by just over half the adult population, 
whereas just over two thirds have thought about the age to which they will 
live.  However, only around one quarter suggested SLS as a factor to be 
considered in retirement planning.  Therefore, in thinking about ways to 
mitigate longevity risk within retirement planning, it might be considered a 
first priority to encourage the activity of retirement planning, and then how to 
offer realistic assumptions for the necessary planning parameters which 
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should include the length of retirement: a function of retirement age and age at 
death. 
 
New Zealanders' stated expectations for likely retirement age are, for the 
majority, either age 60 or age 65.  The duration of retirement people expect can 
be calculated from subtracting stated expected retirement age from SLS, but 
because of the lack of thought about retirement planning, the resulting value 
can only be called "implied" length of retirement.  A narrow range of expected 
retirement ages co-exists with a wide range of implied length of retirement.  
Implied retirement duration expected by New Zealanders fell into three 
equally-sized groups: up to and including 10 years, 11 to 20 years and 21 to 40 
years.  Longevity risk can exist whatever the implied length of retirement.  
Some people expect too short a retirement than they are likely to experience; 
explicitly or implicitly, including some cases of not having a retirement plan.  
The risk in expecting a short retirement is not being able to find or be able to 
do the work they expect to have at older ages; or in finding that their 
retirement income does not last if they do live longer than they expect.  Those 
expecting a long retirement may not appreciate the large amount of savings 
needed to provide an income for that long, and they may be unrealistic about 
either or both of their assumed low retirement age and SLS.   Thus for many 
New Zealanders expectations for retirement age and age at death are either 
not used in retirement planning or are used unrealistically.  Longevity risk - 
the risk of 'dying too late' - is compounded by the risk of ’retiring too early’. 
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10.4 Lifespan indicators key to reducing longevity risk 
Public pension policy exerts a strong influence on retirement planning as it 
sets eligibility age for the public pension, which appears to be a very strong 
driver for intended retirement age.  Further, subjective lifespan expectations 
appear to be made following cues from information on lifespans referenced in 
public discourse, and these indicators come from the same official statistical 
agency which provides policy makers with the mortality data for their 
economic modelling.  The most commonly used lifespan measures have been 
shown here to be underestimates of potential lifespans and the most 
commonly used scenarios of population mortality projections shown to be 
conservative in the case of New Zealand.  The sources of longevity risk in New 
Zealand have therefore been explored within policy for eligibility age for New 
Zealand Superannuation; within the projection data used for estimates of 
future likely lifespans in policy making and within indicators used in public 
discourse on likely future lifespans.   
 
Not increasing eligibility age increases longevity risk 
There are currently (late 2011) no plans to increase eligibility age for New 
Zealand Superannuation (NZS); indeed such a change has been ruled out by 
the current government.  However, an increase in eligibility age would 
directly address the increasing fiscal cost of superannuation caused by 
increasing longevity.  Of the British settler countries used as comparators to 
New Zealand in this thesis, the US has started to raise eligibility age for its 
main public pension from 65 to 67; Australia plans to do so and the UK plans 
to raise the age still further to 68.  Longevity risk within public pension policy 
in New Zealand is therefore greater than that in these countries, and especially 
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compared to the UK and US as New Zealand's mortality is lower and 
improving faster.   
 
The given reason for not increasing New Zealand's eligibility age is that 
estimates of the future fiscal cost of NZS yield acceptable results.  However, 
these costs, estimated using Treasury's Long-Term Fiscal Model, refer to a 
single scenario for future mortality: Statistics New Zealand's Medium 
Mortality.  According to the results of this thesis, a more plausible outlook for 
future mortality is more optimistic.  It is therefore likely that the fiscal costs of 
NZS will be higher than modelled.  Longevity risk in policy planning is 
introduced from using a conservative mortality scenario.  A planned rise in 
eligibility age would be some insurance against this longevity risk.  In fact, an 
increase in eligibility age to 67, even on a slower timetable than other countries 
are planning, has been estimated to cover the increase in cost from the lower 
mortality envisaged in the more plausible scenario, compared to the single 
scenario used.  Thus there is longevity risk in New Zealand Superannuation 
policy, greater than that in other countries, from failure to plan to increase 
eligibility age and compounded by failing to use a plausible range of mortality 
projections.   
 
Conservatism in future mortality projections 
The reliance on a single central estimate for future mortality as input to fiscal 
cost modelling for policy purposes is not confined to New Zealand.  It is 
common practice in most countries.  Official projections of future mortality 
appear technically detailed and are the result of a great deal of modelling 
activity which is difficult for the non expert user to understand let alone 
challenge.  The need to understand the detailed analysis is belied by the 
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inevitably rather arbitrary choice of assumptions for future projections; but 
this may not be obvious to a user.  The nuanced perspective of the 
demographer distinguishing between "forecast" and "projection" may not be 
appreciated.  The non-expert user may be misled into thinking that the 
complexities of forecasting have been considered by the experts, and that their 
central estimate represents a single best estimate.  Generally "Low" and "High" 
variants are chosen to represent an arbitrary equal difference in mortality 
improvement rates on either side of the central estimate, so shed limited light 
on the potential range of outcomes. The handover of official evidence on 
future lifespans from official statistical agency to policy maker therefore tends 
to result in the use of a single projection based on unquestioned assumptions.  
There is generally no detailed analysis made available which could help a non-
expert user to decide which future scenarios for mortality should be tested for 
fiscal consequences.  Fuller data, including less conservative projections which 
may actually represent more plausible future mortality paths, is lost.   
 
Further, in New Zealand and other countries, the official agency appears 
to prefer not to present the results of mortality projections in terms of future 
cohort life expectancies.  This is a conservative approach, as if too much 
reliance should not be put on the underlying assumptions of future mortality 
change in the cohort measures; even though these assumptions are identical to 
those underlying the official projections.  This may be a consequence of the 
statistical agency's primary role in making projections being to estimate the 
size of the national population.  Mortality is only one element alongside 
fertility and migration in the population projections.  In the case of New 
Zealand, the statistical agency specifically warns against using its mortality 
assumptions  "as a precise measure of mortality" and states that the "objective 
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of population projections is not to specifically measure or project the life 
expectancy of the population" (Statistics New Zealand 2009a).  Yet naturally, 
there is great interest in what are assumed to be measures of lifespan; they are 
referenced widely and often misunderstood.   
 
This preference not to publish cohort measures leads to a reliance on the 
available period measures.  These, by definition, assume there will be no 
change in mortality rates in future.  In the current era of improving mortality 
this assumption is not just conservative but unlikely.  The persistent rate of 
mortality improvement in the countries selected for this analysis confirms that 
past period life expectancies cannot be relevant historic lifespan indicators, 
and the shared assumptions of continued mortality improvement mean that 
projected period life expectancies cannot be relevant future lifespan measures.  
Longevity risk is introduced by setting period life expectancy measures, which 
underestimate lifespans, as the most usual form of public information about 
lifespans. 
 
Indicators in public discourse on future lifespans underestimate 
Where individual New Zealanders make unrealistically low assumptions for 
retirement age and lifespan, policy makers can help by providing signposts for 
both parameters.  Again, eligibility age for New Zealand Superannuation is 
critical.  It is a strong signal for intended retirement age, and the greater risk 
for New Zealanders in financial planning for retirement is from a low intended 
retirement age rather than longevity risk from underestimating likely age at 
death.   
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Further, as has happened in other countries, a wider debate than has been 
held so far in New Zealand about raising eligibility age would offer the 
opportunity for introducing the best available evidence on likely future 
lifespans into public discourse, improving from the flawed and 
underestimated data points most commonly referenced.  This means 
referencing projected cohort life expectancies at the relevant age at least on the 
Medium Mortality basis, instead of the more common period measures.  The 
potential for further lifespan improvement can be communicated by 
additionally referencing indicators on the Low Mortality scenario or indicators 
of the extreme ends of the distribution of current ages at death.   
 
The contribution to underestimation of lifespans from using a flawed 
measure - period as opposed to cohort - is greater than the contribution from 
using a more plausible assumption for future mortality than the almost 
universally used medium estimate.  Illustrating with Statistics New Zealand 
data points that might be used in retirement planning by an individual born in 
1960, a lifespan thought to be appropriate by reference to the latest period life 
expectancy at birth would be an underestimate of eight (female) or ten (male) 
years compared to the year of birth-specific cohort measure on the plausible 
(Low Mortality) scenario. Assuming survival to the age of retirement intention 
(that is using period life expectancy at retirement age) improves on assuming 
the period life expectancy at birth measure by adding four years for females 
and five for males.  The remainder of the shortfall is made up by using the 
year of birth-specific cohort measure on the plausible scenario, but all but one 
of these years comes from the change from period to cohort measure, rather 
than from the choice of scenario of future mortality improvement.   
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New Zealanders' subjective longevity expectations are chosen for a variety 
of reasons, and public information on potential future lifespans may not be 
believed or acted on by everyone.  However, the definition of the measure is 
important for getting close to a likely age at death measure.  In an era of 
improving mortality, individuals may not appreciate that their own likely 
lifespan is longer than their parents, grandparents or what they see around 
them at the current time.  It seems an obvious responsibility of demographers, 
actuaries and official users of the data to ensure the indicators in public 
discourse are theoretically robust and plausible, and to carry the message that 
longevity is improving. 
 
In Australia, the official actuarial projections of future mortality (AGA 
2009) are based on two variants rather than three, which is likely to be a better 
prompt for the user to make an informed decision which one to use rather take 
the easy decision to use the central estimate out of three.  In the UK, the 
presentation of future mortality projections  is made in terms of cohort life 
expectancies by the official statistical agency and the government department 
responsible for pension policy (DWP 2011; ONS 2009).  Modal age at death is 
rarely if ever used as an indicator of population lifespan yet it is simple, easily 
available and less likely than period measures to underestimate.  Each of these 
actions would go some way to mitigate the systemic problem of 
underestimation caused either by over-reliance on life expectancy at birth as a 
lifespan indicator or over reliance on a conservative central projection of future 
mortality.  Each is possible in New Zealand.   
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Mortality is inherently uncertain.  An individual cannot predict the age of 
his or her own death, and a demographer or actuary cannot give a policy 
maker an accurate prediction of average future lifespans.  Yet the indicators of 
potential lifespans in public discourse are nearly always flawed.  The result of 
these flaws acts in one direction:  to communicate low estimates compared to 
what is likely.  The innate conservatism of projections of future lifespans by 
demographers, and the failure of policy makers to question the underlying 
assumptions of the main projection offered, leads to further underestimation.  
Longevity risk is the result, both in individual retirement planning and policy 
domains.  Longevity risk exists in New Zealand, more so than in other 
countries which are planning to increase eligibility age of the public pension.  
Increasing the eligibility age of New Zealand Superannuation would itself 
help to mitigate longevity risk.  Whether or not the age is raised a more active 
public debate on the issue would give the opportunity for technically correct 
indicators of future increasing lifespans to be set into public consciousness.   
 
10.5 Contribution to theory 
This thesis has explored the existence, causation and remedies for longevity 
risk in two under-explored domains:  individual retirement planning and 
public pension policy.  In doing so, it has taken a new theoretical perspective 
on measures of lifespan; extended existing demographic and actuarial theories 
to undertake original research on past mortality and lifespan prospects in New 
Zealand; built on an existing body of research on subjective lifespan 
expectations in a new setting, and accumulated theory and empirical findings 
to diagnose longevity risk and suggest remedies applicable in the general case 
as well as in New Zealand. 
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New theoretical perspective on measures of lifespan 
Brief acknowledgement of the shortcomings of period life expectancy to 
represent potential lifespan or to indicate population mortality trends in high 
life expectancy countries can be found within existing literature. 
Supplementary measures such as modal age of death or cohort measures are 
known as theoretically superior.  Modal age at death and other life table based 
measures have been subject to limited empirical analysis but are not used 
practically.  There have been applications of cohort life expectancy, to some 
extent in New Zealand and especially so in the UK. 
 
In this thesis such commentary on the theoretical shortcomings of period 
life expectancy measures, especially period life expectancy at birth, has been 
brought together and developed to confirm the critical contribution these 
flaws make towards longevity risk.  It has been demonstrated that period 
measures of life expectancy are used widely for a purpose they are 
increasingly not suited to, especially in high life expectancy countries like New 
Zealand.  This conclusion has additionally drawn on empirical evidence of the 
flawed use of period measures, the well-known demographic theory of 
mortality compression and emerging demographic theories of mortality 
variance.  It has led to a conclusion that longevity risk will be inherent in high 
life expectancy countries where period measures of life expectancy are the 
main descriptor of population lifespan. 
 
Additional theoretical work in this thesis has brought together emerging 
demographic theory on variance in mortality or age at death.  It has juxtaposed 
the purpose of mortality variance analysis within epidemiology and public 
health disciplines to identify the association of variance in health inequalities 
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and socio-economic position with the proof from demographic theory that 
variation in mortality or lifespan is inherent.  Further, it has drawn 
implications for the validity of extrapolative forecasting of mortality from 
demographic studies showing associations between mortality parameters: 
declining variation in total lifespan as life expectancy increases, increasing 
variance in remaining lifespan at older ages and differential gains in life 
expectancy depending on how advanced populations are on the path 
compression of mortality.  This has suggested a new field of research which 
interprets epidemiological studies of health inequalities through the lens of 
demographic theories of mortality variance. 
 
Further, a new application of these mortality variance theories has been 
tested in this thesis.  If two subgroups within a subpopulation are at different 
stages on the path to compression of mortality, then their indicators of 
variation in lifespan, life expectancy and mortality rates will behave 
differently.  This theory has been used here to show that the trends in 
mortality within the New Zealand population, by two subgroups of ethnicity 
and gender, have been broadly as expected.  The implication offered is that 
extrapolation of population average mortality in this case is valid; it should not 
be disturbed by unexpected changes in subgroup mortality.  Confirmation of 
this conclusion and other applications of this analysis would be useful topics 
for future research. 
 
Original research on mortality past and prospects in New Zealand 
Demographic and actuarial literature is rich in the theory of mortality trends 
and mortality forecasting or projection techniques.  However, much of this is 
not obviously used in the projections of future mortality by official statistical 
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agencies or others involved in the demography of national populations.  For 
example, comparisons of mortality trends between countries is recommended 
as a source of insight when projecting future mortality of a nation, but detailed 
comparative analysis of past mortality tends to be carried out to prove a single 
theory rather than to draw conclusions for projecting forward.  Comparisons 
of the assumptions and outcomes of future mortality projections of like 
countries hardly exist. 
 
In this thesis, an original analytic framework was developed to fill these 
research gaps in the case of New Zealand.  The framework was developed to 
test the consistency and plausibility of New Zealand's mortality projections 
against those of select countries, starting with a comparison of New Zealand's 
past total population mortality trends to those of other countries.  A rich 
inventory of mortality data from the recent past of New Zealand and peer 
countries was therefore developed, as well as a first empirical comparison of 
the assumptions and results of mortality projections in the selected countries.  
This approach follows the philosophy of Hajnal (1955) to draw on analysis of 
past population data in order to project future demographic variables, and to 
do so with "more cogitation and less computation" than other approaches 
which favour data processing over thoughtful insight.  This thesis provides an 
innovative example of Hajnal's approach applied to mortality. 
 
This analysis has several features that are new to demographic or actuarial 
literature.  It selected only the British settler countries of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the UK and US for comparison because of the social and 
ancestral similarities of their populations.  It focused on mortality since 1961 as 
recent trends are not well examined in literature yet may be more important 
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than longer term trends as mortality compresses.  The analysis did not follow 
the usual practice on relying on period life expectancy as a measure of 
lifespans or trend indicator of mortality but supplemented its use with 
analysis of the level of mortality rates, rates of improvement in mortality rates 
and other central measures of age at death.  Actuarial techniques 
supplemented demographic analysis.  The study of past rates of improvement 
in age-specific mortality rates (defined here as "QXI"), which has developed as 
a key theme in actuarial literature, were developed further here.  Where 
available, mortality projections from the official actuarial agency were used for 
international comparison in preference to those from the demography-led 
statistical agency, because the more insightful cohort life expectancies are an 
actuarial-led measure.   
 
This work therefore contributes a detailed empirical evidence base of New 
Zealand's recent past, current and possible future mortality profile and that of 
its peers.  It is a mainly optimistic picture with New Zealand in the middle of 
this group of countries, with leading momentum in mortality improvement in 
the recent decade.  This work shows New Zealand has particularly good 
mortality at older ages, but relatively poor mortality at ages under 20.  Further 
research to correct this poor mortality is indicated.  This thesis is the first 
known analysis of QXI that confirms the existence of the golden cohort in all 
five countries in the range of birth years 1922-1936 for males, extending a 
further five years for females, and the presence of a putative golden cohort in 
birth years 1952-1976 for males starting ten years later for females in all the 
countries except the UK.  This finding is a particularly important contribution 
to the debate on the cause and implications of golden cohorts.  It supplements 
Murphy's (2010) investigation of the existence of golden cohorts but provides 
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an alternative conclusion: that cohort effects are as important than period 
effects, not less so.  Further, the cohort mortality patterns provide a reason to 
doubt the relative optimism of the UK's mortality projections and the relative 
pessimism of New Zealand's.  
 
Setting mortality projections in an international comparative context 
revealed the somewhat arbitrary choice of assumptions.  Each set of 
projections is based on extrapolation of past mortality data with some 
judgement necessary in the choice of parameters.  Extrapolation is 
acknowledged in theory and practice as essentially the only method available, 
and has strong support based on a rationale of hitherto smooth progression in 
population life expectancy.  However, this thesis provides support instead for 
the doubts beginning to be expressed about the validity of pure extrapolation 
for high life expectancy countries.  The relative positioning of future cohort life 
expectancies between Canada, the UK and New Zealand appears inconsistent 
with the rankings of recent mortality and improvement rates.  The robustness 
of the evidence for the assumptions used for projection by official agencies, the 
range of variant projections presented, and the implications for the results of 
the projections being interpreted as more definitive best estimates than they 
are intended to be are all questionable.  While problems with the robustness of 
projections are not unknown in the general case, this thesis develops a 
substantial evidence base to assess the mortality assumptions underlying the 
official projections of New Zealand.  The central finding that the Low 
Mortality variant is more plausible than the Medium Mortality variant most 
commonly used is supported by detailed evidence and analysis and is the only 
known testing of any of the Statistics New Zealand projection variants. 
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Extends existing body of research on subjective lifespan expectations 
Studies based on surveys asking for individuals' expectations for their own 
longevity are found in a variety of literature, having been carried out for a 
range of purposes.  For this thesis, the first study of an adult population's 
expected age at death in a retirement planning context representative of a full 
adult population was made.  It is also the first study to probe reasons for 
responses made and the first study in New Zealand on the subject. 
 
The findings of this survey helped to confirm the findings of previous 
studies that "subjective lifespan" (SLS) is generally an underestimate of likely 
lifespan.  By a technically more advanced analysis of results than most other 
large studies, the distribution of the size of underestimation relative to 
established mortality scenarios strengthens the theory (hypothesised in earlier 
studies) that respondents fail to anticipate future improvement in mortality.  
The profile of underestimation was able to be explored by a large number of 
variables, but amongst mortality risk factors only age and gender emerged as 
salient predictors of lifespan underestimation.  This suggests a systematic 
pattern of underestimation in populations - a notion unexplored in previous 
studies which have focused on associations between demographic factors and 
level of SLS imputing a rational logic to the choice of SLS.  The results of this 
New Zealand study refute the notion that there can be a single model of SLS 
rational choice.  No one model proposed to describe how individuals choose 
SLS fits the data in this study.  Further, reasons for choosing SLS, which were 
ignored in previous studies, were identified as significant predictors for high 
or low SLS despite suggesting a lack of knowledge in respondents' minds on 
what likely lifespans might be.  This leads directly to the theory that retirement 
planning is done without knowledge of likely length of retirement, and is 
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subject to a population bias of underestimation because it relies on internalised 
contemporary evidence of ages at death.  Further evidence was identified for 
the previously hypothesised failure to anticipate mortality improvement as 
around one-third of respondents cited their parents or grandparents' ages at 
death as the main reason for choosing age at death.  
 
Accumulates theory and empirical findings on longevity risk 
While existing literature acknowledges problems with extrapolative 
projections and even suggests solutions, there has been no empirical analysis 
of consequent longevity risk.  This thesis filled this research gap using the case 
of New Zealand's superannuation policy and individual retirement planning.   
 
To calculate the size of longevity risk requires the comparison of likely 
future lifespans and estimates of lifespans used in policy and individual 
retirement planning.  This analysis of longevity risk required both a theoretical 
approach to determine what future lifespans are plausible and original 
empirical findings on subjective longevity expectations, with the identification 
of lifespan assumptions used in policy being a lesser task.  The calculation of 
longevity risk in individual pre-retirement settings implicitly followed the 
widely used lifecycle savings hypothesis which underpins New Zealand's 
leading retirement planning tool.  The calculation of longevity risk in the 
policy setting used existing calculations.  Thus the contribution of this thesis in 
this area is not in the development of new tools to make calculations, but 
rather in the innovative approach that accumulated theory and evidence in 
order to explore longevity risk in practical circumstances, consistent with the 
Hajnal model. 
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Furthermore, this thesis has developed theories and evidence on the cause 
of longevity risk.  The larger part of underestimation of potential lifespans 
occurs when period measures of life expectancy are used but cohort measures 
are more relevant.  Drawing on an illustration of potential assumed ages at 
death in an individual's retirement plan, half of the underestimation of age at 
death was shown to derive from misusing period life expectancy at birth 
instead of at retirement age and most of the remaining half from using period 
rather than cohort life expectancy measure.  A smaller part of underestimation 
was indicated from using a conservative assumption for future mortality 
rather than a more plausible one.  This new finding is important as it focuses 
the mitigation of longevity risk onto a structural issue - the use of lifespan 
indicators - rather than onto a partly subjective issue of which projection of 
future mortality is likely to be most plausible.  In turn this strengthens the 
theory that using time- and context-specific indicators of lifespan in public 
discourse on superannuation policy would be an important remedy for 
longevity risk in both domains of policy and individual retirement planning. 
 
Longevity risk has been found to be a potentially lesser risk in individual 
retirement planning than the risk of assuming too early a retirement age.  The 
quantum of financial difficulty caused by 'retiring too soon' could be greater 
than that caused by 'living too long'.  But the influence on intended retirement 
age identified from eligibility age of superannuation again strengthens the 
theory that the two domains considered here are inextricably linked, and that 
the signals sent by policy can cause or mitigate longevity risk for individuals. 
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This research has provided the first confirmation that New Zealand is 
likely to be underestimating individual and population future longevity.  The 
age of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation is shown as a remedy for 
this longevity risk: as an indicator for retirement age and as a tool to 
communicate future lifespans and the consequences of mortality 
improvement.  These results were not reached by questioning whether the age 
of eligibility should be raised or not, but they do contribute a robust argument 
for why an important policy decision should be publicly debated with correct 
evidence on potential individual lifespans. 
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